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Executive Summary  
Short Summary  
The motivation behind this Doctoral Thesis emerges from the need to analyse three objectives that are 
believed to have eminent policy implications on the acceleration of MENA Region’s Trade flows and 
investment climate. i) to consider how higher intra-regional trade flows among MENA countries could 
be attained; once we control for the governance regimes and trade barriers in the region. ii) to shed light 
on the extent to which the Agadir Association agreement has fostered inter-regional sectoral trade flows 
between the Agadir countries and E.U.  As well to detect the variation in the composition and structure 
of final versus intermediate sector specific export flows for Agadir countries, since the adoption of Pan-
Euro Diagonal Rules of Origin. iii) to analyse how the expected fragility of MENA countries’ institutions 
affected FDI climate after the 2011 incidents through an original qualitative dataset on FDIs in Egypt. 
The methodological approach addressing the first objective was developed by using a Bilateral Trade 
Gravity Model to measure MENA’s merchandise intra-regional trade flows. The dataset covered a 
timeframe of 25 years up till 2010 and used unbalanced panel data to account for episodes of significant 
political incidents in the region. Data on GDP is derived from World Bank Development Indicators 
(2010) and data on distance, contiguity, colonial and language affinities is extracted from CEPII’s 
Gravity Dataset 2014 (TRADHIST). A set of intra-regional dummies are included to account for the 
Region’s sub-regional free trade initiatives. More importantly, the model’s explanatory power was 
augmented by adding Polity IV and Trade Freeness indices converted into dummies.  
Regarding the first objective related to the estimation of MENA’s intra-regional trade flows, it was 
captured through the Polity IV dummy, which was decomposed further into: Polity _demo1 for country 
pairs of democratic institutions, Polity_mixed2 for countries pairs of mixed regimes and Polity_autoc3 
for country pairs of autocratic institutions and as well Trade Freeness dummy. We can detect that the 
transformation of MENA countries’ governance and regimes from autocratic to democratic regimes will 
lead to higher trade intensities between the region’s trading partners. Never the less, we are not able to 
confirm that MENA’s intra-regional trade flows are necessarily higher, when both trading partners in 
the Region are democratic countries. As for trade freeness dummy, it exhibited highly significant results 
to increase MENA’s intra-regional trade across all estimations. (Duc and  Lavallée and  Siroën, 2008; 
Bhattacharya  and Worlde, 2009; Lutmar, 2011; Bacchetta et al., 2012) 
                                                          
1 Poltiy_Demo: dummy for democratic countries at threshold above 5 points on the Polity IV index score 
 
2 Polity Mixed: dummy for countries with mixed combined regimes of both democracies and autocracies and 
their threshold on polity IV is between [-5,5] 
 
3  Polity_autoc: dummy for countries that are declared as having complete autocratic regimes and their 
threshold on the index is less than -5 
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As previously mentioned the second objective considers to what extent the Agadir Association 
agreement signed between (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and E.U.)  fostered sector specific flows 
between its 4 countries and the E.U., when Pan-Euro Diagonal Rules of Origin are adopted. We also 
seek to exhibit the impact of Pan-Euro RoO on changing the spatial structure and re-directing the 
intensity of trade flows, particularly towards higher intermediates and component parts to flow through 
Agadir_4, where products will be processed and re-exported to E.U. countries directly (Augier and 
Gasiorek and Lai Tong, 2007).   
 To the best interest of addressing this objective, a two-fold methodological approach was used to 
estimate inter-regional sectoral flows between Agadir countries and E.U. First step started by conducting 
a ‘Hierarchal Cluster Analysis’ based on Porter’s (2010) and Montalbano and Nenci (2010) to identify 
the relevant sector specific flows, that could be subject to treatment with Pan-Euro Rules of Origin. Then 
sector specific flows for the 3 clusters will be later introduced into a bilateral trade gravity model in 
consistency with the estimation methodologies previously motivated by (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004; 
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008). The gravity model data was based on 
the CEPII Gravity dataset 2010 and (TRADPROD) with ISIC classifications, re-calibrated to fit RoO 
sector specific flows. Next step we combined both the bilateral gravity equation and variables to control 
for treatment by regime wide diagonal Pan-Euro RoO on sectoral flows performed by means of the ‘The 
Double Differences Approach’ (DID). This approach is used for modelling the impact of trade policies 
on sector specific flows elaborated by Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004), Gretton and Gali (2005), 
Augier et al. (2007) and Gasiorek (2008) for other World RoO regimes. In the context of Agadir 
agreement, two treatment groups I and II composed of 50 and 30 Pan-Euro diagonal RoO applicant 
countries respectively were constructed. Equivalently, two control groups I and II comparable in all 
aspects except for treatment with Pan-Euro RoO were also created. 
This third objective of the Doctoral Thesis analyzes the expected fragility of MENA countries’ 
institutions and its impact on FDI climate after the 2011 incidents.  We address this objective through 
qualitative research methodologies, which aim to assess the case of FDI climate in Egypt and the 
behavior of foreign investors after the 2011incidents. We present an original dataset on FDIs in Egypt 
after 2011 incidents. The data was collected through qualitative questionnaires, which targeted 92 
medium-sized foreign and Egyptian multinationals. Moreover, the questionnaires are complemented by 
12 In-depth interviews to obtain specific information regarding institutional challenges facing investors 
on a sector specific level (Ziacik, 2000; Bastos and Nasir, 2004; Tridico, 2006; Klaus et al, 2009; Hotho 
and Pederson, 2012; Garridoet al., 2013; Hanafy, 2015). 
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First step all questionnaire data are coded and prepared for econometric analysis and we conduct the 
‘Principal Component Analysis’4 (PCA) to mitigate the dimensionality problem and reduce the number 
of variables to be added in the estimation. The PCA resulted in three groups of components introduced 
into the logistic regression employed to determine which set of components are the most crucial ones to 
Egypt’s investment climate. In addition, we detect a common thread of results between interviewees of 
the 12 in-depth interviews and questionnaire respondents on the factors that are indispensable to 
investors. 
Detailed Description of Each Chapter:  
The Doctoral thesis is structured into 5 main chapters including the introduction and conclusion 
accordingly:  
Chapter 1: Introduction:  
This chapter introduces the region to the reader by giving the general overview and characteristics about 
MENA region. It addresses the gap between MENA’s actual and potential intra-regional and inter-
regional trade flow. It presents some facts about MENA’s regional trade flow intensity, episodes of 
political and economic instabilities in MENA, Presence of non-tariff, technical and procedural barriers 
to trade, conflicting regulations and procedures between trade agreements in the Region, trade in 
manufactured and value-added content for the Region’s countries and finally it provides a brief overview 
about FDI Climate for MENA countries in transition. The rest of the chapter more importantly lays the 
foundation for the standard Gravity Equation, which will be the framework on which all the econometric 
analysis in the rest of chapters will be based. 
Chapter 2: Would Intra-Regional Trade between MENA Countries Increase, when they are 
more Democratic and less Bureaucratic? 
This chapter considers aggregate intra- regional trade flows between MENA countries, once we control 
for governance, regimes changes and trade freeness variables and their impact on trade institutions. The 
employed ‘Bilateral Trade Gravity Model ̓ measures MENA’s aggregate intra-regional trade flows. The 
model’s power was augmented by capturing the nexus between MENA’s governing and trade institution 
through adding Polity_IV and trade freeness indices (decomposed into Polity_demo5, Polity_mixed6 and 
                                                          
4 Principal Component Analysis: It is a methodology to identify the patterns of data and express data to 
highlight similarities and differences  
5 Poltiy_Demo: dummy for democratic countries at threshold above 5 points on the Polity IV index score 
 
6 Polity Mixed : dummy for countries with mixed combined regimes of both democracies and autocracies and 
their threshold on polity IV is between [-5,5] 
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Polity_autoc7) dummies, in addition to 4 dummies acting as proxies to the four sub-regional trade 
initiatives in MENA, known as: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) , 
Agadir agreement countries  (Agadir_4) and Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) .  
Testing the four underlying scenarios by adding the respective dummies had shown the transformation 
of MENA countries from autocratic to democratic regimes, will reduce trade costs and increase intensify 
of trade flows between intra-regional trading partners in MENA. Nevertheless, similarity between 
governance of both trading partners; given that both trading partners in MENA are democratic, does not 
necessarily guarantee the presence of higher intra-regional trade intensity between both democratic 
partners. The significance of the results extracted were in consistency with the significance of Polity IV 
and Trade freeness dummies detected by the literature for Duc and Lavallée and Siroën (2008); 
Bhattacharya and Wolde (2009); Lutmar (2011); Bacchetta et al. (2012). for other regions. Additional 
results driven from this chapter asserted that capturing the nexus between Polity_IV and Trade Freeness 
dummy variables together, led to 104 percent increase in Intra_MENA trade flows. Finally, PAFTA and 
Agadir dummies contribute a high portion of their flows to MENA’s intra-regional merchandise trade 
and at same time they represent countries of mixed regimes and are not all democratic.   
Chapter 3: What Happens to Trade Flow when Rules of Origin are relaxed? An empirical 
analysis using sector specific flows between Agadir_4 and the E.U 
In this chapter, we examined the extent to which the Agadir Association agreement has fostered inter 
regional trade between Agadir_4 countries and E.U. by means of the gravity equation, we control for 
the evolution of Agadir agreement’s sector specific flows to (RoW) and by looking at the remarkable 
variation in the spatial/sectoral structure of trade since the inception of the agreement. As a key 
contribution of this chapter, we consider how the adoption of Pan-Euro Diagonal Rules of origin (RoO) 
between Agadir_4 and E.U. reduced the percentage of domestic value content threshold, in favor of 
cumulating regional value content in the sectors and products from outside the agreement’s preferential 
area at a lower cost. This result is in line with what was suggested by Augier and Gasoriek and Lai Tong, 
2007. The results of treatment were shown to intensify exports of some sectors of intermediate 
components to flow through Agadir_4 to be considered the hub where those components are 
accumulated and re-exported to E.U. countries.  
The two phases of methodological approach started by conducting a Cluster Analysis to identify relevant 
sector specific flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. Then the 3 cluster groups resulting from the analysis 
were introduced into the ‘Gravity Equation’ estimated by ‘Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
                                                          
7 Polity_autoc: dummy for countries that are declared as having complete autocratic regimes and their threshold 
on the index is less than -5 
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Estimator’8 (PPML). In the second phase, export flows were exposed to treatment with Pan-Euro RoO 
through ‘Double Differences’ approach9(Anderson and Wincoop, 2004; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 
2004; Gretton and Gali, 2005; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Augier et al., 2007; Chaney, 2008; Helpman 
et al., 2008; Gasiorek 2008).The analysis resulted in three main clusters of sector specific export flows 
between Agadir_4 and E.U. with cluster 1 for Petrochemical related sectors, cluster 2 consumer non-
durable goods and finally cluster 3 for components and spare parts of machinery. 
Further results asserted that diagonal RoO treatment contributed to enhancing Agadir’s_4 exports and 
intermediate flows to the E.U. on average by a factor of 2.7 and 1.3 respectively. It also contributed to 
changing Agadir_4 sector specific trade structure and composition to the E.U._26 countries. The Pan-
Euro diagonal RoO cumulation system granted more permissiveness to its members to obtain their inputs 
at highly competitive prices from world trading partners outside their agreement with E.U. Results as 
well had shown that intermediate flows for some sectors between Agadir_4 and E.U. have out grown by 
48 times, after Pan-Euro diagonal RoO were adopted; which was the case of Rubber Products.  
 
Chapter 4: Will the Quality of Institutions Determine Egypt’s Investment Climate? A Qualitative 
Survey and In-depth Interviews on the case of FDI in Egypt 
 
The chapter seeks to distinguish between the behaviour of foreign and Egyptian investors after the 2011 
upheavals in Egypt (Onyeiwu,2003; Méon and Sekkat, 2004; Chan and Gemayel, 2004; Kamaly, 2007). 
Did many foreign investors leave directly after the revolts or they held their investments; in light of the 
deeply-rooted fragility of institutions which became evident after the 2011 incidents (UNDP, 2014; 
OECD, 2015; GAFI, 2015; IMF Survey,2015). One of the original datasets on FDIs in Egypt after 2011 
revolts was gathered through 92 qualitative questionnaires and 12 In-depth interviews targeting medium-
sized investors. The Questionnaire was designed to include three parts. The first part incorporated data 
demographics about FDIs, meanwhile, second and third parts introduced questions to consider the 
quality of economic and political institutions and how they determined FDI climate in Egypt. After the 
gathering, coding and preparing of questionnaire data, a ‘Principal Component Analysis’ (PCA) was 
conducted to reduce the dimension of variables used in the Logistic regression. 
Results of PCA and logistic regression confirm together that a one standard deviation increase in the 
categories of variables affecting protection of investors’ property rights, doing business enablers and 
                                                          
8 Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator: It is the procedure of finding the value of one or more parameters for 
a given statistic which makes the known likelihood distribution a maximum.  
 
9 Double Differences Approach: typically known as a quasi-experimental design used to estimate the effect of a 
specific intervention or treatment of an enactment of policy or large-scale program by comparing changes over 
time between a population that is enrolled in the program (treatment group) and population that is not (control 
group)  
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quality of macroeconomic institutions; led to 74 percent variability in Egypt’s investment climate at high 
degrees of significance. More analytical results pointed out that 73 percent of variability in behavior 
(taking the decision to stay or divest out) between foreign and local top ranked managers and CEOs’ of 
FDIs, depended on the amount and timing of legal and fiscal procedures that investors needed to fulfil, 
timeframe for them to register their investments and declare their taxes status. As well the 12 In-depth 
interviews supported the econometric results driven from the 92 questionnaires and revealed a ‘Wait and 
Hold’ stance by most of the foreign investors, with respect to their intentions to expand investments in 
the near future.  
 
The rationale behind why foreign investors should remain in Egypt during the transition was mainly 
conditional on three specific factors: first the provision of higher investors protection and property rights, 
in addition to rigorous and quicker settlement of investors disputes. Second the implementation of 
macroeconomic reforms to enable investors to conduct their day to day business transactions, eliminate 
capital control and restrictions on Foreign exchange and revenues transfer abroad. Third, granting 
investors a bundle of financial, public utilities and tax related incentives.  
 
Chapter 5: Final Remarks on policy implications for MENA region and future research agenda 
This final chapter summarizes the main results, policy implications, findings, in addition to expressing 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of this Doctoral Thesis. It also presents the limitations and 
future research agenda for many topics that emerged throughout the discussion of this thesis.  This could 
include: i) Detecting the impact of governance and similarity between MENA countries regimes and 
their trading partners from (RoW) on trade flows intensities between MENA and those partners. 
ii)Investigating the neighbourhood effect between MENA countries and how it affects the Region’s trade 
intensity, in the context of the on-going political tensions and conflicts the region was exposed to. iii) 
An in-depth analysis of product specific and regime wide RoO for MENA countries and their impact on 
the region’s sector specific imports. IV) The analysis of intra-regional FDI flows of multinational firms 
between MENA countries, which will determine the future of trade intensity flows between 
countries.VI) Services sector in MENA countries and their impact on increasing the region’s trade 
intensity.  
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Resumen  
La motivación de la presente tesis Doctoral  surge de la necesidad de analizar tres objetivos que tienen 
mucha importancia y son eminentes para mejorar la intensidad de comercio y el clima de inversión en la 
región y además, los objetivos llevan a cabo implicaciones políticas para el bienestar del comercio de la 
región de MENA : I) considerar el crecimiento de comercio intra-regional entre los países de MENA, 
dado que podamos controlar para la gobernación y régimen y barreras de comercio en la región. II) Ver 
a qué grado el Tratado Asociativo entre los países de Agadir y la Unión Europea (UE( podría fomentar 
el comercio inter-regional de los mismos países de MENA (Egipto, Jordania, Marruecos y Túnez) y entre 
los países de la UE. También relacionado al mismo segundo objetivo, detectar la variación de la estructura 
y componentes de los flujos finales e intermedios de exportaciones de países de Agadir, especialmente 
cuando introducimos la adopción de las Reglas de Origen Diagonal ‘Pan Euro’. III) Analizar cómo 
afectaba la fragilidad de las instituciones al clima de inversión directa extranjera (IED) después de los 
incidentes de 2011 a través de una base de datos original y cualitativo sobre (IED) por Egipto. 
El enfoque metodológico que aborda el primer objetivo se desarrolló al utilizar un modelo de gravedad 
capaz de explicar la intensidad de flujos comerciales de mercancías entre los países de la región MENA. 
El conjunto de datos cubrió un plazo de 25 años desde 1985 hasta 2010; y utilizó datos de panel 
desequilibrados para explicar episodios de incidentes políticos significativos y para reflejar las 
irregularidades de la región MENA. Los datos sobre el PIB de países de origen y destinación provienen 
de los Indicadores de Desarrollo del Banco Mundial (2010) y los datos sobre distancia, contigüidad, 
colonias e idioma se derivan de la Base de Datos TRADHIST del CEPII. A partir de dicha información, 
se elaboraron varios modelos gravitatorios con el objetivo de medir el efecto que distintas iniciativas 
subregionales de libre comercio acabaron teniendo en el comercio de mercancías manufacturadas dentro 
de la Región. Más importante aún, el poder explicativo del modelo fue aumentado al incorporar índices 
Polity IV y Trade Freeness convertidos en dummies. 
 
En cuanto al primer objetivo relacionado con la estimación de los flujos comerciales intra-regionales de 
MENA, se contabilizó con la variable de Polity IV que se descompone en (Polity_demo10, Polity_mixed11 
                                                          
10Poltiy_Demo: dummy para países democráticos con un umbral superior a 5 puntos en el puntaje del índice Polity IV 
11PolityMixed: dummy para países con regímenes combinados mixtos tanto de democracias como de autocracias y su 
umbral en la política IV está entre [-5,5] 
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y Polity_autoc12) y otra variable dummy del Trade_Freeness. Ambos modelos darán cuenta de que la 
transformación de los regímenes y sistemas gobernantes de los países de MENA de set autocráticas a 
democráticas, conducirán a subir la intensidad de flujos comerciales entre dichos países. Al mismo tiempo 
no podremos confirmar que la subida de los flujos comerciales entre los países de la región MENA, ocurra 
cuando haya una semejanza de regímenes democráticas entre estos países. Finalmente, los coeficientes 
de variable de libre comercio, ha mostrado resultados significativos para todas las categorías de la variable 
y ha incrementado el comercio intra-regional de los países de MENA a través de todas las estimaciones 
(Duc y Lavallée y Siroën, 2008; Bhattacharya y Worlde, 2009; Lutmar, 2011; Bacchetta et al., 2012). 
 
El segundo objetivo se refiere al Acuerdo Asociativo de Agadir firmado entre (Egipto, Jordania, 
Marruecos y Túnez) conocido como Agadir_4. El objetivo enfoca a mostrar el grado de fomento que 
provoca el Tratado de Agadir sobre los flujos comerciales sectoriales entre sus cuatro países y La UE, 
cuando introducimos las Pan-Euro Reglas de Origen. Otro motivo es comprobar si el impacto de Pan-
Euro Reglas de Origen ha causado un cambio brutal en la estructura, y componentes de flujos comerciales 
entre Agadir_4 y la UE y ha re-orientado la intensidad de flujos comerciales en los sectores intermedios 
y comercio de componentes con un mayor valor añadido hacia los países de Agadir_4 , donde se procesan 
los productos y se re-exporta directamente a los países de UE (Augier and Gasoriek and LaiTong, 2007) 
. 
 
Al abordar el segundo objetivo, aplicamos una metodología de enfoque doble, que empieza en primer 
lugar con la realización de un ‘Análisis de Cluster Hierárquico’ basado en Porter (2010) and Montalbano 
and Nenci (2010) y que identifica los sectores de flujos relevantes, que podrían ser tratados en el segundo 
paso metodológico con Pan-Euro Reglas de Origen (RoO) diagonales. Antes de todo, los flujos de los 
tres clusters derivados del análisis estarán introducida por Modelo de gravedad con estimaciones basadas 
por el Estimador ‘Pseudo Poission Maximum Likelihood Estimator’ (PPML). Al mismo tiempo la 
metodología muestra consistencia con las estimaciones previamente adaptadas (Anderson y Wincoop, 
2004, y Silva y Tenreyo, 2006; Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008). Los datos del modelo de gravedad 
están extraídos del conjunto de datos CEPII Gravity 2010 y (TRADPROD), con la Clasificación 
Industrial Internacional (ISIC) ajustada para realizar la calibración entre los flujos de sectores de 
exportaciones finales e intermedios y la adopción de RoO diagonales. En segundo lugar, combinamos los 
dos: el modelo de gravedad bilateral para calcular los flujos sectoriales entre Agadir_4 e la UE y los 
variables que capturan el tratamiento con RoO diagonales y que estarían estimados a través de los 
métodos de ‘Diferencias en Diferencias’ (DID). Este enfoque se utiliza para modelar el impacto de las 
                                                          
12Polity_autoc: dummy para los países que se declaran tener regímenes autocráticos completos y su umbral en el índice 
es menor que -5 
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políticas comerciales sobre los flujos sectoriales y se valida por Estevadeordal y Suminen (2004) y 
Gretton y Gali (2005) y Augier et al. (2007) y Gasiorek (2008) para estimar los regímenes mundiales de 
RoO. En el contexto del acuerdo de Agadir, construimos dos grupos de tratamiento I y II compuestos de 
50 y 30 países candidatos de la RoO diagonales respectivamente y, de forma equivalente, dos otros grupos 
de control I y II comparables en todos los aspectos excepto el tratamiento con RoO diagonal.  
 
El último objetivo de la tesis consiste en analizar cómo el deterioro de las instituciones políticas, 
económicas y comerciales de los países de MENA después de las revueltas de 2011, han tenido 
repercusiones negativas en el clima de inversión de la región, tal y como prevén algunos autores 
(Onyeiwu, 2003, Méon y Sekkat, 2004, Chan y Gemayel, 2004, Kamaly, 2007). Para acometer este tercer 
objetivo se adopta un enfoque metodológico totalmente diferente, al utilizar técnicas de investigación 
cualitativa centradas en el análisis del clima de la Inversión Extranjera Directa (IED) en Egipto después 
de la transición de 2011. 
 
Como punto de partida de este análisis original, en este capítulo de la tesis se recogen los principales 
resultados obtenidos tras la recopilación de una base de datos novedosa sobre las inversiones extranjeras 
directas realizadas en Egipto después de la turbulencia de 2011. Los datos fueron recogidos a través de 
cuestionarios que fueron dirigidos a 92 multinacionales extranjeras y egipcias de tamaño medio, todas 
ellas con presencia en Egipto. Los cuestionarios fueron diseñados para incluir los datos demográficos de 
los inversores directos extranjeros y los factores institucionales que afectan al clima de la IED en Egipto. 
Los cuestionarios se complementaron con 12 entrevistas en profundidad realizadas para obtener 
información sobre los desafíos institucionales que enfrentan los inversores en sectores específicos. 
Nuestra metodología cualitativa para averiguar el efecto de las variables institucionales sobre el estado 
de IED fue motivado por los siguientes autores (Ziacik, 2000, Bastos y Nasir, 2004; Tridico, 2006; Klaus 
y otros, 2009; Hotho y Pederson, 2012; Garridoet Al., 2013; Hanafy, 2015). 
 
Todos los datos del cuestionario fueron codificados y preparados para el análisis econométrico. A través 
de un ‘Análisis de Componentes Principales’ (PCA), se pudo solventar los problemas de dimensionalidad 
y reducir el número de variables que se añadirán a la estimación. A través del PCA se obtuvieron tres 
grupos de componentes, que serían posteriormente analizados, mediante una regresión logística, con el 
objeto de determinar los factores que mejor definen el clima de la inversión en Egipto. Adicionalmente, 
se aporta un análisis complementario basado en los factores comunes identificados entre los 92 
cuestionares y la información detallada de las 12 entrevistas en profundidad realizadas con personalidades 
y expertos, lo que ha permitido detectar los factores más importantes que influyen en el clima de inversión 
en Egipto a un nivel sectorial. 
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Descripción detallada de cada capítulo: 
 
La tesis doctoral se estructura en 5 capítulos principales, incluyendo la introducción y conclusión en 
consecuencia: 
 
Capítulo 1: Introducción 
 
Este capítulo tiene por objeto ofrecer al lector una visión general de los factores que caracterizan a la 
región MENA, con la intención de identificar los factores que explican los flujos comerciales actuales y 
potenciales que mantienen los países de la región MENA entre sí, y con otras regiones relevantes del 
mundo. El capítulo pasa luego a presentar datos sobre: I) la intensidad de los flujos comerciales entre 
países de la región MENA. II) los episodios e incidencias de inestabilidades políticas y económicas que 
ha sufrido la región. III) la presencia de barreras no arancelarias y técnicas y procedimientos que llegan 
a disminuir los flujos comerciales entre países de MENA debido a los arreglamientos conflictivos entre 
los tratados distintos en la región. IV) Los flujos comerciales de complejidad y valor añadido alto en la 
región. V) una breve reseña sobre el clima de IED en los países de MENA. El resto de este capítulo da 
más enfoque sobre el modelo clásico de gravedad que sería el marco de referencia de casi todas las 
estimaciones econométricas en los otros capítulos. 
 
Capítulo 2: ¿Aumentaría el comercio intra-regional entre los países MENA cuando sus países sean 
más democráticos y menos burocráticos?   
 
En este capítulo se consideran una intensidad de los flujos comerciales entre los países de la región 
MENA, una vez que controlemos por las variables de los sistemas gobernantes en el país, cambio de 
régimen y finalmente categorías de la variable de (Trade Freeness) y sus impactos sobre instituciones 
comerciales en dicha región. El modelo de gravedad bilateral estimaría los flujos bilaterales de bienes 
manufacturados entre países de la región MENA.  Además, el poder del modelo de gravedad incluyó 
variables capturando el nexo entre los sistemas gobernantes en los países de MENA e instituciones 
comerciales a través de añadir Polity IV y Trade Freeness ambos índices como variables en el modelo. 
Las dos variables están descompuestas entre tres categorías. Polity IV (Polity_demo y Polity_mixed y 
Polity_Autoc) mientras que Trade Freeness por (Trade_free y Trade_mfree, Trade_unfree). Además otra 
estimación de robustez estará introducida por los sub-grupos regionales entre la región MENA, que 
pueden por separado provocar la intensidad de comercio entre los países de MENA y son los siguientes:  
Países del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG), La unión de Magreb árabe (UMA), El tratado 
Asociativo de Agadir (Agadir_4) y finalmente el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Árabe (PAFTA). 
 
Al Comprobar con todas las variables anteriores mediante el desarrollo de cuatro escenarios subyacentes 
y añadir las variables dummies correspondientes en cada estimación, se muestra que la transformación 
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de los sistemas de países de MENA de regímenes autocráticas a regímenes democráticas, resultará en la 
bajada de costes de intercambio entre los países y al mismo tiempo una subida de intensidad de flujos 
comerciales entre los países de la región. Al mismo tiempo no podríamos confirmar que la subida de los 
flujos comerciales entre dichos países de la región MENA, ocurra cuando haya una semejanza de 
regímenes democráticas entre los países de MENA. La significatividad de los resultados extraídos estaba 
en consistencia con la significatividad de las variables de Polity IV y Trade Freeeness destacadas en la 
literatura para otras regiones a través de Duc y Lavallée y Siroën (2008); Bhattacharya y Worlde (2009); 
Lutmar (2011); Bacchetta et al. (2012). Otros resultados fundamentales en el capítulo indican el control, 
por el nexo entre, los variables de Polity IV y Trade Freenees llevará a un incremento de 104% en el 
comercio entre países de la región MENA. Al mismo nivel la robustez de las variables sub-regionales en 
MENA como el PAFTA y Agadir_4 han contribuido a un aumento considerable por el comercio intra-
regional de MENA, dado que los países en los dos sub-regiones son mixtos (Democráticas y autocráticas).    
 
Capítulo 3: ¿Qué sucede con los flujos comerciales cuando las Reglas de Origen son más flexibles? 
Exportación de flujos sectoriales específicos entre Agadir_4 y la UE. 
 
En este capítulo, vamos a mostrar el grado de fomento que provoca el tratado de Agadir sobre los flujos 
comerciales sectoriales entre sus cuatro países y La UE, cuando introducimos las Reglas de Origen Pan-
Euro. El otro motivo es comprobar si el impacto de dichas Reglas de Origen ha causado un cambio brutal 
en la estructura y componentes de flujos comerciales entre Agadir_4 y la UE y que ha reorientado la 
intensidad de flujos comerciales en los sectores intermedios y comercio de componentes con un mayor 
valor añadido hacia los países de Agadir_4, donde se procesan los productos y se reexportan directamente 
a los países de U.E. Asimismo, es esencial considerar cómo la adopción de la RoO diagonal Pan_Euro 
entre Agadir_4 y UE y cómo atribuirá a reducir el porcentaje de umbral del valor añadido domestico de 
los sectores por la cuenta de aumentar el valor añadido regional que está atraído por productos y sectores 
de fuera de la zona preferencial que aplica las RoO diagonal. Este resultado es consistente con la 
motivación de la literatura que surgió de la parte de Augier and Gasoriek and Lai-Tong (2007). Los 
resultados de tratamiento han mostrado el cambio y re-orientación de la intensidad de los flujos al pasar 
por los países de Agadir como un eje donde muchos de las manufacturas de componentes y bienes 
intermedios se acumulan y son re-exportados de ahí al (RoW) en lugar de ir solamente a los países de 
UE. 
 
Las dos fases del enfoque metodológico comenzaron por realizar el Análisis de Clúster para identificar 
los flujos relevantes de los sectores específicos entre Agadir_4 e UE. Después, los tres clusters de sectores 
que resultan del análisis fueron introducidos al modelo de gravedad estimado por el estimador de PPML. 
La segunda fase, los flujos sectoriales de exportaciones de flujos relevantes, estuvieron sujetos al 
tratamiento con Reglas de Origen (RoO) diagonal Pan-Euro adaptado por el método de ‘Differencias en 
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Differencias’. (Anderson y Wincoop, 2004; Estevadeordal y Suminen, 2004; Gretton y Gali, 2005; Silva 
y Tenreyo, 2006; Augier et al., 2007; Chaney, 2008; Helpman y otros, 2008; Gasiorek, 2008).  El análisis 
de Clúster resultó en tres grupos de Clúster compuestos de los flujos sectoriales entre Agadir_4 y la UE.: 
Clúster 1 dedicado a los sectores de los Petroquímicos, Clúster 2 consistía de bienes de consumo no 
duraderos. Finalmente, el grupo 3 para los componentes y piezas de recambio de las maquinarias.  
 
Otros resultados afirmaron que el tratamiento con RoO diagonal contribuyó a mejorar las exportaciones 
finales e intermedias entre Agadir_4 y la UE en promedio por un factor de 2.7 y 1.3 respectivamente. 
También RoO diagonal contribuyeron a cambiar la estructura y composición comerciales de los flujos 
sectoriales de Agadir 4 de los países de la UE. El sistema de acumulación de RoO diagonal permitía a 
sus miembros traer insumos para las exportaciones de los países fuera de la zona colectiva que adoptan 
RoO a precios muy competitivos. Los resultados han mostrado que así sube el valor añadido de las 
exportaciones de Agadir_4 a los países de la UE, además, desarrolla el comercio de bienes intermedios 
por los sectores entre Agadir_4 e la UE como ejemplo,  el crecimiento 48 veces de los productos de goma 
después de la adopción de las RoO diagonal.   
 
Capítulo 4: ¿Determinará la calidad de las instituciones el clima de inversión en Egipto? Una 
encuesta cualitativa y entrevistas en profundidad sobre el caso de la IED en Egipto. 
 
El presente capítulo trata de distinguir entre el comportamiento de los inversionistas extranjeros y 
egipcios después de las turbulencias de 2011 en Egipto (Onyeiwu, 2003; Méon y Sekkat, 2004; Chan y 
Gemayel, 2004; Kamaly, 2007). ¿Muchos inversionistas extranjeros salieron directamente después de las 
revueltas o mantuvieron sus inversiones?, dado la profunda fragilidad de las instituciones que se hizo 
evidente después de los incidentes de 2011 (PNUD, 2014; OCDE, 2015; GAFI, 2015; encuesta del FMI, 
2015).  En este capítulo de la tesis se recoge los principales resultados obtenidos tras la recopilación de 
una base de datos original sobre las inversiones extranjeras directas realizadas en Egipto después de la 
turbulencia de 2011. Los datos fueron recogidos a través de cuestionarios que fueron dirigidos a 92 
multinacionales extranjeras e egipcias de tamaño medio, todas ellas con presencia en Egipto. Los 
cuestionarios se complementaron con 12 entrevistas en profundidad realizadas para obtener información 
sobre los desafíos institucionales que enfrentan los inversores en sectores específicos. El cuestionario fue 
diseñado en tres partes. La primera parte del cuestionario incorporó datos demográficos sobre las IED, 
mientras que la segunda y tercera partes introdujeron preguntas sobre la calidad de las instituciones 
políticas y económicas modelada luego por variables ordenados en una forma de matrices para estimar la 
calidad de las instituciones y cómo determinaron el clima de la IED en Egipto. Después de la preparación 
y codificación de los cuestionarios, se realizó un ‘Análisis de Componentes Principales’(ACP) para 
reducir la dimensión de las variables utilizadas en la regresión Logística con variables categóricas y 
ordinales. 
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Los siguientes resultados confirmaron que un aumento de la desviación estándar en las categorías de 
variables que afectan a la protección de los derechos de los inversores e incentivos a los facilitadores de 
los negocios y la calidad de las instituciones macroeconómicas llevó a una variabilidad del 70 por ciento 
en el clima de inversión de Egipto con alta significatividad. Más resultados analíticos señalaron que el 73 
por ciento de la variabilidad en el comportamiento (tomar la decisión de quedarse o desprenderse) entre 
los directores y ejecutivos (extranjeros y locales) de las IED, dependían de los procedimientos legales y 
fiscales que los inversores necesitaban cumplir en un corto plazo para que registren sus inversiones y 
declaren su estancia fiscal.  Además, las 12 entrevistas en profundidad dirigidas a las IED respaldaron los 
resultados econométricos de los 92 cuestionarios y revelaron tomar una estancia "esperar y vigilar" por 
parte de la mayoría de los inversores extranjeros sobre sus intenciones de ampliar sus inversiones en 
Egipto a medio plazo. 
 
La justificación de por qué los inversores extranjeros deben permanecer en Egipto durante la transición 
estaba principalmente condicionada por tres factores específicos: en primer lugar, la oferta de mayores 
derechos de protección de los inversores, además de una solución rigurosa y más rápida de las 
controversias entre inversores y el país donde invierten. En segundo lugar, las reformas macroeconómicas 
para controlar y permitir a los inversores que lleven a cabo sus transacciones comerciales diarias, como, 
eliminar el control de capital y las restricciones sobre las monedas extranjeras y la transferencia de 
ingresos de inversores al extranjero. En tercer lugar, otorgar a los inversores un paquete de servicios 
financieros, servicios públicos e incentivos fiscales. 
 
Capítulo 5: Observaciones finales sobre las repercusiones de las políticas para la región MENA y 
la futura agenda de investigación 
 
Este último capítulo resume los principales resultados e implicaciones políticas y las contribuciones 
teóricas e empíricas de la tesis doctoral. También el capítulo presenta las limitaciones y líneas de 
investigación y agenda investigadora de varios temas que han surgido al presentar el contenido de la tesis 
doctoral que incluirá: I) detectar el impacto de sistemas gobernantes y cómo pueden las semejanzas entre 
regímenes en los países de MENA causar una intensidad en los flujos comerciales entre dichos países y 
otros países en el resto del mundo (RoW). II) investigar el efecto de vecindad entre los países de MENA 
y cómo puede efectuar los flujos comerciales e intensidad de comercio entre los mismos países, 
especialmente dentro del contexto de tensiones políticas y continuidad de conflictos que la región está 
sufriendo. III) Un análisis profundo de las reglas de origen específico de los productos y RoO diagonales 
para los países de MENA y sus impactos sobre las importaciones sectoriales e inter-regionales. IV) 
Análisis empírico de los flujos comerciales entre compañías multinacionales en la región de MENA. VI) 
El sector de servicios en la región de MENA y las expectativas de intensidad de flujos comerciales entre 
dichos países debido al sector de servicios.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Middle East and North Africa’s Regional Outlook and Challenge 
 
“The MENA Region, with over 400 million people, exports roughly the same amount as Switzerland” 
(Bernard Hoekman, Intra-Regional Trade: Potential Catalyst for Growth in the Middle East, MEI Policy 
Paper, April 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stat Planet World Bank - Open Data 
1.1 Middle East and North Africa’s Regional Outlook and Challenges  
 
It is quite impressive how a Region formed of 21 countries13 having a market potential of 425 million 
individuals, owning three fourths and 45 percent of the world’s proven crude oil and gas reserves 
respectively and eventually it only contributed to 6.6 percent of global Merchandise trade during 2014. 
As well the common geographical proximity, language and cultural ties, should unleash the Region’s 
potential to reach a higher level of inter-regional and intra regional trade flows (Wei, 1996). Although 
                                                          
13 MENA region’s 21 countries based on World Bank latest reports and Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, Syria, Tunisia, Palestine, Israel, Yemen. 
Djibouti, Malta, Iran.  
  
Democracy Index for Middle East and North from 1985 -2014 
soAfrica 
LBN 
SDN 
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MENA is endowed with natural resources; which represented up to 77 percent of its total exports, there 
is an apparent contrast and diversity of resources across MENA countries and ‘Trade 
Complementarity’14 opportunities between its countries. On one hand ‘Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries’ (GCC)15 mainly rely on oil exports and manufactures (Boughanmi et al., 2016), whereas, 
countries with less natural resources such as ‘Agadir Association Agreement’16have their trade flows 
backbone dependent upon non-oil manufactures and component part industries (Sullivan et al., 2011). 
Finally, the role played by the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership17’, should support in increasing 
MENA’s regional trade intensity and harness the ‘Lock in Reforms’18 within the Arab Mediterranean 
region. 
There have been many reasons justified by the literature and shown in this dissertation, addressing why 
the region’s actual trade intensity and global integration efforts lagged that of other regions: First reason 
would be the evidence of governance deficit and fragility of economic and political institutions across 
most of its countries. Second, presence of non-tariff, technical and procedural barriers to trade on 
a regional level; which caused discrepancies between trade flows of its countries.  Third, the existence 
of a multitude of regional agreements known by ‘The Veritable Spaghetti bowl of Trade Agreements’ 
within MENA, as shown in Figure 1.1. This veritable Spaghetti bowl of agreements led to higher levels 
of conflict and costs in applying trade regulations between MENA countries. Fourth the reduced 
manufactured and value-added content of its final and intermediate trade flows, which prevented 
the region from boosting the value-added content of its trade flows. Finally, the region’s marginalized 
share of investments, which plunged further by 51 percent to reach USD 45 billion during 2013; 
especially after the famous Arab Spring turmoil of 2011 (Wippel, 2004; Direction of Trade database, 
2006; Seshan and Casero, 2010; Walkenhorst and Shui, 2010; Behar and Freud, 2011; Rouis and Tabor, 
2013; Hoekman, 2016) 
                                                          
14  Trade Complementarity: It shows prospects of exchange between structures of country’s imports and exports and 
how they can match.  
 
15 Gulf Cooperation Council countries include 6 Gulf countries Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E, Saudi Arabia, and 
Kuwait  
 
16 Agadir Agreement Countries: Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt  
 
17 Euro Mediterranean partnership: a partnership between E.U. countries and southern Mediterranean countries 
with the objective of removing barriers to trade and increasing investment flows between both partners. 
 
18 Lock in Reforms. The hidden potential that region has through the various opportunities from regional 
partnerships, resources, human capital, strategic location, and cultural aspects.  
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Figure 1.1Time line for full Development of Sub-Regional Trade Initiatives in MENA Region [1985-2010] 
 
Source: Own’s elaboration extracted from CEPII dataset to estimate intra-trade flows for MENA countries 
1.2 Descriptive analysis about MENA’s intra-Regional and Intra-Regional Trade Flows: 
1.2.1 Facts about MENA’s Regional Trade Flows Intensity 
MENA region’s trade accounted for 7 percent of the world’s merchandise trade based on Hoekman 
(2013) and WTO Statistical reports (2014). According to WTO Statistical Database for [1999-2009] and 
as explained in Figure 1.2, the Region was ranked the fourth in terms of its trade compared to the rest of 
the world (RoW) after E.U., NAFTA, and ASEAN during 2009 and its total world exports did not exceed 
5 percent. MENA countries, especially oil producing ones; as elaborated by Abed and Davoodi (2003) 
witnessed an economic boom benefiting substantially from the sharp increase in oil prices during the 
70’s.  
Figure 1.2 MENA Region’s Merchandise Trade Benchmarked to other Regional Blocs during 2009  
 
Source: World Trade Organization Statistical database 1999- 2009 & raw data from CEPII gravity data-
set.  
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Moreover, MENA countries intra-regional exports and imports accounted for 10 percent and 16 percent 
of the Region’s total exports and imports respectively during 2011 and its Intra-regional trade reached 
around 3.5 percent of the region’s GDP during 2009. Although around 62 percent of its exports 
represented fuels and its derivatives in contrast to 54 percent of its imports concentrated in manufactured 
merchandise, yet the motivation for assessing MENA’s intra-regional and inter-regional trade flows in 
the context of this dissertation will be built only on merchandise flows and no oil flows will be analysed.  
The Region’s exports of manufactures reached roughly 22 percent of its exports during 2009 and finally 
MENA’s share of trade in services accounted for 9 percent (Hätinger, 2009; World Bank, 2011; Aktar 
and Bolle and Nelson, 2013). Its main trading partners during 2009 were broken down in ascending 
order of trade values as demonstrated in Figure 1.3, such that the majority stake of the region’s trading 
goes to RoW within which falls Asian trading partners (Japan, South Korea, China, India), rest of 
ASEAN 19members, African countries of COMESA20, SADC21, and others in Latin America. In second 
position came the European Union at 25 percent, followed by Unites States at 12 percent and finally 
intra-MENA at 8 percent. 
Figure 1.3: MENA Region’s share of Trade (X+I) with other partners 
 
Source: Raw data from the CEPII gravity dataset 2014 
                                                          
19 ASEAN Members: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
20 COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  
 
21 SADC: Southern African Development Community  
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1.2.2 Episodes of Political and Economic Instabilities in MENA  
Over the last thirty years MENA countries suffered from several wars, political fragmentation, 
authoritarian regimes in most of its countries and the presence of pervasive and consistent conflicts in 
the region. This was verified by several authors among which are Nabli and Jaurégui and Aysan (2008), 
as they explained the impact of instability on the slow-down of MENA’s democratic institutions and its 
effect on undermining the Region’s accountability for longer than expected. Unfortunately, deficiency 
of democratic institutions became contagious not only to political but also economic institutions causing 
contraction in the growth of the Region’s countries, higher inflation, large fiscal and current account 
deficits and reduced trade intensity (ACHY, 2000; Abed and Davoodi et al., 2003; Khamis ,2014).  
 
Although many of the MENA region countries (e.g., Lebanon, Morocco, Egypt and GCC countries) 
since the 90’s took the initiative on their shoulders to start a series of economic structural reform and 
privatization programs under the guidance and monitoring of IMF and World Bank, yet most of these 
programs did not realize their targets.  During this time, MENA region’s privatization receipts amounted 
only to USD 8.2 billion compared to USD 178 and US USD  65 billion privatization gains recorded by 
Latin America and Eastern Europe economies respectively during their reforms. Finally, in vain, up till 
the moment MENA countries are facing daunting challenges with respect to their political, economic 
and social institutions evident from the lagging governance indicators, heavy bureaucratic and arbitrary 
regulations, low productivity levels, instability of exchange rate policies and suppressed trade flows.  
 
Most recent Upheavals and Incidents of Arab Countries in Transition (ACT) during 2011 
 
The series of violent incidences struck the region like a domino effect with the resultant of governments 
overthrown in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and the Republic of Yemen after 2011. Civil wars broke out in 
Libya and Syria and major turbulences extended to Bahrain, Turkey and Lebanon (Ferragina, 2014). 
Four years later, Arab countries in revolts had shown different responses to deal with the political and 
economic transitions and to reach the speedy recovery towards their paths of growth and development. 
Countries similar to Morocco and Jordan maintained their status quo and they managed to monitor well 
the series of institutional and political reforms they introduced since 2011 and learnt their lessons from 
other neighbouring countries. After the onset of the Arab revolutions, policy makers, politicians and 
economists’ expectations on Arab Countries in Transition (ACTs) future were very floundering and 
sceptical. They were divided among themselves into two schools: the first school acknowledged the fact 
that it’s still too early to judge whether ACTs waves of revolts succeeded in changing their countries 
political and economic institutions and laid the foundation for peaceful democratic transitions to 
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stimulate trade and FDI flows in the region 22 . The second group of experts remain to be more 
conservative in drawing conclusions and giving excessive optimism on the future of ACTs and they 
claim that their expectations from Arab revolts were set too high. (Behr and Sasnal, 2012; Kausch, 2013; 
Khader, 2013). In the context of the thesis, Arab countries in transition will be only referred to during 
the analysis on the fourth chapter to determine impact of institutions on FDI climate in Egypt during and 
after the 2011 turmoil.  
 
1.2.3 Presence of non-tariff, Technical and Procedural Barriers to Trade 
 
The wide discrepancy in average tariff rates across the MENA countries rendered countries paying 
custom duties, at higher vulnerability to suffer from trade distortions; i.e. starting from 2007 most of the 
GCC countries did not report import tariffs exceeding 5 percent in contrary to others in Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU)23 with import duties during the same year amounting up to 30 percent (IMF Trade Data 
base, 2007; Hätinger, 2009; Shui and Walkenhorst, 2010). As well some sub-initiatives such as the 
‘Agadir Agreement Countries’24 attained relatively considerable international ‘Trade Freedom’ 25 
scores arranged in ascending as follows: Jordan scored 7.9, Tunisia at 7.09, Morocco at 6.96, and finally 
Egypt at 6.23, during 201126 (Fraser institute report, 2013). This is strictly due to the fact that; Agadir 
agreement countries were committed to apply their bilateral PTA protocols signed with E.U and in 
consequence they started to reduce their weighted average ‘Most Favored Tariff rate’ (MFN)27 . 
                                                          
22 Critics and authors in the book are very argumentative about how long should the Arab countries stay in transition, some 
of them argue it should be three to four years, others claim it could involve a change of a whole generation with a time 
span of 21 years.  
 
23 Arab Maghreb Union countries: they are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.  
24 Agadir Free Trade Agreement: Free trade agreement between four Arab south Mediterranean countries (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt). It is an initiative of the Union for Mediterranean incepted by the European Union and an 
example of South South integration policy.    
 
25 Freedom to Trade: it represents a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, affecting the imports 
and exports of goods and services (((Tariffmax  − Tariffi)/ (Tariffmax − Tariffmin))*100 − NTBi (Economic Freedom, 
2017)  
 
26 Fraser Institute: includes 4 Freedom to trade internationally adjusted score: a composite trade index containing the 
following indicators: international trade tax revenues as a % of trade/mean tariff rate/standard deviation of tariff rates 
/regulatory trade barriers/non-tariff trade barriers/compliance cost of importing and exporting/ black market exchange rate 
and international capital market controls. 
  
27 MFN Most Favored Nation tariff: represents a Non-discriminatory trade policy commitment offered by one country to 
another on a reciprocal basis and quota-restrictions on imports between each other, which they apply on the similar imports 
from any other country." (Wippel, 2005) 
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Accordingly, the MFN tariff across those countries began to converge to the world averages; falling 
from 23.4 percent during 1995 to around 13.2 percent on average during 2009. Although Agadir 4 
countries efforts to control for trade restrictive barriers have been noticeable through their minimized 
tariff and MFN rates, application of ‘Pan-Euro Rules of Origin’28 to facilitate trade with the E.U. yet 
they still suffer from major nontariff barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary Standards (SPS) to trade29, 
property right abuses. In addition, both parties together are currently working towards harmonizing 
SPS’s30, especially for certain agricultural and food products (Eurostat SPS protocol, 2012).  
1.2.4 Veritable Spaghetti Bowl of Trade Agreements in the MENA Region  
In spite of the region’s involvement in 8 intra-regional and inter-regional agreements; described by the 
‘Veritable Spaghetti Bowl of intertwined and overlapping agreements’31; yet the region did not 
achieve the anticipated intensity of trade flows and gains due to the presence of conflicting regulatory 
regimes between its countries. The overlapping regional agreements in the MENA, added complexity in 
applying many trade regulations, increased the artificial non-tariff barriers over its various categories of 
antidumping provisions, quantitative restrictions and clashing Rules of Origin (Hätinger 2009).  Some 
of the most significant sub-initiatives in Region and with other regions: ‘Agadir Association 
Agreement’ (Agadir_4), ‘Arab Maghreb Union32’ (AMU), ‘Gulf Cooperation Council’33 (GCC), 
                                                          
28 Pan-Euro Rules of Origin: diagonal Rules of origin on products and sectors applied between E.U. and South 
Mediterranean countries to facilitate trade and rupture of the horizontal structure of Hub Spoke trade between E.U. 
countries and South Mediterranean countries  
 
29 Other technical barriers to trade: such as import quotas, voluntary export restraints, restrictive state trading 
intervention, export subsidies, countervailing duties, Rules of origin, technical barriers to trade and domestic 
content requirements (Beghin, 2006)  
 
30 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS): Bilateral trade agreements between E.U and south Mediterranean 
countries are import and export hygiene restrictions on some agricultural, food and poultry products. Reference 
protocol of European Commission  
 
31  "Veritable spaghetti bowl of 31intertwined   relationships and overlapping associations"; where every MENA 
party is a partner to at least one regional economic agreement and many countries are members of five or more of 
such agreements, causing conflict in their RoO and fragments the benefits resulting from region’s intra-regional 
trade (Walkenhorst and Shui, 2010). 
 
32 Maghreb Union: The Arab Maghreb Union: Sub regional bloc within MENA region, consisting of the following 
countries : Libya, Morocco, Algeria , Tunisia & Sudan (Walkenhorst and  Shui, 2010). 
 
33 Gulf Cooperation Council GCC: Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Walkenhorst and Shui 2010). 
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‘Euro-Med Association Agreements’34 , ‘free trade agreements with the United States’35,  ‘Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area’ 36 (GAFTA) re-adapted into the ‘Pan Arab Free Trade Area’ (PAFTA)37i 
(e.g., Abed and Davoodi, 2003; ACHY 2006; Dadush and Falcao 2009; Rouis and Tabor 2013). Many 
empirical studies conducted by means of the trade gravity model and motivated by Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) , So derling (2005) and Miniesy and Nugent (2005), asserted that MENA’s intra-regional trade 
is doing much less than what is expected, On the other hand, Portugal and Perez (2012) confirmed that 
estimating separately the trade intensities for some of MENA’s sub-regional initiatives such as PAFTA 
and Agadir, revealed a positive and significant impact on their member countries trade flows at between  
[25-28] percent, which exceeded the impact of a standard preferential trade area.   
1.2.5 Trade in manufactured and value-added content for the Region’s countries  
 
The intra-regional trade flow between MENA’s countries is characterized by having low bilateral 
‘Trade Complementarity Indices ITC’38 as indicated by Péridy (2004), which did not exceed by any 
means 0.27, Comparatively to ITC values exceeding 0.5 and 0.35 respectively for other regional blocs 
such as EU and Mercosur (Yeats,1998). Agadir agreement countries is considered one of the region’s 
                                                          
34 Euromed association agreements: They represent the reciprocal bilateral association agreements between some 
of south Mediterranean Arab countries and E.U. starting chronologically by Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, and 
Lebanon.  
 
35 Free Trade Agreements with the United States: Some MENA countries entering free trade agreements with (e.g., 
Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman and QIZ between Egypt and US and Israel) (). 
 
36 Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA): including 20 of the MENA countries except for Algeria. It also 
included Sudan (Walkenhorst and Shui,2010).   
 
37  Pan Arab Free Trade Area: PAFTA known as well as the GAFTA and signed during 1997; including the 
membership of over 18 Arab countries and it accounts for 80 percent MENA’s total trade (Rouis and Tabor 2013) 
 
38 This type of index is frequently used in the empirical trade literature as for instance of Otsubo and Umermura 
(2003). 
 
𝐼𝑇𝐶 = 1 −
∑ |
𝑀𝑗
𝑘
𝑀𝑗   −
Xi
k
Xi |𝑘
2
 
ITC: Index of Trade complementary:  with 0ITC1 , and the i being the exporting country, j the importing country, 
and k represents categories of goods. This index equals to one when the imports needs of country j match perfectly 
with the export supply of country i , the more this index tends to 1, the higher is  relation between i’s country exports 
and j’s country imports.  Conversely, it takes a zero-value when the sector specific composition of country i’s 
exports has no overlap with the import composition of country j". (Pérdiy,2004). Relatively higher Trade 
complementarity indices are recorded for advanced regional trade agreements such as European Union or NAFTA 
at 0.5 (shui & Walkenhorst ,2010)  
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sub-initiatives that contributed the highest trade in value added; as it originated under the umbrella of 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the European Union and South Mediterranean 
countries. In addition, several studies led by the Agadir Technical Unit report (ATU, 2010), 
demonstrated statistically and through field survey analysis 39  that the application of the Pan-Euro 
Diagonal Rules of Origin (RoO) raised the threshold of regional value-added components to be imported 
from outside the agreement. This in turn gave more permissiveness for its countries to enrich the value-
added content of their final and intermediate flows. This led to the emergence of trade flows in new final 
and intermediate sectors, in addition to the change in the composition and spatial structure of the 
Region’s trade flows through Agadir, which will certainly act on providing new opportunities for 
investments to the region.  (Augier and Gasoriek and Lai Tong, 2007; ATU report, 2009 & Eurostat, 
2014). 
1.2.6 FDI Outlook and Investment Climate for MENA countries in Transition  
 
One of the inseparable elements of MENA’s trade intensity are the Region’s investments flows and how 
much they were hardly hit during the 2011 transitions. Figure 1.4 and 1.5 gave a comparative analysis 
on FDI inflows of the Arab region and ACT countries before and after the 2011 revolts. It is seen that 
since 2008 FDI receipts to the region took a negative dip down; declining by 34 percent from USD 66.8 
billion during 2010 to USD 43.9 billion during 2014. This was accompanied by diminishing Arab 
countries’ share of global FDI to reach 3.2 percent during the same year. Many Investors in ACT’s 
decided during 2011 to withdraw their investments with highest divestments recorded in Egypt at USD 
483 million, Yemen at USD 518 million and Qatar at USD 840 million and this occurred for both public 
and private investments during 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012; Khandelwal and Roitman, 2013; Ernest and 
Young, 2015). Emerging Market Attractiveness Survey classified investors who reacted after the Arab 
Spring incidents into three groups. First group multinationals on top of which were Nestle, Unilever, 
Eriksson, BMW, shell and American Express and Halliburton just shut down and left after the incidents.  
The second group of investors as Coca Cola started to downsize, minimize their activities and shifted 
their production towards the assembly activities rather than complete production process.  Finally, the 
third type of investors ran their operations through regional representative offices in Cairo or Dubai, 
such as Cargill and Caixa Bank 
                                                          
39  Agadir Technical Unit report, they perform in-depth surveys on a selected sample of small and medium 
enterprises in Agadir agreement countries to assess their capacities in promoting intra-regional trade between Agadir 
countries and their trade flow with E.U countries on the basis of complying with the diagonal RoO and the objective 
is to shed light on a number of potential sectors where RoO cumualtion could be easily applied. (ATU 2009) 
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Figure 1.4 Ante 2011 FDI Inflows for MENA countries in$ USD million 
 
Source: UNCTAD Annex tables for FDI Inflow by regions 2015 report 
 
1.3 Econometric Analysis: Theoretical Foundation for the Trade Gravity Model  
 
The main quantitative and empirical analysis used to measure MENA’s intra- regional trade flows and 
sector specific inter-regional trade flows for its countries in the context of this Doctoral Thesis will  be 
based on the  ‘Bilateral Trade Gravity Model ̓ .The simplest form of the gravity equation is derived 
from Newton’s universal gravitation law (1687) with its main notion that the attraction between two 
bodies is proportional to the product of the their masses and inversely proportional to the squared 
distance separating both bodies. The analogy of the gravitational law was transmitted into the 
theoretical depth of international trade by Tinbergen (1962). Thus, the intensity of trade flows between 
country pairs increases with the size of their economies, and decreases with bilateral trade costs between 
them; to act as the proxy of geographical distance translated into a very basic framework for the gravity 
equation: 
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𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺
𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑗
∝3   Eq. (1.1) 
Where Trade between country 𝑇𝑖𝑗: represents bilateral trade flows between country i to country j, which 
will depend on the product of Yeconomic capacity or GDP of country i and GDP of country j adjusted 
for the bilateral distance between both ij.  
By taking a lineal transformation of the multiplicative expression of the gravity, then the transformation 
of the original multiplicative expression into the OLS estimation will be as follows: 
Ln(𝑇𝑖𝑗)=Ln(G)+∝1Ln (𝑌𝑖) + ∝2Ln (𝑌𝑗) - ∝3Ln (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗)+∝4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑗+∝5 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗+∝6 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗+𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
 
 eq.(1.2) 
 
The Augmented gravity variables here are: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗, which captures the presence of common 
borders between trading partners i and j, meanwhile, 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 both account for existence 
of a common official language and colonial ties between trading partners respectively. In line with the 
considerable realm of empirical literature, contributing to the enrichment of the theoretical framework 
of the gravity variables along with Anderson and Wincoop (2003) adding the concept of ‘Multilateral 
Resistance’40 to approximate for trade cost effects and the elasticity. All augmented variables were 
included to approximate for cultural, historical, linguistic and political aspects, currency unions and 
even the effect of membership into WTO (Rose, 2003; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 2005; Frankel, 2007; 
Baier and Bergstrand ,2007; Mitchell, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2012).   
Additional estimators are used to correctly account for bilateral trade flows, especially for sector 
specific flows and to solve for many gravity challenges (Larch et al., 2012).  In the context of using the 
gravity model to measure MENA’s intra-regional and Agadir_4 countries to E.U. Inter-regional trade 
flows, we will be facing the following challenges arising with estimations of the gravity model and we 
will be resolving for them based on the following solutions proposed by the literature. The ‘Zero Trade 
Flows’ is the first challenge and is treated for in several manners as referenced by Eaton and Tamura 
(1995) and Martin and Pham (2008), Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Egger et al. (2011). The second 
challenge will be ‘Heteroscedasticity’41 which as well was fixed through the methodologies used by 
                                                          
40 Multilateral Resistance: Apart from the mutual attraction between the economic masses of two trading 
partners, there are additional forces and trade costs that make their trade more resistant (Anderson, 1979; 
Anderson and Vancoop, 2003) 
 
41 Heteroscedasticity: It po ints out that the estimates and effects of trade costs and policies that are inconsistent, 
when the gravity model is estimated in log-linear form of OLS.  
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Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Third will be the 
‘Endogeneity’42 typical to occur when trade flows are correlated to trade policies and which has been 
tackled by Trefler (1993) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), however, it is really a challenging task to 
solve for endogeneity problems related to trade flows and trade policies. Finally, the gravity with 
‘Disaggregated Data’, which is grounded on Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) and Larch and Yoto 
(2016b) and it relies on obtaining sectoral flows to measure the impact of trade policy on those flows. 
In this case, this type of data will require treatment for multilateral resistance and unobserved 
heterogeneities of origin and destination countries and time which will be treated through ‘Fixed 
Effects43’. 
Along with all the theoretical foundation used as the basis for all our estimations, a set of augmented 
variables will be used for our specific purpose of assessing intensity of intra-regional trade flows 
between MENA countries. These variables will be Polity IV and Trade Freeness indices meant to 
account for governance and freeness of trade regimes for the Region and to capture the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on executives in exercising public trade policies and effecting trade 
regimes. This methodology was based on a modelling technique used in the literature analysing the 
‘Gravity of Institutions’44 for other regions and elaborated by Duc and Lavallée and Siroën (2008) 
and Bhattacharya and Wolde (2009) and Lutmar (2011); Bacchetta et al. (2012). Another scope of 
theoretical foundation proposed, which depends on combining between Gravity models and impact 
policy evaluation to measure sector specific disaggregate flows for MENA’s inter-regional exports with 
E.U. In this case, the bilateral gravity model included variables to measure treatment through an 
approach known as; ‘The Double Differences Approach Estimation Panels’ (DID). This approach 
is used for modelling the impact of trade policies on sector specific flows and left its imprint in previous 
analysis motivated by Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) and Gretton and Gali (2005) and Augier et 
al. (2007) and Gasiorek (2008) on World Wide RoO regimes.   
                                                          
 
42 Endogeneity: This happens when the trade policy is possibly correlated to unobservable cross-sectional trade 
costs and it involves in this case reverse causality.  
 
43 Fixed effects: are exporter and importer fixed effects model to provide consistent estimates for any gravity 
model introduced in the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and the heterogeneous firms model of 
Chaney (2008) 
  
44  Gravity of Institutions: it is the scope and brand of literature combining between both gravity model 
estimations and political variables and indices accounting for governance and quality of regimes. This scope of 
literature is motivated by many in the literature review, on top of which are Duc and Lavallée and Siroën (2008) 
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1.4 Qualitative Data Analysis: Based on Field Questionnaire:    
 
This part of the qualitative methodology is built upon designing a questionnaire with a conceptual 
framework that analyses the impact of institutions on FDI climate in Egypt during the 2011 transition. 
We could identify the dependent and independent variables through the research question. Then we 
developed a conceptual framework based on literature review relating FDI’s climate to factors and 
variables determining FDI climate. Then the stage of designing questions started and we designed most 
questions in the form of ‘Close-ended45’ and ‘Open-ended’46 questions and Likert scale matrices 
questions, usually graded in a scale of 5 categories of preferences. The third stage moved to the data 
being coded and prepared for econometric analysis to draw on common patterns from the collected data 
and finally present the results justified through illustrative explanations and individual responses. This 
methodology came in consistency with the following realm of literature (Ziacik, 2000; Bastos and 
Nasir, 2004; Tridico, 2006; Klaus et al, 2009; Hotho and Pederson, 2012; Garridoet al., 2013; Hanafy, 
2015).  
1.5 Thesis Reasoning Structure   
In summary, we have shown in this chapter that, although the MENA has many geographical features, 
substantial market potential, natural resources and connectiveness through regional trade agreements, 
yet it has not yet managed to increase intra-regional or inter-regional trade flows as indicated by 
previous theoretical and empirical assessments. One of the most efficient empirical instruments to 
estimate intra-regional and inter-regional trade flows for the Region would be through the gravity 
equation, due to its multifaceted functions and as well it allows augmenting of other variables that are 
essential to assess the specificities of the MENA Region. 
This Doctoral thesis will present three separate chapters suggesting to the reader different aspects of 
MENA’s intra regional trade intensity addressed in chapter 2. As well chapter 3 assesses for the 
MENA’s inter-regional trade intensity through estimating export flows between Agadir agreement 
countries and E.U. countries in the context of capturing the adoption of Pan-Euro RoO. Finally, chapter 
4 presents a case study about the impact of institutions on FDI climate in Egypt during the transition of 
2011. The three chapters share common concerns regarding fragility of the region’s governance, 
                                                          
45 Close-ended: question that provide options to the respondents and require them to choose one or more items 
in the list  
 
46 Open Ended: questions allowing the respondents to express their opinion freely and are not restricted by the 
option choices only  
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sequence of political disruptions and regime changes all increased the difficulty to trade and the 
emergence of trade barriers either between MENA’s countries or on its inter-regional trade with the 
E.U. The fragility of institutions in MENA was not only reflected on the trade performance, but as well 
it affected the Region’s investment climate over the last 30 years. This is where, we implicate that 
looking to control for political stability, increase of governance, and eliminating trade barriers will be 
the ‘Top Bottom Integration Approach’47 needed to guarantee the harmony between the political, 
economic and trade institutions across MENA’s countries. As well Identifying successful sub-regional 
trade initiatives, as Agadir Agreement that are believed not only to contribute to MENA’s trade flows, 
but more importantly focus on upgrading the region’s trade flows to assimilate highly processed and 
manufactured value-added trade flows and upgrade the Region’s spatial trade structure and composition 
to a more sophisticated level. This integration approach is known to be the  ̒Bottom Up Integration 
Approach’48 and was advocated by Hoekman (2016). Finally considering that trade and investment 
flows are sides of the same coin for the Region’s best integration efforts, with the aim to have investor 
friendly regulations that help in protecting investors rights, giving them fiscal, financial and public 
incentives and re-assuring them to the stability of MENA’s countries institutions and economies. 
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Chapter 2: Would Intra-Regional Trade between MENA 
Countries Increase, When they are More Democratic and Less 
Bureaucratic? 
Gravity Model controlling for Aspects of Governance and Trade Freeness in the 
MENA Region  
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Integration Outlook of MENA Region compared to other Regional Blocs 
 
Over the last thirty years most of the MENA countries suffered from repeated episodes of wars, 
political fragmentation, authoritarian regimes and above all the presence of pervasive and 
persistent civil conflicts in many of its countries. This is one of the reasons why MENA’s actual 
share of intra-regional trade flow does not account to more 8 percent of the region’s total flows 
compared to its share with Rest of the World (RoW) and the European Union (E.U.), which both  
recorded an average of 50 percent and 25 percent respectively over the last 5 years (Ekanayake 
and Embry, 2009; Rouis and Tabor, 2013).The notion of political disruption and how it led to 
the appearance of dysfunctional institutions in MENA and above all how this affected the 
Region’s trade intensity has been challenged by the mainstream literature motivated by Nabli 
and Jaurégui and Aysan (2008). 
The literature on this topic moved in different directions and it attempted to explain the link 
between how political institutions impacted trade governance and policies (ACHY, 2000; Abed 
and Davoodi, 2003; Khamis, 2014). It focused mainly on good governance, which will lead to 
greater effectiveness and vigour across all institutions. Empirical evidence suggested that trade 
flows are significantly and positively influenced by democratic regimes and this is exhibited in 
the design and implementation of their trade policies (Bliss and Russet, 2005; Kubota and 
Milner,2005; Lundström,2005). However, up till now there is no general theoretical consensus 
on whether bilateral trade flows increase, when two trading partners are more democratic or not 
(Mayer, 1984; Rogowski ,1989; Duc and Lavallée and Siroën, 2008). As for the relation between 
democratic institutions and how it affects intra-regional trade intensity in MENA, it is already a 
debatable topic. Accordingly, one of the aims of this chapter is to reveal whether the 
transformation of MENA countries from autocratic regimes to democratic ones, in light of the 
Region’s geopolitical nature and complexities, will lead to greater effectiveness and vigour in 
governing institutions and above all trade institutions (Duc and Lavallée and Siroën, 2008). The 
state of governance is not the only factor influencing MENA’s Intra-regional trade, however, it 
is important to consider various aspects of ‘Trade Freeness’ to account for the restrictiveness of 
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tariffs and behind the border technical barriers imposed by custom points. Then ‘Trade Freeness 
Index’ accounts for trade restrictiveness measures to control for any distortions, besides trade 
facilitation measures that are supposed to reduce trade compliance and rent seeking costs 
(Djankov et al., 2006; Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010) 
 
There have been a considerable scope of the literature developed by Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000); So-derling (2005); Miniesy and Nugent (2005); Cieslik and Hagemejer (2009); 
Bhattacharya and Wolde (2010) and Lutmar (2011) estimating empirically through trade gravity 
equations and computable general equilibrium models, the significance of intra-regional 
initiatives in MENA and their contribution to the intensity of the Region’s flows. Some of the 
most significant intra-regional initiatives between MENA countries emphasized by the literature 
included: ‘Agadir Association Agreement’(Agadir_4), ‘Arab Maghreb Union ii’ (AMU), 
‘Gulf Cooperation Council iii’ (GCC), ‘Greater Arab Free Trade Area’ iv (GAFTA) re-
adapted into the ‘Pan Arab Free Trade Area’ (PAFTA)v (Abed and Davoodi, 2003; ACHY, 
2006; Dadush and Falcao, 2009; Rouis and Tabor, 2013). The diagnosis of MENA’s Intra-
regional trade should account for the effect of those smaller sub-initiatives and examine whether 
they genuinely contributed in increasing MENA countries trade flows. One of the most 
pronounced results in line with the notion regarding MENA’s sub-initiative was detected by 
Portugal-Perez and Freud (2012); estimating that trade flows of sub-regional initiatives in 
MENA (Agadir Agreement, GCC, AMU and PAFTA) increased its intra-MENA trade by 
almost 26 percent more than estimating the intra-regional flows for the entire region.   
The main motivation of this chapter is to consider higher intra- regional trade flows49 among 
MENA countries which could be attained; once we control for the presence of democratic 
institutions and governance, showing a direct impact on trade regimes and policies. Ideally, 
democratic regimes and institutions in the context of MENA should enable executives and 
decision makers to eliminate trade constraints and to intensify intra-regional trade flows and to 
support the well-functioning of successful sub intra-regional initiatives within MENA. In 
consequence, this chapter sheds light on the impact of good governance on trade regimes and 
the transformation of MENA countries from autocracies to democracies or mixed regimes, 
which eventually leads to greater effectiveness and vigour in their governing institutions and 
above all less costs to trade among MENA’s institutions. 
                                                          
49 Intra-regional trade flows: means in this context estimating the merchandise trade in manufactured 
goods of aggregate exports and imports of the region’s countries  
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In addition to the theoretical foundation based on the literature of modelling the relationship 
between good governance and trade regimes, the empirical methodology will be conducted by 
means of a ‘Bilateral Trade Gravity Model’; estimating the dependent variable as MENA’s 
bilateral intra-regional trade of manufactured goods, based on a subset of data for MENA region 
driven from CEPII’s Gravity Dataset 2014 for (TRADHIST) covering 178 countries and our 
data will cover a timeframe of 25 years. Democracy and trade freeness measures have been 
captured in the model by using ‘Polity IV Index and ‘Trade Freeness Index’ introduced as 
augmented variables to the classical bilateral gravity model aimed to assess intra-MENA’s trade 
flows.  Those indices have been previously utilized to measure the significance of trade flows 
for other regions by Duc and Lavallée and Siroën (2008); Bhattacharya and Wolde (2009); 
Lutmar (2011). Above all, the study will show that MENA’s intra- regional trade flow intensity 
is more pronounced, when the region was broken into initiatives as that of GCC, Agadir_4, 
PAFTA and AMU as previously advocated by Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) and Abedini and 
Péridy (2006) and Ekanayake and Embry-Riddle, (2009)  
 
The model’s explanatory power was augmented to account for democracy and trade 
restrictiveness measures to be calibrated and introduced in the gravity equation for estimation 
purposes. The Estimations will run on two baseline scenarios, once using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimations and another using, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) ‘Pseudo Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator’ (PPML) for robustness and to treat for Heteroskedasticity and zero 
trade flows. Both first and second scenarios will incorporate polity IV and trade freeness indices 
and decompose those indices into several thresholds. Scenario 3 will demonstrate the interaction 
between trade restrictiveness and governance measures and finally last scenario will divide 
MENA countries into sub-regional initiatives to detect, which sub-regional initiative contributed 
the highest intensity to the Region’s trade flows. General results have shown consistency of 
standard gravity variables across all estimations and specific results demonstrated that Polity_IV 
index increased intra-regional trade between MENA countries of mixed regimes by a factor of 
0.5, meanwhile, Trade Freeness index has shown higher significant levels in raising intra-
MENA trade by a factor of 0.8. More accurately said the interaction term between Polity IV and 
trade freeness indices has shown a substantial increase in MENA’s intra-regional flow by a 
factor of 2 at 104 percent. This implies, that we cannot confirm that only the transformation of 
MENA’s governance and regimes will be the reason behind the increase in its intra-regional 
trade flow.   
 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured into section 2 Moves on to the literature review, section 3, 
giving a descriptive overview on MENA countries trade flow Section. 4 presents the empirical 
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estimations and different gravity model scenarios and followed by results in section 5 and finally 
policy implications and conclusion 
 
2.2 Revisiting the literature on linkages between international trade and 
governance of institutions within the context of MENA Region 
Before bringing to the readers’ attention the methodology used in this chapter and its impact on 
MENA’s intra-regional trade flows, some of the principal papers linking between democracy 
and trade institutions will be identified. Starting with the proposition by Mesquita and Downs 
(2005) suggesting that higher economic growth stimulates democracy in all governing 
institutions, however, the opposing tides of autocratic regimes will be more resistant just 
working to strengthen their power and run their institutions in the same corrupt manner. Another 
proposition suggested by Whalley (1998) and Mansfields et al. (2002) and Wu (2004) that 
countries moving at compatible democratic paces are readier to sign trade agreements 
committed to their voter’s credibility. Rosendurff and Shin (2014) re-instated 10 years later that 
democratic states signed more agreements than autocracies to self-insure themselves against 
policy uncertainties.  
 
Finally, other views postulated the existence of simultaneity and endogeneity between higher 
trade and democratic institutions. Some of the literature stream supported the notion of. 
comprehensive trade agreements such European Neighbourhood Policy between MENA 
countries and E.U. will eventually act as the mediator to speed up democratization and create 
in-depth negotiations and understanding between trading partners (Gylfason and Martinez-
Zarzoso and Wijkman, 2012). The same line of thought was advocated by Córdova and Meissner 
(2006); arguing that one standard deviation increase in trade with other countries, will eventually 
transform economies into higher states of democracy and have them move up the ranking of 
their polity score. 
 
The context of how democracy and good governance impacted MENA’s trade regimes and 
institutions has first emerged, when Barro (1991) wrote about the conflicts in MENA region that 
led to absence of institutional stability and twenty-four years later Sab (2014) shared the same 
insights regarding the persistent conflicts in MENA region, accompanied by spill-over effects 
disrupting stability across the rest of the Region’s countries. As for the consequences, Abed and 
Davoodi (2003) and Nabli and Jaurégui and Aysan (2008) emphasised that lagging political and 
institutional reforms typically in MENA countries led to fragmentation, recurring conflicts and 
authoritarian ruling, which stood in front of the progress of the region’s institutions. Also, more 
authors as Lutmar (2011) could detect the positive relationship between trade openness and 
democracy Nabli and  ,Finallyrun in all regions apart from the MENA region. -long the over 
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Jaurégui (2012) asserted that democracy is not a ‘Binding Constraint’50 to the region’s growth, 
forward to guarantee better governance, greater accountability -mportant stephowever, an i
 towards enabling trade and investment climate. On the level of sub-regional initiatives, Miniesy 
and Nugent (2005) predicted that MENA’s intra-regional trade fell short due to the absence of 
trade friendly policies and prevalence of fragile governance and later on after 10 years Zaki and 
Karam (2015) estimated MENA region’s conflict and weak governance to be equivalent to 
imposing a 5 percent tariff on the value of the region’s trade (Nabli et al., 2008; Ianchovichina 
and Ivanos, 2014; Hoekman,  2016).  
 
Apart from that, democratic regimes grant higher incentives to unilateral openness and as well 
tariff negotiations between countries of democratic regimes will facilitate removal of barriers 
and offer more concessions than between countries of mixed regimes (Rosendorff, 2006) Many 
econometric approaches have modelled the impact of governance on MENA’s trade policies 
and institutions, using a battery of estimations, on top of which are the bilateral trade gravity 
and general equilibrium models. The literature proposed a number of variables and indices to 
account for wars, conflicts, polity IV indicators, weak governance indicators, ‘Trade 
Restrictiveness Dummies’51,lower voice and accountability variables, all employed to capture 
the fragility of the region’s trade institutions. Most of the findings by Al-Atrash and Yousef 
(2000and Miniesy and Nugent (2005) and Cieslik and Hagemejer (2009); and Bhattacharya 
and Wolde (2010) and Lutmar (2011) and finally Chauffour and Hoekman (2013), when 
modelled indicated that the region’s intra-regional trade performance is underestimated on 
average by [10-15] percent below its expected value.  
 
To the best of the knowledge, the use of Polity IV index to control for governance of institutions 
has been further elaborated in the literature review on Eastern Europe’s trade by DUC and 
Lavallée and Siroën (2008) and Aidt and Gassenbner (2010) and not for MENA countries 
                                                          
50 Binding Constraint: meaning that directly after a regime is shifted into a democratic one, there 
should be a direct abrupt change in its institutions, it takes time to achieve this shift and recovery of 
the institutions from the previous influence into ones of higher credibility and accountability, and 
better governance promised to investors. Nabli and Jáuregui (2012) 
 
51 Trade Restrictiveness Dummy are driven from trade restrictiveness index (TRI); employed as an 
open scale to measure trade protection through the tariff and non-tariff barrier components and they 
used in explaining the lower integration of intra-trade figures among MENA countries and it 
includes the average time to clear exports and imports from the customs, inefficiencies in trade 
institutions and costs associated with inefficiencies, trade infrastructure and logistic services. This 
dummy turned out to be statistically significant through the gravity model estimations including 
trade for intra-MENA countries, however, it is not region specific and does not particularly model 
trade impediments of Arab countries (Al Atrash and Yousef, 2002) 
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(Mansfield et al, 2002; Wu,2004; Carrere,2006; Rosendurff and Shin, 2014; Almargo,2015).For 
the purpose of accurately and to account for good governance and democracy, Polity IV is a 
comprehensive index, which includes various aspects of liberties and the exercise of preferences 
about alternative policies. Second the index incorporates the existence of institutionalized 
constraints on the exercise of power by executives in all governing bodies and it implicates that 
executive recruitment in governing institutions should be in the best interest of the country’s 
trade policies and regimes. The index was decomposed into several measures indicative of the 
country’s governance regime classification. One of the index’s advantages is considering the 
differences in scales and sensitivities across scores of democratic, mixed and autocratic regimes 
and their impact on institutions.  
Another index with the tendency to control for how trade policies and decisions are implemented 
will be the ‘Trade Freeness Index’; as a composite index encompassing height of tariff, non-
tariff and technical barriers. Nevertheless the trade freeness index is ample enough to proxy for 
daily bottlenecks in trade institutions, measures of transparency and anticipation of trade 
regimes in evaluating deficiency in cargo tracking, port congestion problems, complicated 
transhipment regulations, absence of cross border transit procedures, improving trade 
facilitation measures and connectiveness for firms (Hummels , 2001; Djankov et al. 2006; Shui 
and Walkenhorst, 2010; Quality of Government D1ataset Book Code, 2011; Chauffour and 
Hoekman, 2013). Apart from here, those two indices (Polity_IV) and (Trade freeness) were 
transformed into variables to be incorporated into the next step of the estimation methodology 
through the augmented gravity model to account for governance and its impact on MENA 
countries’ governance regimes and how it affects intra-regional trade intensity in MENA.  
2.3 Intra-MENA’s trade Descriptive Analysis   
Although MENA’s intra-regional trade flow was relatively much smaller than its merchandise 
trade with the ‘Rest of World52’ (RoW); as shown previously in Figure 2.1, yet its trade flow 
with (RoW) has proven to be fluctuant over the 20 years’ period ending 2010. The fluctuations 
and downturns in the region’s trade performance were justified by the sequence of political 
instabilities, civil wars, border conflicts, economic global shocks the region was exposed to 
                                                          
52MENA trade with RoW increased after 2005 due to the entrance of some of the region’s 
countries (e.g., Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan and Egypt) in ‘Free Trade Agreements’ 52 and 
‘QIZ’52with the U.S.A in favour of stimulating merchandise trade between MENA countries and 
RoW (Rouis and Tabor, 2013). 
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during this time frame. Some of the region’s most significant incidents which were also 
accounted for in model by the variables of: Conflict 1 and Conflict 2 for the ‘Iran Iraq War’ 
associated with rising oil prices 1987 and ‘Iraq Kuwait – Gulf War’ during 1991, meanwhile 
Conflict 253 included all the rest of conflicts and civil wars in the region. Besides, Crisis 1 and 
Crisis 2, which are both accounting for ‘Global Food Crisis 2006’ and finally ‘Global 
Financial Crisis’ of 2009 respectively (Nabli et al, 2008; ACHY, 2010). 
 
 
As well there is a remarkable peak for MENA’s trade with the (RoW) during 2004, this is when 
Preferential Trade Areas (PTA) with RoW and E.U started to come into action. An example 
would be the QIZ agreement between U.S, Egypt and Israel and free economic zones between 
Jordan and United States. MENA Region’s exports to RoW relied on unmanufactured raw 
materials and primary semi-processed products, however, the Region’s imports superseded their 
exports by nearly USD 90 billion during 2004, as they were still unprepared to compete with 
(RoW) giant emerging economies such as India and China (Rouis and Tabor,2013). 
 
Inspecting MENA’s intra-regional merchandise trade (X+I), has shown that it did not exceed 10 
percent of the region’s total trade flows during 2010; which is consistent with the findings by 
Ekanayake and Embry (2009). Also, the sharp decline for MENA’s intra-regional trade 
witnessed during 2000 overlapped in time with first wave of Euro-Mediterranean bilateral 
association agreements between E.U. countries and MENA countries, which proceeded 
accordingly: Tunisia 1998, Morocco 2000, Jordan 2002, Egypt 2004, Algeria 2005 and Lebanon 
2006. The boom of agreements with E.U is suspected by many in the literature Rouis and Tabor 
(2013) and Hoekman (2016) to have caused intra-regional trade between MENA countries to be 
diverted to other regional blocs in RoW, and E.U. As well, it is evident that MENA’s trade to 
the E.U. grew progressively since the inception of the Barcelona Process 1995, bilateral 
association agreements between E.U. members and MENA countries and this was captured in 
the methodological part through the Regional Trade Area with E.U. denoted as RTA_E.U. 
dummy variable.  
  
                                                          
53 Conflict 2 in this context will include incidents in the region like Palestine – Israel conflict, 
tensions in Yemen, and other border tensions and in this case dummy given value 1 , for all 
MENA countries impacted by the conflict 2 
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Figure 2.1: Times series of Merchandise Trade (X+I) for MENA Region [1985-2010] 
 
Source: Primary data extracted from CEPII dataset to estimate intra-trade flows for MENA 
countries 
 
2.3.1 Polity IV Index capturing Governance and Trade Regimes  
Polity IV and Trade Freedom indices are the two key indices both derived from Code Book of 
Quality of Governments dataset (2011). The index is first transformed into bilateral values 
through obtaining the average score of two countries and then the resulting index scores are re-
calibrated based on the country’s ranking on the original index. The ‘polity Index’; is defined 
as an index which monitors regime changes and their impact on the governance of institutions 
across all countries.  It covers a graded scale of 21 points, with +10 score denoted at upper part 
of the scale as ‘Consolidated Democracy’54and -10 marked the ‘Hereditary Monarchy’ 55and 
additional ranges [-77, 66] assigned for extreme values not included in our dataset of MENA 
countries. On one hand Schmidt (2015) defined ‘polity IV’56, as one of the precise indices 
                                                          
54  Consolidated Democracy: refers to the high graded scale of democracy resulting from 
institutions built totally upon democratic regime and laws and signalling to citizen’s values, 
concept and behaviour practice of democracy has been absorbed and changed and there is no way 
back to authoritarian system.  
 
55 Hereditary Monarchy: a form of power of ruling where sovereign power descends by right of 
inheritance and it signals in some instances and countries to the extreme state of autocracy.  
 
56 polity IV: comprised of four pillars recording changes in the institutionalized qualities of 
governing authority referring to the competitiveness of the executive recruitment whether in 
elections or transitional one. In second place comes the openness of executive recruitment through 
dual elections, constraints on the chief executives whether they are exposed to unlimited authority 
or more towards limitations. The participation in political institutions is it restricted or a secular 
one (Marshall and Gurr and Jaggars 2016) 
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capturing institutional transformation of countries from autocracies to democracies and it covers 
four main pillars regarding the quality of institutions and their governing authorities. These 
pillars are ‘Openness of Elections’, ‘Competition in Executive Recruitment’, ‘Executive 
Authority Constraints’ and ‘Participation Competition’. It also accounts for convergences 
between governing authorities for institutions and among which are trade institutions across 
different countries. Accordingly, it is a comprehensive index spanning the full spectrum of 
institutionalized autocracies, mixed or incoherent regimes, strict dictatorships and autocratic 
regimes to fully institutionalized democracies. Almagro (2015) and Zeynalov (2016) identified 
the positive significant relation between polity and PTA’s and revealed that one of the 
determinants of trade intensity between PTAs’ is the existence of democratic countries, as they 
spontaneously tend to sign more PTA’s and reduce costs of trade.  
 
Table 1 exhibits Marshall and Gurr and Jaggers (2016) categorized MENA region countries 
based on their Polity IV scores and generally discovered that this region is still lagging on the 
index, when benchmarked to average scores of other regions. Unfortunately, MENA has been 
diagnosed with persistent democracy deficits over the last 40 years and it has shown that most 
of its countries fall within the range of autocratic and mixed scores on the Polity IV index. Only 
two countries from the region during 2016 could exceed the threshold towards the democracy 
score which is above 5. 
Table 2.1: Categorization of MENA countries based on their individual Polity IV Index Scores 
during 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Trade Freeness Index Capturing Trade Barriers  
On the other hand, ‘Trade Freeness Index’57 as a sub component of Economic Freedom index 
originally developed by Heritage Foundation and denoted in our model as Trade Freeness. It is 
                                                          
57 Trade Freedom index: is a composite measure of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect the 
exchange of goods and it is used in quality of government database code book and denoted by 
Trade Freeness and it ranks world countries based on a combined composite measure of trade 
  Based on polity IV index and their relevant scores 2013 
Autocracies [-10: -6] Mixed [-5: 5] Democracies [+6: +10] 
Libya Egypt Lebanon 
Oman 
Iran  
Algeria 
                     Mauritania    
Tunisia 
Israel  
Qatar Iraq  
Saudi Arabia Jordan  
Syria Morocco  
United Arab Emirates Sudan  
Kuwait Yemen  
Bahrain Palestine   
Source: Primary data from Polity IV Project by Marshall and Gurr (2013) 
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composed of ‘Trade Restrictiveness Regime indicators’ covering nearly 0.75 of the index’s 
total value of 1 and which reflects upon the height of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The second 
component of the index is ‘Trade Facilitation’ accounting for 0.25 and it includes custom 
services that are free from corruption, reliance on transparent risk management and prompt 
duties collection and refunds. According to Anderson and Neary (1996) a single indicator is not 
able to capture all trade barriers , however, the comprehensiveness of Trade Freeness allows to 
account for various levels of tangible tariffs and technical barriers imposed by trade authorities 
at custom points across the Region. As well it accounts for additional trade administrative and 
logistic impediments, such as; ‘Administrative Impediments’58 , transport constraints and 
custom clearance bottlenecks (Djankov et al., 2006; Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010). In 
complementarity to restrictiveness measures, trade facilitation as the other component of the 
index, allows for the inclusion of a wide spectrum of tariff control prices, monopolistic and 
technical measures that are supposed to reduce trade compliance and rent seeking costs.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows equivalent measures and interaction between Polity IV and trade freeness 
indices for MENA countries driven from Code Book of governments dataset 2011. The size of 
the bubbles in Figure 2.2 indicates to the share of each MENA country of the intra- regional 
trade (X+I) flow. Most of the Gulf countries except for Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen and Syria 
during 2010 recorded on average score of above 60 points for mostly free trade; as their 
composite value on trade freeness index indicated to minimized tariff rates and only to the 
presence of non-tariff and technical barriers to trade for those countries. The same Gulf countries 
(U.A.E, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman) were grouped under the category of Autocratic 
regimes ranging from less than -5. As well most of the MENA countries are scaled as evident 
around the mixed regime middle range of [5, -5] for their Polity IV index scores. The only two 
countries with democratic regimes as per se are Lebanon and Israel and both as well scored 
above the threshold of 80 for being classified as having trade freeness. More over, Figure 2.2 
correlates between size of the bubble for share of intra-MENA trade and scales on both indices. 
It is evident that size of the bubble is directly correlated with Trade Freeness index of higher 
values, giving intuition that intra-regional trade flows might be more correlated to trade freeness 
                                                          
restrictiveness 0.75 and custom trade facilitation of 0.25. The Lowest score below 0.60 indicates 
presence of trade freeness, and lower barriers to trade, meanwhile, bigger scores over 0.6 0 
indicates absence of trade freeness. (Teorell and Jan and Samanni and Sören and Bo Rothstein, 
2011) 
 
58 Administrative Impediments: hindering trade represent lengthy and redundant trade procedures that might 
account from 2% up to 15% of the value of traded good. Non- tariff barriers as a part of administrative constraint 
will include and not be limited to : administrative burdens, information/transparency, inconsistent or discriminatory 
behaviour of officials, time constraint, payment, infrastructural challenges, securityconstraints  and legal  (OECD 
2002; WTO 2012) 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
2.1 Would Intra-Regional Trade of MENA countries increase, when they are more Democratic and less 
Bureaucratic? 
55 
index as emphasized by the literature for that region. (Djankov et al., 2006; Bhattacharya and 
Wolde, 2010). It also shows from the upper right quadrant that the size of the bubble for intra-
regional trade is relatively correlated to the higher values on the Polity IV index., however  there 
are as well small and medium sized bubbles like Algeria and Lebanon who have advanced polity 
IV measures, yet their contribution to the MENA’s intra-regional trade is minimal , this goes in 
reciprocity to Saudi Arabia and U.A.E substantially having a higher portion of the intra-MENA 
trade but at a lower threshold for Polity IV. 
 
Figure 2.2: The combined Bubble diagram for trade Freeness and Polity IV indices and Intra-
regional trade (X+I) Shares for MENA countries 
 
Source: Primary data from Polity IV Project by Marshall and Gurr (2013) and Economic Freedom 
Index (2016) 
  
2.3.3 Sub-Regional Initiatives within MENA 
Based on our own dataset used in the empirical exercise of modelling MENA’s intra-regional 
trade on this chapter, the region will be classified into several sub-regional initiatives as shown 
on Table 2.2. This classification is consistent with Bolle (2006), who suggested that the 
significance of intra- regional trade for MENA stands-out, when there is higher trade intensity 
and complementarity between countries of those smaller sub-initiatives. More on this behalf, 
several empirical models developed by Bhattacharya and Wolde (2010) using trade gravity 
equation have proven the lower significance of belonging to MENA in absolute; compared to 
testing the intensity of trade for the Region, when divided into smaller sub-regional initiatives. 
On this respect, many empirical studies obtained a negative coefficient for Intra-PAFTA trade 
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flows as they are formed of 17 MENA countries59. As a result, this chapter will also propose 
one scenario for dividing MENA into sub-regional initiatives to test for its robustness on 
increasing the intensity of MENA’ intra-regional flows (Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010; Carrére 
and Gourdan and Olarreaga, 2012; Carrére et al, 2012; Hoekman 2013) 
Table 2.2: Sub Regional Initiatives within MENA for three years 2000-2005 -2010 
 
MENA's Intra Regional Trade in Billions of 
Dollars  2000 2005 2010 
GCC60 13 30 75 
AMU61 13 10 15 
Agadir Countries 62 0 25 40 
PAFTA 4 5 50 
Source: Primary data extracted from CEPII dataset to estimate intra-trade flows for MENA 
countries 
 
Again, as shown in Table 2.2 with the chronological order for shares of sub-regional trade blocs 
in MENA starting with GCC group of 6 Gulf countries; known as one of the most successful 
sub-regional initiatives in MENA. GCC countries have aligned their common objectives to the 
free movement of labor, capital and full national identity regarding ownership and economic 
activity between their countries since 1981 (Boughanmi 2008; Hätinger, 2009; Rouis and Tabor, 
2013). GCC as a sub-group in MENA contributed to 41 percent of intra-regional trade during 
2009, however the backbone of its exports relies on oil and for this purpose the model’s 
estimations will only capture petrochemical manufactures of this sub-region.  
 
The second biggest initiative in size and trade value within MENA was the Pan Arab Free Trade 
Area (PAFTA) re-launched during 1997 and was known before as Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA); when it first came into action during 1981. PAFTA is composed of 17 MENA 
countries, which shared at 28 percent of MENA’s intra-regional flows during 2010 and their 
members are working on the common goal of boosting the region’s intra- trade activity through 
reducing most favoured nation tariffs (MFN). Although PAFTA countries managed to bring 
down their average ad valorem tariff from nearly 15 percent during 2002 to 6 percent in 2009, 
nevertheless, there still appears to exist wide discrepancies in average tariff rates with less than 
                                                          
59 Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement annotated (PAFTA) consists of 17 countries : they are Jordan, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, 
Egypt, Palestine, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan and Yemen.  
60 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed of this six countries Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain  
 
61 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) includes Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania 
.  
62 Agadir Association Agreement countries: Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and Morocco  
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5 percent import duties for GCC countries contrasted to 30 percent for AMU countries. Thus, 
MENA countries are still facing the traditional custom duties, which leaves them at higher 
vulnerability to suffer from trade distortions (IMF Trade Data base 2007; Hätinger 2009; Shui 
and Walkenhorst, 2010).  
 
In third position came Agadir Association Countries; as a sub- regional initiative under the 
umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade area ratified between MENA countries and 28 
EU members. Agadir countries marked 22 percent of the region’s intra- merchandise-trade 
during 2009 and its success came after engaging in several joint trade schemes with the E.U. 
They represent trade facilitation measures, services liberalization, investments incentives, 
besides intellectual property rights and rules of origin adoption (Agadir Agreement Technical 
Unit report, 2009; Rouis and Tabor, 2013).  
 
The least share is attributed to Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) at approximately having 9 percent 
of Intra-MENA’s flows and mainly dependent on tariff reduction, however, it did not fully 
succeed in removal of behind the border and technical barriers to trade. Due to the significance 
of the four previously mentioned sub-regional initiatives in determining MENA’s intra-regional 
flows. Last part of the chapter will be dedicated to estimating the separate effects of each of 
those sub-regional areas on MENA’s intra-regional trade flows. (Rouis and Tabor, 2013) 
2.4 Econometric Analysis 
2.4.1. Theoretical Gravity Model Framework to measure Intra-MENA Trade 
 
The gravity estimation of this chapter is grounded on the following literature of the classical 
bilateral gravity equation used to measure the intensity of intra-regional trade flows between 
MENA countries. The intensity of trade flows between country pairs increases with the increase 
in their economic size proxied for GDPs, (Mitchel, 2007) and decreases with increase in 
geographical distance between two countries and regions, which acts as a control for bilateral 
trade barriers between country pairs. (Disdier and Head, 2008; Dincecco and Prado, 2013) The 
general framework of the gravity equation for taking lineal transformation OLS estimations will 
be: 
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Ln (Tij,t) = Ln(G) + β1Ln (GDPit) + β2Ln(GDPjt) + β3 Ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗)+ 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑗 
+𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑗+𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡  
 
Eq.(2.1) 
 
The Augmented gravity variables here will incorporate the  𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑗 dummy variable to 
capture the presence of contiguous borders between trading partners i and j as elaborated by 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (2005), meanwhile, 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗  and  𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗both account for existence 
of a common official language and colonial ties between trading partners respectively (Frankel 
,2007). The model is in line with the considerable realm of empirical literature, contributing 
to the enrichment of the theoretical framework of the gravity variables with Anderson and 
Wincoop (2003) adding the concept of ‘Multilateral Resistance’63 to approximate for trade 
costs and elasticity. Then later augmented variables were included to approximate for cultural, 
historical, linguistic, political aspects, currency unions and even the effect of membership into 
WTO on international trade. (Rose, 2003; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 2005; Frankel, 2007; Baier 
and Bergstrand ,2007; Mitchell, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2014). These estimations go beyond 
to include other augmented variables that we believe will control for the Region’s specific 
governance and trade regimes and MENA’s intra-regional initiatives. 
2.4.2 Model’s Specification and Definition of Variables  
 
In this case, our dependent variable is the aggregate Intra-regional trade flow between MENA 
countries. Regarding the exogenous variables, we first consider a group of standard gravity 
variables to approximate economic size denoted by𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  for country i and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 for country 
j. Both GDPs are based on nominal values derived from the Technical Report on Global Prices 
and Incomes Database (2013) to mitigate the occurrence of the Bronze Medal Error (Baldwin 
and Taglioni, 2006). Second, bilateral trade costs between country i and j are capturing 
multilateral resistance as motivated by Anderson and Wincoop (2003).  
 
Third, a set of historical, cultural and, linguistic affinity variables adapted from CEPII’s 
Gravity Dataset 2014 (TRADHIST). Fourth, MENA region’s countries membership in  ̒
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ̓ (GATT) denoted by 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 and ̒ Generalized 
System of Preferences scheme ̓ introduced in the model as 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗 based on Rose (2003). Both 
                                                          
63 Multilateral Resistance: Apart from the mutual attraction between the economic masses of two 
trading partners, there are additional forces and trade costs that make their trade more resistant 
(Anderson, 1979; Anderson and Vancoop, 2003) 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
2.1 Would Intra-Regional Trade of MENA countries increase, when they are more Democratic and less 
Bureaucratic? 
59 
dummies were augmented to reflect on MENA Region’s countries membership in ̒ General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ̓ (GATT) and  ̒Generalized System of Preferences scheme ̓ 
(GSP); covering schemes of tariff reduction and privileges given to developing countries that 
are not members of a certain PTA. The above-mentioned dummies reserved 1, when two 
MENA countries are members of WTO or eligible to apply GSP; otherwise the dummy value 
will be zero.  
As well regional trade areas of MENA countries with E.U. agreements are incorporated in the 
model as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) previously emphasized. Fifth are the Conflict_1 
dummy based on Iran-Iraq war 1987 and Iraq Kuwait war 1991, and in parallel Conflict_2 
dummy based on other civil and armed conflicts in the region. Also, Crisis_1 dummy for food 
crisis of 2006 and crisis_2 to reflect on 2009 financial crisis. All dummies are incorporated in 
the model to reflect on the Region’s nature in line with the descriptive analysis introduced in 
this chapter and with similar dummies used in the literature by Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) 
and Miniesy and Nugent (2005) and Cieslik and Hagemejer (2009); and Bhattacharya and 
Wolde (2010) and Lutmar (2011) and finally Chauffour and Hoekman (2013).  
Equation 2.2 refers to the standard gravity equation estimating and denoting the dependent 
variable as 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 to measure the value of bilateral trade between country i of origin and country 
j of destination during a certain year t and given a set of all possible independent variables and 
through applying exact double log specification of the model as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) +𝛽4(𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 .𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽5(𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦.𝑖𝑗 ) +𝛽7(𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽8(𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛.𝑖𝑗 ) +
𝛽9(𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗)+𝛽10 (𝑟𝑡𝑎−𝐸. 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) + 𝛽11(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡1𝑖𝑗𝑡)+𝛽12(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽13(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽14(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 𝑖𝑗𝑡)+𝜋𝑖, + 𝜒𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
 Eq.(2.2) 
 
2.4.2 Additional Variables: Polity IV and Trade Freeness Indices and Sub-Regional 
Initiatives  
 
Additional variables will be augmented to the gravity equation to capture the governance and 
trade freeness measures through Polity IV and Trade Freeness indices added and the real 
intention at this point is to measure the governance and regime similarity or dissimilarity 
between MENA country pairs based on specific thresholds on the Polity IV and trade freeness. 
As the Polity and trade freeness indices are both unilateral, these indices will be transformed 
into a bilateral index by constructing an average index between country pairs to preserve the 
continuity nature of the index. A second step would be to re-define polity IV as a dichotomous 
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dummy variable with country pairs; taking the value of one, if their score is towards 
democratic or mixed regimes and otherwise both countries will be given a zero dummy in 
consistency with literature’s methodological approach to model the index elaborated by Duc, 
Lavallée and Siroën (2008). A third step will be to classify country pairs into 3 thresholds in 
consistency with the Marshall and Jaggers (2010) Quality of Governance datasets. The Polity 
IV measures will be divided: into Polity_Demo dummy for MENA country pairs with a 
threshold for the interval [5,10]. Polity_Mixed dummy for MENA country pairs with a 
threshold between [-5, 5] and finally Polity_Autoc dummy for MENA country pairs with a 
threshold of [-10 -5] (Mansfield et al, 2013).  
 
The second index used to adjust for trade regimes and policies will be the trade freeness index 
previously used for the same motivation but with a different set of countries by Bhattacharya 
and Wolde (2010). Trade Restrictiveness Index components assess MENA’s Intra-regional 
trade regimes and in our estimations, the trade freeness index will be converted into an average 
score for MENA’s bilateral trading partners. Then a it is re-calibrated in a similar way to Polity 
IV index into three thresholds from [0-100] in the following manner: Trade_Free dummy for 
country pairs in MENA region at a threshold between [80-100], Trade_mfree dummy for 
country pairs that are mostly free in trade regulations holding an interval of [60-80] and finally 
Trade_unfree dummy for [40-60].Last variables to be introduced in the gravity model will 
allow to capture the classification of the region into four sub-regional trade initiatives 
chronologically introduced as: PAFTA_17, GCC, AMU and Agadir_4 
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Table 2.3: The Variables of Bilateral Gravity Model and Expected Signs: 
Variable Description Expected 
Sign 
Consistency with 
Literature  
𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 Trade from origin o to destination d for year t 
and vice versa  
 
 
   _____              
𝑌𝑖𝑡 Nominal GDP in the origin country (o) 
(exporting) for year t.  
 
 
  Positive  Mithcell (2007)  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 Nominal GDP in the destination country (d) 
(importing) for year t. 
 
Positive Mitchell (2007)  
    
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗 Distw is a city population weighted 
mean between each pair of countries, extracted 
from the CEPII’s GeoDist data set 
 
 
Negative CEPII 2017; 
Dincecco and Prado, 
(2013) 
 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑗 Dummy=1 if (i and j are contiguous; otherwise 
0) 
 
Positive  Frankel, Stein and 
Wei (2005); Frankel 
(2007) 
 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 Dummy=1 if (i and j share common language; 
otherwise 0) 
 
Positive  Frankel, Stein and 
Wei (2005) 
 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 𝑖𝑗
 
Dummy=1 if (o and d both belong to same 
colonizer; otherwise 0) 
 
Positive Echiergreen and 
Inrwin (1998) 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 Dummy=1 if (i and j both belonged to the same 
colonizer historically; otherwise 0) 
 
Positive Head and Mayer and 
Ries 
(2009) 
 
𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 Both are members of General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs reserves the value of dummy 
= 1; otherwise 0 
 
Negative Rose (2003) 
 
 
 
 
𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑗 Membership dummy in the Generalized System 
of Preferences scheme applied across all 
developing countries equals 1; otherwise 0 
 
 Positive  Rose (2003) 
 
 
 
𝑟𝑡𝑎_𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑗,𝑡 Accounting for regional trade agreement 
dummy with E.U. =1 for both countries i and j 
in time t; otherwise 0 
 
 
Positive  Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡_1𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
 
It is a dummy taking the value of 1 in-case of 
Iran- Iraq war during 1987 & Kuwait -Iraq war 
1991; otherwise 0 
 
Negative  
 
 
 
Karam and Zaki 
(2016) 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡_2𝑖𝑗 
 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_1𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
It is a dummy taking the value of 1 in-case of 
rest of region conflicts, Yemen, Lebanon, Israel 
-Palestine. 
 
 
It is a dummy taking the value 1 during 2006 for 
the case of food crisis; otherwise 0 
 
It is a dummy taking the value 1 during 2009 for 
the case of financial crisis; otherwise 0 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
 
Negative  
 
 
 
Negative 
 
  
Karam and Zaki 
(2016) 
 
 
 
Karam and Zaki 
(2016) 
 
 
Karam and Zaki 
(2016) 
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑉_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑗  Weighted index at value between [-77,5] for 
polityvi and then converting it into a dummy of 
one for both countries i and j given that their 
index value at a threshold of more than 5; 
otherwise 0  
 
Negative  Gurr et al. (2003); 
Duc and Lavallée and 
Siroën (2008) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 Trade Freeness Weighted index taking dyad 
value ranging from [40- 80] for trade freeness 
between country pairs and then converting it 
into a dummy for both countries i and j equal to 
one given that their index value is more than 80 
for free 
 
 
Positive  Bhattacharya and 
Wolde (2010) 
𝑃𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴_17𝑖𝑗,𝑡 Pan Arab Free Trade Area is a dummy variable 
of 1; when both countries are member of this 
area during time t  
 
 
Mixed  Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) 
𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡 A dummy variable reserving 1 if both countries 
of the 17 are members of Gulf Cooperation 
countries during time t  
 
 
Positive  Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) 
𝐴𝑀𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡 A dummy variable equals to 1; given that both 
countries are members of the Arab Maghreb 
Union during time t  
 
Positive Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) 
]𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑟_4𝑖𝑗,𝑡 A dummy variable equals to 1; given that both 
countries are members of the Agadir association 
agreement (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan  
 
Mixed Al Atrash and Yousef 
(2000) 
𝜋𝑖, Origin country i fixed effects   Eaton and Kortum 
(2002) and Chaney 
(2008) 
𝜒𝑗 Destination country j fixed effects   
𝛾𝑡 Year Time Fixed effects   
Own’s Elaboration Gravity Model output derived from CEPII Gravity dataset (2014) 
[TRADHIST] 
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2.4.3 Model’s Data  
 
The model’s data was derived from the CEPII gravity dataset 64 2014 [TRADHIST] used for 
all countries pairs and then a subset of the data was employed to assess aggregate flows for 
the MENA region (Fouquin and Hugot, 2016). The subset of the data for this purpose 
considered a 25-year timespan; beginning from 1985 up till 2010 to incorporate conflicts and 
crisis occurring during this time frame. The collected data is unbalanced panel data for 21 
MENA countries by origin and destination at an approximate number of observations 11,025 
excluding zero flows. Apart for defining the data of this gravity, it is necessary to clarify that 
the gravity model estimations of this chapter will only deal with merchandise and 
petrochemicals manufactures and not with crude oil flows. Data for GDP for i and j was 
obtained from Technical Report on Global Prices and Incomes Database (2013), meanwhile, 
data on distance, contiguity, colonial and language dummies is derived from CEPII’s Gravity 
Dataset 2014 (TRADHIST). In this case our dependent variable of bilateral trade flow 
between MENA countries is benchmarked by a standard ISO identifier code for countries 
running across years compared previously to other estimations (Comtrade Statistical 
Database, 2009; Head and Mayer, 2013). The data for the three dummies of GATT, GSP and 
RTA_E.U. are in consistency with Rose (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007). For 
practicality purposes data of Polity IV and Trade Freeness were extracted from the Quality of 
Government dataset for 2011; which could be easily merged by country ISO code identifier 
with CEPII gravity dataset for 2014. 
Figure 2.3: Relationship between Gravity defined as (Tij/GDPi *GDPj) and Distance MENA 
 
Own’s Elaboration Gravity Model output from original dataset  
                                                          
64  CEPII gravity dataset from the ‘Centre d’Estudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales’; allows the estimation of bilateral international trade flows in the form of 
gravity equation accounting for bilateral GDP flows between country pairs and trade costs 
through bilateral distance Dyad. (Head and Mayer, 2013) 
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2.4.4 Estimation Methodology: Baseline Scenarios with OLS and PPML.  
    
The two principal econometric estimators used were OLS and comparatively ‘Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum likelihood’ (PPML) to validate the consistency of the expected signs across the 
gravity estimations and account for zero flows. First baseline estimation method relied on 
‘OLS Regression’65and incorporated all variables of equation 2.2 except for Polity IV, Trade 
Freeness and sub-regional dummies. The only uprising problem with OLS estimator is 
undermining almost 20 percent of the dataset lost as zero flows and for accurate reporting 
purposes and accounting for all observations without reducing the model’s explanatory power, 
PPML estimation Silva-Santos and Tenreyro (2006) was employed  
 
It is important to mention as well that a set of year and country fixed effects by origin and 
destination will be introduced to PPML baseline estimation. Those fixed effects represent time 
invariant characteristics affecting our dependent variable and at the same time accounting for 
specific characteristics and multilateral resistance of origin, destination, and time in the model. 
The incorporation of fixed effects will prevent correlation between the error term and the 
dependent variable of average bilateral trade value known as, ‘Heteroskedasticity 
Autocorrelation Robust Standard Errors’ (HAC); which could underestimate the model’s 
robustness, as previously indicated by Rose (2003) and (2004) and Vogelsan (2008).  
This is the augmented gravity equation estimated by PPML and denoting the dependent 
variable as 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 measuring the value of bilateral trade between country i of origin and country 
j of destination t for time in MENA region; given a set of all possible independent variables, 
in addition to the bilateral polity IV and trade freeness indices dummies both capturing 
MENA’s intra-regional.  
Senarios 1-4 
𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) +𝛽2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) +𝛽4(. 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽5( 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 𝑖𝑗+𝛽7(𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 .𝑖𝑗 )+𝛽8(𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽9(𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽10(𝑟𝑡𝑎_𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡)   +  𝛽11 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑉_𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡  +𝛽12𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡   +𝛽13 
𝑃𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴_17𝑖𝑗,𝑡+ 𝛽14 𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗,𝑡+  𝛽15 𝐴𝑀𝑈𝑖𝑗,𝑡+  𝛽16 𝐴𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑟_4𝑖𝑗,𝑡+  𝛽17 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡_1𝑖𝑗,𝑡+ 𝛽18 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡_2𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽19 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_1𝑖𝑗,𝑡+ 𝛽20 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2𝑖𝑗,𝑡+𝜋𝑖 + 𝜒𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   Eq.(2.3)  
                                                          
65 OLS (Ordinary Least Squared Method): the econometric estimation used in calculating the 
gravity model for the country pairs. It highlights the coefficients of the model’s independent 
variables in relation with the dependent variable. It also computes the standard errors that are robust 
to clustering by country pairs (Rose 2003). 
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Table 2.4: Base line 1 and 2 Gravity Model Estimations by using OLS and PPML Estimators 
    
  Baseline (1) Baseline (2) 
  OLS_1 PPML1 
 Variables  Ln Trade Trade 
    
 lnGDP_i 0.791*** 0.755*** 
  (0.0199) (0.156) 
 lnGDP_j 0.981*** 0.242** 
  (0.0138) (0.108) 
 𝐋𝐧𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐰𝐢𝐣 -1.230*** -0.712*** 
  (0.0323) (0.0339) 
 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐣 0.567*** 0.391 
  (0.0877) (0.269) 
   𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐢𝐣 1.414*** 1.123*** 
  (0.0560) (0.0323) 
 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐂𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐲 𝐢𝐣 0.313*** 0.377* 
  (0.0552) (0.198) 
 𝐂𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐲 .𝐢𝐣 1.289*** 1.345*** 
  (0.125) (0.156) 
 𝐁𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐧 𝐢𝐣 0.107* 0.977* 
  (0.0598) (0.0711) 
 𝐆𝐒𝐏𝐢𝐣 -0.252** -0.263** 
  (0.0984) (0.131) 
 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐭_𝟏 -0.0268 -0.387 
  (0.397) (0.364) 
 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐭_𝟐𝐢𝐣,𝐭 -0.565 -0.104 
  (0.440) (0.477) 
 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬_𝟏𝐢𝐣,𝐭 -0.361*** -0.396*** 
  (0.117) (0.146) 
 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬_𝟐𝐢𝐣,𝐭 -0.680*** -0.706** 
  (0.123) (0.129) 
 𝐫𝐭𝐚_𝐞𝐮𝐢𝐣 0.125*** 0.127*** 
  (0.0235) (0.0237) 
 Constant 9.05*** 18.05*** 
  (0.455) (0.603) 
 Country i Fixed Effects No Yes 
 Country j Fixed Effects  No Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects  No Yes 
 Observations 11,394 13,678 
 R-squared 0.940 0.671 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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2.4.5 Standard Gravity Variables Responsiveness and Expected Signs for Baseline 1 
and 2 Models  
 
Table 2.4 contains estimation outcomes resulting from OLS and PPML baseline models. The 
second column using the OLS estimates logarithm of trade as the dependent variable and 
leaving out 20 percent of the sample with zero bilateral trade. Bilateral gravity model variables 
behave as predicted by the literature and as indicated in showing highly significant coefficients 
for GDP of country i and j trading partners (shown in figure 2.4) especially between gravity 
variable 𝑇𝑖𝑗/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 . Most of the gravity variables and augmented variables 
realized the expected negative coefficients with the predicted magnitudes conducted through 
OLS and PPML Estimations. The coefficients of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  has managed to increase 
bilateral intra-regional trade flow between MENA countries by 79 percent and 98 percent 
respectively at highly significant levels of less than 5 percent. As for distance, it has shown 
that distance works with the expected sign and magnitude. When it increases, it causes a factor 
of 2.4 [exp (-1.23) -1] decrease in intra-MENA trade flows. In this case trade cost barriers are 
taken as a proxy for distance and are statistically significant and are in consistency with the 
benchmark estimate of -1 reported in previous estimations for the region by Disdier and Head 
(2008).  
As anticipated OLS coefficients are slightly higher in absolute values than those of PPML, 
however, PPML results are preferred to OLS’s as they minimize the possible over exaggerated 
impact of geographical proximity and colonial ties on trade flows (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
For PPML estimations the 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 are expected to increase by a factor of 2 [exp 
(0.755) -1] *100 and 1.3 [exp (0.242) -1] *100 respectively and cause the partial increase in 
intra-regional trade between MENA countries. As well distance shows negative elasticity at 
highly significant levels proven for the PPML estimator. The expected sign for the augmented 
variable of common language seem to work correctly across both OLS and PPML baseline 
estimations. They both show coefficients above unity of 1.4 and 1.1 respectively at highly 
significant levels and indicative to the partial increase of bilateral trade between MENA 
countries due to increased mutual understanding and harmony in legal aspects of trade 
institutions in contrast to other regional blocs in the world (Bethune and Ledgerwood and 
Riddle, 2009). 
Although border effects here is much lower than common language dummy for the OLS and 
it is insignificant for PPML estimations, yet a common border between MENA countries 
resulted in a [exp (0.567)-1] which is translated to 76 percent increase in intra-regional trade 
for OLS estimations. It is interpreted that MENA countries with common borders have an 
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extra incentive to trade more and this result is in consistency with standard common border 
effects for gravity obtained by Helliwell (1998) and McCallum (1995)66. When it comes to 
sharing common colonial history67and ties, they play a substantial role in reflecting on higher 
intra -regional trade between MENA countries at highly significant coefficients of 1.28 and 
1.34 respectively and at least historical colonial relationships, which are expected to reduce 
cultural differences between their countries. The rest of the dummies of Bothin, GSP and RTA 
were employed to account for free trade and bilateral agreements with E.U and having more 
privilege to trade with other countries in general. They are taken as an indication of regional 
bias in trade of MENA countries towards E.U. or RoW and controlled for as previously 
motivated by Rose (2003) and Baldwin et al (2006). Only regional agreements with E.U. for 
both OLS and PPML estimations have shown to increase trade slightly between MENA 
countries across both estimations at 13 percent, which might suggest some trade re-orientation 
from intra-MENA countries to inter-regional trade between E.U. and MENA countries. Apart 
from there we would be left with conflict 1 and 2, grasping the two main wars and other civil 
conflicts in the MENA and which did prove to decrease in intra-regional trade between its 
countries but did not appear to show any degree of significant impact on its trade in line with 
having the same sign of conflict dummy but not in robustness with the results of Karam and 
Zaki (2015). Finally, both food and financial crisis dummies have appeared to have their 
negative effects on intra-MENA’s trade flows. 
The time and country fixed effects by origin and destination and as well time fixed effects by 
Feenstra (2004) were introduced to the PPML estimations to help in accounting for 
unobserved country characteristics that are fixed over time; thus, allowing for these 
unobservable effects to differ between countries of origin and destination. Origin fixed effects 
expressed as πi for origin country, destination fixed effects known 𝑏𝑦 𝜒𝑗.and 𝛾𝑡 for year fixed 
effects all control for unobserved heterogeneity and individualistic characteristics of 
observations over time.  All the time changing variables retained the same signs for PPML 
estimations but some of the variables had shown lower significance 
 
                                                          
66 Helliwell (1998) and Callum (1995) estimated the border effect to be around 20% in Canada US 
trade and that both countries were able to trade at 20 times higher attributed to sharing a common 
border and the implied effect. 
 
67 MENA countries sharing a common past before in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya all being 
colonized by the French system long ago but all gained independence, as will be seen later the 
Arab Maghreb Union composed of those countries show one of the highest intra-trade coefficients 
in the MENA region. 
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2.4.6 Contrasting Gravity Models Results Across 4 Scenarios:  
In this section, we describe four scenarios to be simulated from the gravity model, in order to 
capture the impact of governance and trade regimes on MENA’s intra-regional trade through 
alternative measures of democratic institutions described by Polity IV, Trade freeness indices 
and finally sub-initiatives in the MENA region. The 4 scenarios which will be described in 
Table 2.5 The common estimator used across all rest of scenarios 1-4 will be PPML estimator:  
Table 1Table 2.5:  Summarizing Different Scenarios with Key results 
 
 
Scenarios New Augmented 
Variables 
Estimation 
Method 
Sign Significance  Literature 
Intuition 
Base line 1 Normal gravity 
Variables 
OLS +ve. 
-ve 
 
High Pro-intuitive 
Base line 2 
 
 
 
First Scenario 
Normal gravity 
Variables 
 
 
Polity IV  
        PPML 
 
 
 
PPML 
+ve 
 
 
 
+ve  
High 
 
 
 
High  
Pro- 
intuitive 
 
Pro-intuitive  
 
 
Second 
Scenario 
 
 
Demo. 
Auto. 
Mixed 
 
 
 
PPML 
 
 
   -ve 
             -ve 
+ve  
 
 
 
Low 
High 
High 
 
 
 
Pro- 
intuitive 
 
Third Scenario 
 
Trade Free 
Mostly Free 
Unfree 
 
PPML 
 
+ve 
+ve 
–ve 
 
High 
High 
High 
 
Pro- 
intuitive 
      
Fourth Scenario PAFTA 
GCC 
AMU 
Agadir_4 
PPML +ve 
+ve 
-ve 
+ve 
High 
Low 
Low  
High 
Pro and 
Counter 
Intuitive  
Own’s Elaboration derived from output results of the Gravity models 
Scenario 1 Introducing Polity IV Variable: 
As we previously mentioned that the Polity IV index score was transformed to a bilateral 
average score for MENA’s trading country pairs based on the thresholds for each group of 
regimes. Later-on as shown in Table 2.5, the First Scenario introduced the Polity _IV 
variable, which reserves the value of one, if both trading partners belong to democratic or 
mixed regimes. Otherwise the dummy will take the value zero for Polity dummies on the same 
grounded foundation used by DUC, Lavallée aand Siroën (2008) for Europe’s polity IV 
dummy 
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Scenario 2 Classification of Polity IV to Democracies, Mixed and Autocracies: 
This scenario rigorously decomposes the Polity IV score ranges for MENA countries as 
follows: the first dummy denoted as ‘Polity_demo’ and equals one, when two countries in 
MENA region both hold a democratic score of threshold greater than 5. The second dummy 
known as ‘Polity_autoc’; reserving the value of 1; when both countries are autocratic with a 
bilateral score less than -5. At last for mixed regimes variable ‘polity_Mixed’ dummy; refers 
to a mix of both regimes; when two countries are characterized by having a mixed regimes at 
threshold less than five and greater than -5. 
Scenario 3: adding the Trade Freeness Index and labelling it by threshold into Free, 
mostly free and unfree trade: 
Adds the other necessary index to complement measuring trade freeness regimes and their 
restrictiveness and facilitation components. The index is re-adapted in a similar way to Polity 
IV index into three thresholds indicative to the difference between degrees of trade freeness 
categories given to country pairs.  Then a dummy is conditioned according to a specific range 
of scores given to the index components; with trade free dummy, if the score exceeds 80 and 
mostly and unfree trade for country pairs of a score that is below 8068. 
Scenario 4: dividing MENA into sub-regional Initiatives to account for intra-regional 
trade flow: 
The fourth scenario opts to untangle MENA countries to be re-group to sub-regional initiatives 
and trade areas. In the case of scenario 4, the region will be divided into four intra-regional 
trade areas proxied by dummies accordingly: PAFTA_17, GCC, AMU and Agadir_4 in the 
literature by Al Atrash and Yousef (2000) and Abedini and Péridy (2006); Ekanayake and 
Embry-Riddle, (2009). The classification of the region into sub-initiatives will act as a 
robustness to check which sub-initiatives has the most significant impact on MENA’s intra-
regional trade intensity.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68  Both parts of trade freeness index in this instance refers to it as composed of 0.75 for trade 
restrictiveness measures and 0.25 for trade facilitation part, both together adding to 100% of trade 
freeness index value.  
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Table 2.6: Base line 2 using PPML Estimator and Scenario 1-adding Polity IV and Trade 
Freeness Indices Values and Sub-Regional Initiatives in MENA 
 
 
Own’s Elaboration derived from output results of the Gravity models 
Scenario1 Scenario (2) Scenario (3) Scenario (4)
PPML PPML_Polity PPML_Trade Freeness Sub-Intra MENA 
Variables Trade Trade Trade Trade 
lnGDP_i 0.755*** 0.509*** 0.452** 0.554**
(0.156) (0.136) (0.183) (0.131)
lnGDP_j 0.242** 0.853*** 0.877*** 0.326***
(0.108) (0.0694) (0.0709) (0.112)
lnDistW -0.712*** -0.835*** -0.894*** -0.882***
(0.039) (0.014) (0.015) (0.120)
Border ij 0.391 0.264 0.607** 0.349
(0.269) (0.322) (0.285) (0.281)
Language ij 1.123*** 1.123*** 1.123*** 1.123***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Colony ij 0.377* 0.393* 0.401* 0.374*
(0.198) (0.168) (0.182) (0.126)
Current colony ij 1.345*** 1.345*** 1.345*** 1.345***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Bothin WTO ij 0.977* 1.319** 1.231** 0.794*
(0.058) (0.057) (0.064) (0.116)
GSP ij -0.252** -0.298** -0.211** 0.0821
(0.094) (0.032) (0.072) (0.449)
conflict_1 ijt -0.0268 -0.387 -0.234 -0.392
(0.397) (0.364) (0.356) (0.359)
conflict_2ij -0.565 0.104 0.0904 0.0995
(0.440) (0.477) (0.514) (0.477)
crisis_1 ijt -0.361*** -0.396 -0.297 -0.429
(0.117) (0.306) (0.245) (0.327)
crisis_2 ijt -0.680*** -0.706** -0.599** -0.742**
(0.123) (0.319) (0.265) (0.342)
rta_E.U.ijt 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.127***
(0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0237)
Polity IV ijt 1.185*** ______ _________ _______
(0.015)
Polity IV_Demo ijt ______ -0.115 -0.115 _______
(0.473) (0.473)
Polity IV_Mixed ijt ______ 0.349** 0.349** _______
(0.055) (0.055)
Polity IV_Autoc ijt ______ -1.158* -1.16* _______
(0.166) (0.166)
Trade_free ijt ______ ______ 0.632** _______
(0.074)
Trade_mfree ijt ______ ______ 0.559** _______
(0.084)
Trade_unfree ijt ______ ______ -0.540** _______
(0.056) _______
AMU ijt ______ ______ ______ 0.197
(0.349)
PAFTA_17 ijt ______ ______ ______ 1.126**
(0.094)
GCC ijt ______ ______ ______ -0.450
(0.350)
Agadir_4 ijt ______ ______ ______ 0.530**
(0.083)
Constant -18.05*** -9.512*** -8.589*** -9.692***
(0.603) (3.548) (4.681) (3.514)
Country i Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country j Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,678 13,678 13,678 13,678
R-squared 0.671 0.662 0.574 0.536
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.4.7 Results of Augmented variables of Gravity Model from Scenario 1 – 4: 
 
Scenario 1 in Table 2.6 we introduced the Polity IV variable for MENA region and it yielded 
a positive coefficient at highly significant levels with a one point increase up towards more 
democratic regimes leading to a factor of 2.3 increase in MENA’s intra-trade and those results 
remain to be in consistency with some of the results driven by Gassebner and Lassmann (2008) 
and Qureshi (2009) and Almargo (2015) for the Polity IV variable. They all detected 
significant coefficients for this dummy, when they estimated bilateral trade flows intensity 
and import and export variety for European Union members and Latin American countries. It 
is of prime importance to mention that none of the previous estimations including evidence 
by DUC et al (2008), did confirm that if both trading partners are characterized by being 
democratic and having similar regimes, they will necessarily trade more with each other. 
Scenario 2 we presented a precise assessment regarding a robustness of the previous Polity 
IV results. It was done by means of decomposing the Polity IV index into three dummies 
(Polity_Demo, Polity_Mixed and Polity_Autoc.) motivated by the more recent literature 
approach used by Aidt and Gassenbner (2008); Qureshi (2009) and Zeynalov (2016). The 
Polity dummies were assigned according to the different threshold ranges given; based on the 
similarity or dissimilarity in governance regime between trading partners. The results 
supported by the literature in some instances were being ambiguous on whether two trading 
partners being more democratic, would certainly signify that they trade more with each other.  
As for Table 2.6, Polity_Demo variable has not shown any significance and reversed to a 
negative sign for intra-MENA trade and equally true for Polity_Autoc. variable; where two 
MENA countries traded less with each other, when they both belonged to autocratic regimes. 
The estimations has shown that is not necessary that similar regimes in the case of 
Polity_demo will reduce trade costs and foster bilateral trade intensity, on the other hand, it 
was very evident that if two MENA trading partners were both following autocratic regimes, 
this will indeed increase trade barriers and would result in lower intra-regional trade flows by 
a factor of 2.2 [exp(-1.158)-1]. The Polity_mixed variable was the only highly significant 
variable among the three thresholds and thus indicated that trading between mixed regimes of 
MENA countries would raise intra-MENA trade by 42 percent [exp (0.349)-1] *100.  
Scenario 3 Moves to adding the second set of Trade Freeness variables that are supposed to 
adjust more accurately in determining MENA’s Intra-regional trade intensity in compatibility 
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with the results69obtained by Abedini and Péridy (2006) to account for trade restrictiveness 
and facilitation measures. The three variables representing trade freeness denoted as 
(Trade_free, Trade_mfree and Trade_unfree) maintained significance across most of the 
categories. When both MENA trading partners had trade_free, this fostered the region’s trade 
by 88 percent, compared to 74 percent when both trading partners are mostly free and finally 
unfree partners in MENA suffered from a 71 percent decline in their intra-regional trade flow.  
Table 2.7 of the appendix demonstrated an extra robustness check by showing that the 
interaction between Polity IV variables and Trade freeness variables will lead to the optimum 
and highly significant combination regime for bilateral pairs of MENA trading partners to 
increase trade between them. Accordingly, the interaction term exhibiting the highest 
significant coefficients were the ones crossing between mixed regimes and trade freeness 
between MENA countries and they increased MENA’s intra-regional trade flows by 104 
percent at [exp (0.715)-1]*100. As well democratic countries that had witnessed trade freeness 
managed to increase the intra-MENA trade flows by 79 percent [exp (0.587)-1] *100. 
Accordingly, key results driven from these findings, illustrate that regardless of the similarity 
between two MENA countries governance regime, yet to reach higher intra-regional trade 
intensity, both partners need to be harmonized on the level of trade freeness indicators to be 
able to trade more. It is evident from the coefficient of the interaction term for Demo_unfree 
at high significance with a factor of 5.1[exp (-1.6234)-1] *100, that it directly undermined 
intra-MENA trade. intensity. 
Scenario 4: This last scenario was used as a robustness check to fully assess the MENA’s 
intra-regional trade intensity. In this scenario, we classified the region into four dummies as a 
proxy to account for the its sub-initiatives. This classification was contemplated in various 
forms by the literature, however our analysis included the whole comprehensive set of intra 
regional agreements to be able to detect which contributed the most to MENA’s trade 
intensity. First starting with PAFTA’s results from Table 2.6 which came at high and 
significant coefficients, contributing to the region’s trade flows and which gave a sign pro-
intuitive to that motivated by the literature and the significance was counterintuitive to our 
findings. (Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010; Carrére and Gourdan and Olarreaga, 2012; Carrére 
et al, 2012; Hoekman 2013) 
Then Agadir dummy showing pronounced effects at a highly significant coefficient and 
increasing intra-trade flow between MENA countries at 71 percent and it matched empirical 
                                                          
69  The free variable derived by Abedini and Péridy (2006) is composite index taking into account 
mean tariff rates, revenue from taxes to trade, regulatory barriers to trade on actual /expected trade 
values. 
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estimations regarding Agadir Agreement’s dummy previously illustrated by Gylfason and 
Martinez-Zarzoso and Wijkman (2015). As for GCC dummy results had shown lower non -
significant coefficients, which were not strongly robust with the main stream literature based 
on Dogruel and Tecke (2010); stating that GCC as oil-rich countries show complementarity 
between their export composition and basket of goods. The dummy still partially increased 
the region’s trade at a lower multiplier and percentage of 10 percent [exp (0.333)]. We suggest 
that the diminished share of GCC group in the significance of the results could be explained 
by the contextual framework of this model which included only merchandise trade and 
excluded oil flows. The AMU dummy, similar to other previous estimations did not turn to 
show high significance and contribute much to intra- regional trade flows in MENA.  
2.5 Possible econometric problems and limitations of the model:   
Most of the econometric problems for this model were treated during the estimations such as 
making sure the PPML estimator deals with zero trade flows; especially for a dataset of 20 
percent zero flows and at the same time to provide consistent estimates that are controlled for 
heteroscedasticity. One of the benefits of PPML estimator is maintaining its robustness even 
when fixed effects by origin and destination are applied, that are very much needed as well in 
models with countries suffering a loss of observations such as for MENA region. As well 
multicollinearity arising between dummies was detected between GAFTA and PAFTA 
dummies; which was corrected for when GAFTA dummy was removed and automatically 
then PAFTA significance increased. Other econometric problems could arise from the 
literature relating trade and democracy, precisely for the endogeneity problem (Aidt and 
Gassenbner, 2008). The endogeneity problem could be partially resolved for by introducing 
lags of a variable; as previously done by Karam and Zaki (2015). Taking the lag of the polity 
IV variable to determine its effects on intra-regional trade would resolve the problem and in 
line with the same model estimations, the lagged value of polity IV MENA dummy was 
introduced and the results indicated that lagged dummy is persistent and retains a positive 
significant coefficient but smaller in magnitude. This robustness estimation does not 
necessarily confirm that the endogeneity problem is fully resolved for. The endogeneity 
problem is only effectively treated with the use of instrumental variables; which are correlated 
to the dependent variable but not to the error term (Bacchetta et al, 2012). It is sometimes 
challenging to use the right, viable and strong instrument in modelling endogeneity, 
specifically for this literature realm measuring impact of regime and governance on trade 
intensity. Accordingly, it is behind the scope of this work to use instrumental variables and it 
could present an opportunity for a future extensive research agenda to be conducted on this 
topic for the MENA   
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Table 2.7: Showing Interaction between Polity IV and Trade Freeness Variables: 
 
Own’s Elaboration derived from output results of the Gravity model 
 
Scenario1 Interaction terms 
PPML Trade
Variables Trade Trade Freeness Polity IV
lnGDP_i 0.755*** 0.516***
(0.156) (0.131)
lnGDP_j 0.242** 0.855***
(0.108) (0.069)
lnDistw ij -0.712*** -0.837***
(0.039) (0.144)
Border ij 0.391 0.245
(0.269) (0.329)
Language ij 1.123*** 1.123***
(0.032) (0.032)
Colony ij 0.377* 0.392*
(0.198) (0.128)
Current Colony 1.345*** 1.345***
(0.156) (0.156)
Bothin WTO ij 0.977* 1.295*
(0.058) (0.083)
GSP ij -0.252** 0.0684
(0.094) (0.330)
conflict_1 ijt -0.0268 ____
(0.397)
conflict_2 ijt -0.565 _____
(0.440)
crisis_1 ijt -0.361*** _____
(0.117)
crisis_2 ijt -0.680*** _____
(0.123)
rta_E.U. ijt 0.125*** _____
(0.0235)
Polity IV ijt 1.185*** _____
(0.015)
Demo_free ijt ______ 0.587**
(0.078)
Demo_mfree ijt ______ -0.253
(0.770)
Demo_unfree ijt ______ -1.634***
(0.330)
Mixed_free ijt ______ 0.715**
(0.346)
Mixed_mfree ijt ______ 0.130**
(0.076)
Autoc_free ijt ______ -0.12
(0.182)
Autoc_mfree ijt ______ -0.164
(0.104)
Autoc_unfree ijt ______ -0.415
(0.325)
Constant -18.05*** -9.692***
(0.603) (3.514)
Country I Fixed  Effects Yes Yes 
Country j Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 13,678 13,678
R-squared 0.671 0.587
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6. Remarkable Results driving to Policy Implications:  
 
Political and economic diversity and heterogeneity across countries of the MENA region has 
introduced difficulties and challenges to the fully harmonized integration vision of its 
countries, needless to mention that successive wars, conflicts, upheavals and economic 
turbulences the region suffered from, made it 10 times harder for this integration vision to be 
accomplished until now. It is however justified through the findings of this chapter that 
sometimes the diversity in governance regimes and heterogeneity across the region could be 
a blessing rather than a curse to fostering intra-regional trade intensity between its members. 
In this work, we are not contradicting the fact that the transformation of MENA’s governance 
and regimes from autocratic to democratic will reduce trade costs and lead to higher trade 
intensity between MENA trading partners. The main finding is that MENA’s intra-regional 
trade flows are not necessarily higher, when both trading partners in the Region are democratic 
countries. 
First, it was important to lay the foundation of intra-regional trade flows showing to what 
extent the gravity equation performs well for MENA countries, obtaining consistent results 
for the standard variables across all scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4. As for the augmented gravity 
variables, we had shown that when Polity IV variable was introduced to capture MENA’s 
intra-regional trade, it increased intra-regional trade intensity by a factor of 3.2. This result 
emanates only from considering one threshold value for the Polity IV variable and not when 
we determine if there is similarity between governance and trade regimes of both trading 
partners in MENA. In order to account for this, the three dummy variables Polity_Demo, 
Polity_Mixed and Polity_Autoc were included and as well trade freeness measures to address 
aspects of trade facilitation and capture tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade regimes 
and their harmonization across MENA countries. 
Under all circumstances, it was proven through the results that similarity between governance 
of both trading partners especially for Polity_Demo variable, does not necessarily guarantee 
in absolute terms higher intra-regional trade intensity between MENA countries and this same 
result was motivated by Duc and Lavallée and Siroën (2008) for other regions. On the other 
hand, mixed regimes were more useful based on our estimations to prove higher intra-MENA 
trade flows. As well a very remarkable result we obtained was addressing the significance of 
trade freeness dummy variable with all its categories in affecting MENA intra-regional flows, 
either for democratic or mixed country regimes. That’s why results asserted that capturing 
both together Polity_IV and Trade Freeness dummy variables together, their combined impact 
on intra_MENA trade flows will reach a 104 percent increase. Significant results were also 
robust for PAFTA and Agadir dummies contributing to most of MENA’s intra-regional 
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merchandise trade and at same time they represent countries of mixed regimes and are not all 
democratic. Finally, the work could draw on two essential dimensions of policy implications 
that should be worked on to achieve higher intra-regional trade flows for MENA countries in 
the future and they are the following: 
1) Implementing a wide range of political reform policies across the region to improve MENA’s 
governance and serve the region’s specific trade regime, policy needs and control for effective 
governance of institutions. This will create mutual understanding and agreement between 
MENA’s trading partners. It is not evident that the region was not able to reach this stage of 
minimum reforms up till now due to the accentuated episodes of political events MENA 
suffered from and which still has not reflected on the full maturity of its governance and 
regimes. As empirical results had shown, it is not a necessity for both trading partners in 
MENA to belong to democratic regimes to be able to negotiate on mutual understanding and 
agreement about trade policies and treaties, however, a certain degree of agreement (in case 
of mixed regimes) between partners would be certainly healthy to augment the region’s trade 
intensity. 
 
2) Although the border variable was not significant across all PPML estimations, yet the only 
estimation scenario 3, is when we accounted for trade freeness as a proxy to control for behind 
the border impediments to trade and this is when the variable became significant. This implied 
that controlling for trade restrictions either behind the border, technical or logistic are more 
pronounced and relevant to reducing the region’s trade costs, magnifying border effect and 
boosting MENA’s intra-regional trade intensity.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on revealing some of the dimensions, fostering MENA intra-regional 
trade intensity. It is true that historically the episodes of conflicts and crisis impeded the 
region’s progress, besides the slow change in the region’s autocratic governance regimes had 
its implications in preventing the proliferation of MENA’s integration efforts. It caused the 
deficiency in governance and lack of coordination and harmony between legal aspects and 
regulations of trade agreements between its counties and this in turn increased trading barriers 
and costs. Accordingly, this Chapter’s main contribution was to show that through controlling 
for the deficiency in governance of executive regimes across all governing institutions coupled 
with considering aspects of trade restrictiveness and facilitation of trade policies all together 
will lead to a considerable increase in MENA’s intra-regional trade flows.  
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The empirical methodology was conducted via a classical Trade Gravity Model measuring 
intra-regional trade flow intensity for MENA countries. The baseline scenario summarized 
the standard gravity model independent variables indicative of economic size, distance used 
as a proxy to control for trade obstacles, in addition to augmented variables, as a set of cultural, 
historical and language affinities, regional trade area dummy, conflict and crisis dummies to 
grasp the region’s sequence of political incidences. In addition to the gravity’s classical 
variables, 4 different scenarios were iterated, three of which involved the inclusion of Polity 
IV and trade freeness variables to be decomposed into 3 three thresholds each to account for 
the influence of governing and executive authorities on trade regimes and policies. Both 
variables covered aspects of executive and competitive constraints placed on governing bodies 
and regimes and in addition it considered trade facilitation schemes and existing bottlenecks 
of trade procedures across the region’s countries. The fourth scenario was used as a robustness 
to inspect which of MENA’s Intra-regional initiatives contributed more to its trade intensity. 
The common estimation approach used across all scenarios has been the PPML to treat for 
Heteroskedasticity and zero trade flows. The model’s empirical evidence has shown that 
transformation of MENA countries institutions from autocracies to mixed and democratic 
regimes, led to greater effectiveness and vigour in their governing institutions and in spreading 
more understanding between trading partners; which will eventually increase intensity of trade 
flows between them. This does not however guarantee that similarity of regimes between 
MENA trading partners, would always result in higher trade intensity between the Region’s 
countries, however, on the contrary trade between MENA countries of mixed regimes and a 
certain degree of freeness from trade non-tariff, procedural and technical barriers will reflect 
significantly well on intra-MENA trade. As well this fact was verified once again by the 
significance of intra-regional trade of smaller sub-initiatives such as PAFTA or Agadir 
countries whom do not all belong to the same governance regime, but have worked on 
different schedules and schemes to harmonize their tariffs, non-tariff and technical barriers to 
trade. 
From all the underlying gravity estimations and scenarios, this work draws on several 
important points: first, the continuous improvement in the quality of governance and self-
regulated process implemented by governing executives and authorities away from pressure 
and interest groups will help them negotiate in an unbiased manner terms of trade that increase 
mutual understanding and benefits for both partners and in parallel increase trade flows on an 
intra-regional level. Second attempting to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic behind the 
border and technical impediments to trade will certainly accelerate trade intensity in the 
region. Finally, fostering some of the promising smaller sub initiatives in region like Agadir 
association agreement, and PAFTA could offer opportunities to expand the region’s 
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merchandise trade and work on increasing trade complementarity between MENA countries 
and trade in higher value added as will be discovered through our next chapter analysing sector 
specific trade flows for the Agadir Agreement countries with the E.U. 
 
At this point, we cannot confirm whether regime similarities might provoke higher trade 
intensities between MENA countries and (RoW), to confirm robustness of results for intra-
MENA trade intensities based on regime similarities. Let’s say, we can find, that MENA 
members which belong to mixed regimes can trade more intensively with E.U. countries, 
meanwhile, Gulf MENA countries that are more towards the autocracy scale, will trade more 
with autocratic countries from the (RoW). This conclusion could suggest future channels of 
research to investigate this topic at higher accuracy and obtain the impact of governance and 
regimes on MENA countries trade intensities when trading with (RoW) countries. Another 
prospect for future research lines driven from this chapter, will be Border Effect for MENA 
countries and their impact on intra-MENA trade intensities, given that all MENA countries 
remain to be under ongoing tensions and which might differentiate between two groups of 
good and bad trading neighbours in the region.   
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Chapter 3: What Happens to Trade Flows when Rules of Origin are relaxed?  
An empirical Analysis Using Sector Specific Flows between Agadir_4 and the 
E.U 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) are defined as the product’s economic passport and its ability to acquire 
‘Originating Status70’; given that the product is wholly grown, or extracted from a certain country 
and not originating from outside its ‘Preferential Trade Agreements’ PTA71. In a nutshell RoO could 
be classified based on Steafano (2009) and European Commission handbook on RoO (2014) into two 
broad categories: ‘Product specific RoO’ and ‘Regime wide RoO’ 72 . The more flexibility is 
introduced to a product’s RoO, the less will be the originating status restrictions and more value-added 
content will be allowed from outside the trading partners. On the other side regime RoO work to 
harmonize and unify trading schemes between countries to facilitate mutual trading.  
At first impression RoOs appear to be simple, however understanding the implementation of RoO is 
a tedious task for both exporters and researchers and equally complex appears to be measuring their 
overall impact on trade flows. Trade and economic welfare gains derived from applying RoO in the 
literature has been controversial between some of the streamline literature being in favour of economic 
and regulatory benefits of RoO, as in the case of Krueger (1993); Krishna and Kruegar (1995); Falvey 
and Reed (2000); Estevadeordal and Suominen (2005) and Feré (2009). The counter arguments 
elaborated by Kruegar (1993); Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003); Chase (2008) and Estevadoerdal, 
Harris and Suominen (2007) emphasized the additional costs and trade distortions caused by applying 
RoO of conflicting regimes.  
Around 50 countries of the E.U and their affiliated Free Trade agreements with the Baltic, CEFTA, 
EFTA, South Mediterranean, Mexico and Chile started applying ‘Pan-Euro Diagonal RoO 
                                                          
70 Origin’s Protocol Conditions: The product has to obtain "originating status"; thus under-going certain 
amount of working or processing within its same preferential trading area. Each product depending on its 
nature and production process and value added has a different working or processing % (in most cases with 
an average between 40 to 60%), in order to confer origin to the PTA (User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential 
Origin used in trade between E.C and European countries). 
 
71  Preferential Trade Agreements: unilateral trade preferences provided by developed countries granting 
preferential tariff to imports from developing countries such as Generalized System of Preferences. 
 
72 Regime Wide RoO: Additional RoO provisions applied across the world PTA’s such as: PANEURO, 
E.U_South Africa, E.U-Mexico, E.U-Chile, EFTA_Mexico, NAFTA, U.S-Chile, G3, Mexico-Costa Rica, 
Mexico-Chile, Mexico-Bolivia, Canada_Chile, CACM-Chile , CACM, Mercosur, Mercosur-Chile, Mercosur-
Bolivia, Caricom, ANZCERTA, SAFTA, SPARTECA, AFTA, Bangkok, Japan-Singapore, U.S-Singapore, 
Chile-Korea, COMESA, ECOWAS, ASEAN, SADC, GCC, U.S-Jordan, U.S-Israel, Canada-Israel , Mexico-
Israel ( Cadot , De Melo and Estevadoerdal  and  Eisenmann and Tumurchurdur 2002). 
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Cumulating System’ 73  known by (PECS) since 1997. The permissiveness of Pan-Euro diagonal 
RoO, allows its participants to source up to 40 percent of their product’s inputs from trading partners 
that are outside their PTA with E.U. According to Augier et al. (2007), this will cause the rupture of 
the  ̒ Hub-Spoke Structure ̓ 74  between E.U, as hub countries to the south Mediterranean spoke 
countries. The amplification of trading partners base from where diagonal RoO applicants can obtain 
their inputs efficiently at a lower cost, will encourage higher intensity of trade flow between spoke 
countries and ‘Rest of the World75 (RoW). One of the good candidate agreements on which the Hub -
Spoke structure with E.U. applies will be the ‘Agadir Association Agreement’76. In parallel one of 
the agreement’s boldly highlighted objectives is to apply sector and product specific diagonal RoO, in 
attempts to increase trade flows between Agadir countries and E.U. members and at same time increase 
Agadir_4 trade flows to (RoW). 
In this context, the aim of this chapter is to shed light on the following issues: to what extent the Agadir 
Agreement has fostered intermediate and export flows between the EU and the 4 Agadir countries, 
once that we control for the evolution of trade to RoW. The next valid question will be regarding any 
remarkable variation in the spatial/sectoral structure of this trade, and to what extent has it been 
induced by the Agadir agreement itself or precisely after the adoption of the Pan-Euro diagonal RoO 
scheme? As it has been observed in other regions, can we certify that lowering the percentage of 
domestic value content threshold in favor of a product to be considered as an originated product, has 
                                                          
73 PANEURO RoO: it is that term used to describe the diagonal cumulation system in operation between the 
European Community and several European countries. The following member countries are operating under 
the Pan-Euro cumulation system and they are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland ,Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,   Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey, south Mediterranean countries Tunisia, Syria, 
Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and other international countries. (User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential Origin 
used in trade between E.C and European countries) 
 
74 Hub Spoke Structure: The spatial structure created between a group of countries that are members of a 
trade agreement; where hub countries are central to the trading flows and they receive the highest intensities, 
meanwhile, spokes as peripheries don’t have the same trade intensity as hubs. 
 
75 RoW Trade reorientation: When a spoke country B is engaged in membership of PTA with E.U, under the 
diagonal RoO cumulation system, it is allowed to source out on average percentage depending on the nature 
of the product 40% of its inputs from outside the PTA at more efficient lower costs than expensive imports 
supplied from member countries within the PTA and this results in trade re-orientation towards rest of the 
world (Augier and Gasoriek and Lai Tong  2007).   
 
76  Agadir Agreement countries: sub-regional initiative under the umbrella of Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements between 27 European Union and 976 south Mediterranean countries. It includes 2 
Arab Mashreq countries (Egypt and Jordan) and two Arab Maghreb countries (Morocco and Tunisia). The 
agreement was originally signed during 2004, ratified and entered into force during 2006.  All together of 
Agadir members constituted an integrated market potential of over 120 million inhabitants and with a 
combined GDP of nearly 200 billion euros during 2005  
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reduced the intensity of trade flows for intermediate products (parts and components) flowing from 
ROW directly to Europe and increased the ones entering through the 4 Agadir countries?  With the 
aim of answering some of those questions, in this chapter we developed several alternative impact 
evaluation approaches and in addition to the use of a rich dataset which includes exports and 
intermediate sector specific flows77 between Agadir 4 and the E.U. collected from CEPII Gravity 
dataset and (Trade Prod.) for final and intermediate export flows and ‘Regional Value Content’ is 
derived from ‘Agadir Technical Unit’ Report 2010. 
The Chapter’s main methodological approach used is a twofold one: First a ‘Hierarchal Cluster 
Analysis’ was conducted to investigate sector specific final and intermediate exports showing a certain 
degree of linkage between their flows and Regional Value Content from Agadir_4 to E.U.; especially 
after adoption of diagonal Pan-Euro RoO. Preliminary cluster analysis resulted in three main 
subgroupings of sectors based on export flows on top of which:  Cluster 1 for Petrochemical related 
industries, Cluster 2 belonging to consumer non- durable goods and finally Cluster 3 of heavy 
duty machinery and spare parts. Second step continues by taking final and intermediate flows 
resulting from the three clusters to be subject to treatment with Pan-Euro Diagonal Rules of origin 
through ‘The Double Differences Approach Estimation Panels78’ (DID). All Countries adopting 
the Pan-Euro RoO were denoted by the treatment group I for all Pan-Euro RoO applicants. Besides a 
smaller treatment group II, estimating final and intermediate flows only between Agadir 4 countries 
and E.U. 26, when exposed to Pan-Euro diagonal RoO and for robustness purposes, two control groups 
were introduced.  
This chapter’s methodological contribution lies in combining bilateral trade gravity model considered 
as one of the workhorses in empirical analysis of international trade flows for Agadir Association 
agreement’s exports to the E. U. (i.e Silva & Silvana, 2006; Chaney, 2008; Helpman et al., 2008; Head 
and Mayer, 2013) and at the same time, introducing treatment with Pan- Euro RoO through impact 
evaluation instruments of the DID approach. Both methodologies have been used previously to capture 
                                                          
77 Exports Flows: represents the value of exports of a reported exporter country with an iso country code 
to an importer iso country (cepii data set definition Trade_cepii8004.dta) 
 
Intermediate flows:  the represent the portion of exports flowing from Agadir_4 to E.U. to be used to 
produce final or finished products. These goods are sold between industries in countries for resale or for 
production of other goods such as rubber products. (CEPII gravity and TradProd. Data set,2009; ATU, 
report 2010) 
 
78 Difference in Difference Estimation: This estimation method identifies a specific intervention policy to 
which two comparative groups are selected; where group one known as treatment group is exposed to the 
policy and the other known as control is not subject to the policy, then the difference in outcomes for those 
comparative groups will show whether the policy has succeeded in accomplishing it objectives or not 
(Bertrand and Duflo and Mullainathan 2003) 
 
CHAPTER 3  
3.1 What Happens to Trade Flow when Rules of Origin are relaxed? 
89 
RoO’s impact on trade flows for other regions by (i.e. Cadot et al., 2002; Duttagupta and Panagariya, 
2003; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; Gretton and Gali, 2005; Augier and Gasiorek and Lai-Tong, 
2007 Gasiorek, 2008; Kelleher, 2012) but to our knowledge, not specifically targeting the impact of 
Pan-Euro RoO on small association agreements such as the Agadir Agreement. The main estimator 
used throughout the chapter is Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML); due to its capacity of resolving heterodeskedacity problems and treatment of the zero-inflated 
bilateral trade flows between country pairs. Note that our models are fed with sector specific flows, 
which amplifies the number of zero flows.  
The interaction term known as   (β10
k DPij) is a variable combining treatment with diagonal RoO and 
time of treatment. Based on the results of the interaction coefficients of the gravity model and using 
DID approach of treatment to account for diagonal Pan-Euro RoO, 11 and 8 sectors out of 12 sectors 
for exports and intermediate flows between Agadir countries and E.U. were highly significant. Besides 
the treatment with diagonal RoO which contributed to fostering of Agadir’s_4 final and intermediate 
exports to the E.U._26 on average by 157 percent and 186 percent respectively and in the emergence 
of a different structure and composition for final and intermediate flows between both partners to 
include the following sectors (industrial chemicals, other chemicals, transport equipment spare parts, 
food products, machinery and medical spare parts) 
 
The chapter starts with a section 2 theoretical framework and evidence from the Literature on the 
Impact of RoO Regime on Trade Flows. Section 3 Descriptive data on Agadir_4 to E.U and Cluster 
analysis. Then section 4 introduces the bilateral sector specific Gravity Model estimations. Section 5 
Treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO through Policy impact of DID approach. Finally, section 7 
provides a discussion across all estimations and results and the conclusion. 
3.2 Evidence from the Literature on the Impact of RoO Regime on Trade Flows  
3.2.1 Main Stream argument about Adopting RoO  
 
The controversy around the restrictiveness versus the flexibility of RoO arises from two main 
argumentative directions; one in favor of the trade liberalization benefits, ‘Trade Creation 
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Effects’79,‘Multilateral Openness’80evident when regime wide RoO’s are implemented.  This view 
has been widely supported by the theoretical literature, highlighting the role of Pan-Euro diagonal 
RoO cumulation as a trade harmonizing tool. Starting back by Krueger (1993) and Krishna and 
Kruegar (1995) both shedding light on RoO as an instrument used in protecting exporters against 
dumping; especially in low tariff countries. Later, during the early 2000’s, Falvey and Reed (2000) 
advocated RoO as the natural commercial instrument offsetting the ‘Optimal Tariff’81 taken from 
importers and encouraging them in return to abide by RoO regimes through the less costly ‘De-
minimis Provisions’82; known by the unified regime wide RoO provisions. As for Estevadeordal and 
Suominen (2005), they advocated multilateral harmonized RoO regimes and they had proven that 
through investigating discrepancies and similarities across RoO regimes worldwide; relaxing Pan-
Euro RoO, revealed a positive advantage for trade between E.U. and its trading partners from Balkan 
and Mediterranean countries. Accordingly, this caused the rupture of the normal hub-spoke relation 
between northern and southern countries and re-oriented flows to new hubs of Arab Southern 
Mediterranean countries. At the meantime, Augier and Gasiorek and Lai-Tang (2007) laid the 
foundation for a standardized Pan-Euro RoO system to be implemented across all north and south 
European and Mediterranean countries and they investigated how Pan-Euro diagonal RoO unified and 
minimized extra costs of conflicting RoO bound to different PTAs’. 
On the other hand, the opposing argument set by Kruegar (1993) and Duttagupta and Panagariya 
(2003) and Chase (2008) and Estevadoerdal, Harris and Suominen (2007), identified RoOs’ as a trade 
discriminatory and protectionist device limiting trade liberalization benefits from disseminating to all 
trading partners. Krueger (1993) was the first to draw attention to the dubious nature of RoO; given 
they worked well as a natural anti-dumping tool; however, she also indicated to the economic 
inefficiencies that they might cause in free areas; due to their resemblance to custom duties. Duttagupta 
and Panagariya (2003) and Chase (2008) attempted to clarify the political economy dimension behind 
the use of product specific RoOs and how it might restrict competition in front of intermediate 
                                                          
79 Trade flow creation: this concept indicates how non-restrictive RoO averse trade distortion and inefficiencies 
caused from Hub-Spoke structure and recreates trade flow between Spoke-Spoke countries; where they are able to 
source out more intermediates between themselves and from RoW, instead of supplying higher priced intermediates 
only from same PTA members (Gasiorek and Augier and Lai-Tong  2007 
 
80 Multilateral openness: the state of moving towards multilateralism between countries when less restrictive and a 
unified system of Rules of origin such as regime wide provision as diagonal and full RoO cumulation are applied 
between PTA(Hansen 1996; Estevadoerdal, Harris and Suminen 2007) 
 
81 Optimal Tariff: It is a discriminatory type of tariff set by policy makers depending on the product and its aim is 
to maximize importer’s welfare gains (Falvey and Reed 2000).  
 
82 De-Minimis provision: allowing the use of maximum % of non-originating materials without affecting origin 
(User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential Origin used in trade between E.C and European countries) 
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exporters and importers; especially for the protection of domestic and interest groups involved in RoO 
settings. Equally true El-Megharbel (2006) and Estevadoerdal, Harris and Suminen (2007), elaborated 
on differences between RoO regimes around the world that might cause trade distortive effects across 
regions. Accordingly, they proposed harmonized multilateral RoO system to be one remedy; aiming 
to reduce frictions across different RoO’s regimes. Many other views attributed the existence of 
confusion and contradictions between RoO associated to different PTAs within the same region, which 
makes it much more challenging and costly for a region to adopt different RoO protocols (Harou, 
2007). This might leave smaller association agreements such as Agadir Agreement countries facing 
more challenges into implementing several bilateral RoO in harmony with U.S and other RoW 
countries and in parallel assuming diagonal Pan-Euro RoO with European and PAFTA countries.  
3.2.2 Empirical Literature Review on RoO Assessment: 
 
To the best of our knowledge, few empirical studies (see Table 3.16 of the appendix of this chapter 
for the literature review) have been conducted studies to capture the impact of regime-wide RoO 
protocols on trade. The reason is how tedious it is to collect the accurate information on bilateral sector 
and product specific trade flows, origin, production process, Regional and local value content, 
percentages of intermediates and value added determining a product. One of the original empirical 
work in this literature realm was developed by Kruegar (2003), who assessed NAFTA’s product 
specific RoO through analysis of the aggregate trade flows between Mexico and Canada; assigning 
‘Utilization Rates83’ across industries. This indicator will show how much exporters preferred RoO 
product specific regimes rather than applying ‘Most Favored Nation’ (MFN) tariff rate MFN84 . 
During 2000’s the real progress for empirical investigation started when trade gravity models were 
used to estimate RoO and measure their impact. One of the early investigations were elaborated by 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004), when they adopted an ‘Augmented Gravity Equation85’ with 
the addition of an average ‘Restrictiveness Categorical RoO Index86’for all product categories; to 
                                                          
83 Utilization Rates: It is an indicator equivalent to a tax rate in percentage signaling that higher is this rate, the more 
prone are exporters and importers to join RTA agreements and apply their associated RoO regimes rather than being 
subject to MFN tariff rate. This rate depends on the product classification and weighing out of cost of compliance to 
RoO regimes and MFN tariff rate. 
 
85 Augmented Gravity Equation: Augmenting extra variables to a classical gravity equation measuring trade flows, 
in order to capture the impact of applying sector specific RoO on final and intermediate trade flows and therefore it 
is necessary to have in the model additional variables to estimate RoO compliance. (Estevadeordal and Suminen 
2004). 
 
86 Estevadeordal (2000) average RoO restrictive index: represents a categorical index ranging from 1 given for least 
restrictive RoO regimes such as Asian ones and 7 given to the most restrictive RoO as an example will be the 
NAFTA’s RoO. The index measures the degree of restrictiveness of a product’s RoO’ which is determined in 
ascending order of restrictiveness as follows: change in product’s chapter, change in a product’s heading within a 
chapter and change in a product’s sub-heading, change in tariff classification and least is change in value content 
criterion (Estevadeordal  et. Al. 2000) 
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capture heterogeneity across different product specific RoO regimes. Their analysis was a milestone 
in the RoO literature which determined the exporters’ ability to comply with sector and product 
specific RoO for final and intermediate trade flows. Although the empirical literature on modelling 
RoO is still in its infant phase, yet more recently new approaches of policy impact evaluation such as 
‘Propensity Score Matching’ 87  (PSM) has been modelled and combined with trade gravity 
estimations. The impact evaluation approaches gained popularity in evaluating the vigor of certain 
policies, such as entrance and membership in currency unions and on a more limited scale has analyzed 
the adoption of RoO provisions on trade flows for regimes of European countries (Kheir El Din and 
Gohenim, 2005; Cadot and Melo, 2007; FEMISEvii Research Centre, 2007; Chintrakarn, 2008; Imben 
and Wooldridge, 2009; Millimet and Tchernis, 2009; Jurše and Logoižar and Vide,2010; Gauto, 2012). 
Another important landmark in modelling RoO regimes and their ‘Ex.post Effect’88on trade flows 
was developed by Augier Gasoriek and Lai-Tong (2004) to capture the impact of regime wide diagonal 
Pan-Euro RoO on bilateral trade flows of manufactures and intermediates within the European, Baltic, 
CEFTA and south Mediterranean. Their remarkable results indicated that missing out on the 
application of diagonal RoO, led to a 47 percent underestimation in intermediates trade flows on 
average between 1995 and 1999. Finally, a considerable amount of the empirical literature examined 
RoO through general equilibrium models and the introduction of weighted indices. These indices 
estimated components of product specific and regime wide RoO on bilateral sector specific flows 
through gravity models capturing RoO provisions and only a few focused-on panel estimations 
through using Double Differences approaches. (i.e.: Cadot et al., 2002; Duttagupta and Panagariya, 
2003; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004; Gretton and Gali, 2005; El- Megharbel, 2006; Augier et 
al., 2007 Harris, 2007; Gasiorek, 2008; Kelleher, 2012).  
3.3 Theoretical Framework of Modelling Pan-Euro RoO and Model’s Descriptive Data  
3.3.1 Technicalities about Pan-Euro RoO Cumulation System (PECS)  
 
Pan-Euro diagonal RoO came into action in 1997 and they always aimed at harmonizing RoO regimes 
across countries. As illustrated in Table 3.1, this system included 15 original European Economic Area 
countries, EFTA countries89, Central European countries and the Baltic States and 9 Mediterranean 
                                                          
 
87  Propensity Score Matching: matching of treated individuals with their nearest neighbour controls by using the 
appropriate matching conditioning characteristics common between the two groups (Diamonds 2006) 
 
88  Ex.post effect: It measures the actual impacts accrued by the beneficiaries that are attributable to program 
intervention and there are many such programs and approaches as Double differences , Propensity score matching 
and treatment effects models developed by Heckman and Vytlactil (2005) 
 
89 EFTA: European Free Trade Association  
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countries. Later-on during 1999, many other RoW90 countries became members of the Pan-Euro 
cumulation system and it was amplified to a total of 38 member countries.  Finally, during 2001, the 
total number of members adopting Pan-Euro diagonal RoO schemes reached 50 countries world-wide. 
Any product that has obtained originating status in the above -mentioned countries will be recognized 
and given a certificate of movement known as (Euro1 or Euro-Med). 
Rules of Origin (RoO) follows the standard product specific Rules and Regime wide harmonizing 
Rules. Product Pan-Euro specific RoO are stricter and need conformity by specific criteria: i) Change 
in the ‘Tariff Classification’ of a sector (CTC91) ii) Change in product’s ‘Value Added Content’ 
(RVC)92; iii) ‘Technical Requirement Criteria’ (TECH); defined as the substantial change in a 
product’s chemical or physical composition allowed for changing origin. On the other hand, regime-
wide RoO are supplementary provisions introduced to harmonize and ease discrepancies across all 
RoO regimes and this is what exactly our gravity equation and treatment approaches will be interested 
to model. Usually regime RoO follow three ‘Types of Cumulation Schemes’93; which describe the 
system of acquiring origin through bilateral, diagonal or full cumulation system (Steafano, 2009; 
European Commission, 2014). The virtue of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO lies in its flexibility to allow 
                                                          
 
90 RoW: The rest of the world here is meant all other world countries except for 30 E.U countries in the model 
, among which are also the 4_agadir countries excluding intra_agadir trade statistics 
 
91 Change in Tariff Classification (User’s Hand Book to the Rules of Preferential Origin Eurostat).   
 
91 CTC: Change in tariff classification system based on the "Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System" and classified into 97 tariff chapter inclusive of sectors and products. The product’s tariff class, duties, 
charges, equivalent charges, preferences, quotas and ceilings could be determined based on this classification. 
Two products under the same sector but belonging to different chapters will be subject to different tariff rates, 
while, normally when a product is under the same heading or sub-headings, its tariff category does not 
necessarily change (User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential Origin used in trade between E.C and European 
countries) 
 
92 Change in Regional Value Content: it signals to percentage of processing or value added in a product which 
originates from outside the preferential origin area for a PTA. For Pan-Euro RoO it ranges from 40% to a 
maximum of 60% in this range for the majority of products. (User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential Origin 
used in trade between E.C and European countries) 
 
93 Bilateral RoO cumulation: RoO provision system which constraints the use of material and components 
originating of a product only to countries belonging to the same regional trade area and does not allow 
processing from outside the RTA (User’s Hand Book to the Rules of Preferential Origin Eurostat) 
 
Diagonal cumulation: Diagonal Rules of Origin Cumulation System: If we have three countries A, B and C and 
they have agreements with each other and each operating identical rules of origin, in this case they are allowed 
to process some non-originating materials from other countries, under certain conditions 
 
Full Rules of Origin Cumulation System: Involves a higher degree of integration within the context of Pan-
European cumulation origin rules, and it is only existent between the European Economic Area members 
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inputs to be accumulated from outside the E.U. countries, given that Pan-Euro diagonal RoO countries 
have already signed prior bilateral or preferential trade agreements with other (RoW) countries. This 
certainly relaxes RoO opening the door in-front of efficiently sourced inputs and intermediates from 
countries outside the Pan-Euro compliance area. The only condition imposed is a threshold set on the 
average intermediate constituent allowed to be sourced from outside the Pan-Euro cumulation area not 
to exceed more than 40 percent of the final good. (Eurostat, 2010; User’s Hand book of Rules of 
Preferential Origin used in trade between E.C and European countries, 2011; Augier and Gasoriek and 
Lai, 2008) 
Table 3.1: Timeline for Mediterranean Countries Joining in Pan-Euro Rules Origin Cumulation (PECS) 
during 1997 
 
Note: During 2013 based on the European Commission’s general aspects of preferential origin and Pan-
Euro Mediterranean Cumulation and PEM Convention, its members reached 50 countries.   
Source: European Union Commission 2013 
3.3.2 Stylized Facts about Agadir_4 Sector Specific Trade and Export Flows: 
 
This analysis gives a comparative brief on the descriptive data and evolution of Agadir_4 countries94 
trade flow to RoW, Intra-Agadir and with E.U.; especially for export flows to E.U.; which will be part 
of the methodological approach. The analysis aims at showing to what extent the agreement has 
fostered trade between the EU and the 4 Agadir countries, once that we separate Agadir’s 4 evolution 
of trade to the RoW. Although some of the European countries entered Pan-Euro diagonal RoO since 
1997; as evident from Table 3.1, yet they did not start operating with diagonal RoO before year 1999 
                                                          
94 The context meant by Agadir_4 countries here (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia)  
 
Original PECS_RoO Pariticipants Cumulation Date Other Countries Diagonal PECS_RoO Cumulation Date 
Austria 1997 United States 1999
Azerbaijan 1999 Chile 1999
Belgium 1997 China 1999
Cyprus 1999 Australia 1999
Denmark 1997 Canada 1999
Finland 1997 EFTA Diagonal PECS_RoO Cumulation Date 
Framce 1997 Swizerland 2006
Germany 1997 Iceland 2006
Greece 1997 Norway 2006
Georgia 1999 Agadir Association Agreement Diagonal PECS_RoO Cumulation Date 
Hungry 1999 EGYPT 2006
Portugal 1997 Jordan 2006
Poland 1997 Morocco 2005
Italy 1997 Tunisia 2006
Lativa 1999
Netherland 1997 Barcelona Process (Euromed partnership) Diagonal PECS_RoO Cumulation Date 
Spain 1997 Algeria 2007 *
Slovekia 1999 Israel 2006
Slovenia 1999 Lebanon No 
Lativa 1999 West Bank and Gaza Strip 2009
Syria No 
* For Algeria mean cumulation started only for few setors and was not fully applicable 
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(European Commission, 2013). Accordingly, our database will cover the same timeframe of data to 
be employed later in the gravity model from [2000: 2010]. The main motivation using sector specific 
final and intermediate export flows between Agadir 4 and E.U. was due to two reasons: first, the 
missing data on the level of sector specific imports from E.U. and presence of wide discrepancies 
between sector specific import data collected from the custom authorities and the reporting through 
the Agadir Technical Unit. Second, the absence of data relevant to the breakdown of import tariffs 
rates and ‘Regional Value Content95’(RVC) applied for imports.  Accordingly, the estimations rely 
on Sector specific final exports and intermediate export flows from Agadir_4 to the E.U. for the 
analysis and gravity dataset 
Regarding Figure 3.1 it is worth mentioning the reversal point observed in 2008 for Agadir-4 with E.U 
trade respect to Agadir_4 to RoW. Historically Agadir_4 to E.U.’s total trade precisely started to pick 
up and increase after the on-set of the agreement during 2005 and it witnessed more than a 50 percent 
upsurge between 2005 and 2008. This sudden increase coincided at the same time with the ratification 
and implementation of the Pan-Euro diagonal RoO on some of the sector’s specific bilateral flows 
between Agadir_4 to E.U. The reason why Agadir_4 to E.U. trade started to fall again below Agadir_4 
to (RoW’s) trade one year later was due to the occurrence of the economic crisis of 2009, which hardly 
hit European countries and ultimately trade flows were re-directed from Agadir_4 to RoW partners; 
especially to Asian markets96. Agadir_4 to RoW trade has grown on average at 14 percent from 2003 
to 2009, boasted by the entry of some member countries into several bilateral trade agreements with 
U.S 97. After 2006 Agadir_4 to RoW’s trade started to diminish by 5 percent and it rebound back in 
2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95  Regional Value content based on the percentage of processing or value added in a product which 
originates from outside the preferential origin area for a PTA. For Pan-Euro RoO it ranges from 40% to a 
maximum of 60% in this range for the majority of products. (User’s Hand book of Rules of Preferential 
Origin used in trade between E.C and European countries and Agadir Technical unit statistics and database 
,2010) 
 
96  Asian partners: The ASEAN area including: Brunei, Indonesia, Cambodia, Lao people republic, 
Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, and India. (Ayadi. Et al. 2009) 
 
97  Some of the Agadir agreement countries entered into several bilateral trade agreements with U.S 
chronologically as follows: Jordan during 1998 followed by Egypt in 2005 
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Figure 3.1: Total Aggregate Trade Flows for Intra_agadir_4 / Agadir_4 to RoW / Agadir_4 to E.U. 
 
Source: Own’s Elaboration based on the original source and Agadir Technical Unit Statistics 2010  
Although Agadir_4 imports to E.U. will not be subject to treatment in the section of econometric 
data, yet it is worthy to mention that Agadir countries in general acted as net importers from RoW 
since 200298. Over 60 percent of their final imports were concentrated in heavy duty Machinery, 
electronics, transport equipment and processed food products, meanwhile, their exports to RoW were 
concentrated in textiles, fabricated metals, Iron and steel, industrial and petrochemical paints, 
varnishes, furniture and processed food products. (Model’s descriptive data [2000-2010]; ATU 
Statistics, 2009; Ayadi. et al, 2009; Eurostat trade database, 2010).  
We can see from Figure 3.1, that although Intra Agadir_4 trade flow remained flat for long time, it 
started to grow at an average of 26.3 percent over 4 consecutive years since the agreement’s inception 
during 2005. Consequently, intra-Agadir exports grew over its imports by 1.5 million USD during 
2010, however, its exports composition was still confined to low value added primary and semi 
manufactured industries99and which involved increasing the complexity of products between Agadir-
4 countries and the E.U., as in the case of the Automotive sector. In this case Tunisia specialized in 
safety seat belts for motor vehicles, Jordan provided radiators for motor vehicles and Egypt exported 
the brake system parts then all components combined and re-exported to E.U. countries. (Model’s 
descriptive [2000 -2009]; Berbache, and De Cenival, 2008; ATU report, 2012) 
                                                          
98 Trade data for Agadir_4 with RoW: is only available post 2002, data scarcity problem in the region for 
aggregate and sector specific flows exists 
 
99 Feeding Industries for heavy machinery and transport equipment: Intra Agadir_4 has a 25 percent of 
exports in this category and 17 percent imports and it includes manufactures ship building, motor vehicles, 
motorcycles, bicycles, aircraft, railroad equipment. They represent 382, 383 and 384 for revision 2 ISIC 
code (Eurostats.un.org 2011;ATU 2009) 
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3.3.3 Changes in Final and Intermediate Exports Composition between Agadir_4 and the E.U. 
This section will orient the reader on the remarkable variation of sector specific exports driven from 
the model’s data incorporated with data from Agadir Technical Unit database for 2010 between the 
Agadir_4 and E.U before and after the on-set of the agreement and adoption of Pan-Euro RoO. Figure 
3.2 divided into parts A and B both plotting some of the significant results for sector specific flows 
between Agadir_4 final exports and intermediates to be sold to firms for final production at the E.U. 
two years before the onset of the agreement and two years after. The most striking result implicated 
from the data is the emergence of new sectors such as Rubber Products, Leather, Minerals after the 
agreement was established and RoO applied either for exports or intermediates. In general, the 
Petrochemical related industries including several new sectors100 constituted 70 percent of Agadir_4 
exports to the E.U. The intensity of flows increased for exports of other chemicals recording nearly 
triple for final exports and quadruple for intermediates during 2008. The only two sectors scoring 
lower flows after the onset of the agreement were Machinery spare-parts and furniture.  
Figure 3.2: Parts A and B: Sector Specific Exports and Intermediate flows during 2004 and 2008   
 
Source: (Estevadeordal 2000; ATU Statistics 2009; CEPII original data; Eurostat 2011) 
 
                                                          
100 Petrochemical related industries for Agadir 4 exports to E.U. during 2008 was proportioned as follows: 
Industrial Chemicals at 42 percent Other Chemicals at 30 percent , Minerals 6 percent , Rubber Products are 3 
percent. (CEPII Gravity dataset 2010; Eurostats.un.org 2011; ATU 2009) 
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Moreover, Table 3.2 demonstrated that the sectoral breakdown of export flows from Agadir_4 to 
E.U. considering two comparative points: as two years, prior the adoption of Pan- Euro diagonal RoO 
in 2004 to include data analysis covering the onset of Agadir agreement 2005. As well, two years 
later during 2008 to guarantee that Pan- Euro RoO went in vigour for all countries. The table includes 
a breakdown of Agadir_4 to E.U. sector specific exports and intermediate flows based on CEPII’s 
trade dataset 2010,  TradeProd database. and the percentage of RVC101 and LVC102 , MFN tariff rates 
applied on each sector and finally RoO schemes adopted all derived from Agadir Technical Unit 
database 2010. In general, a remarkable difference has been observed in sector specific exports from 
Agadir_4 to E.U. First commentary suggests that during 2004 around 66 percent of Agadir’s_4 
exports to the E.U encompassed: Machinery Spare Parts, Furniture, chemical sector and its 
derivatives, meanwhile, during 2008 Petrochemical related industries included several new sectors103 
reaching 70 percent of their exports. Other key export flows which grew at considerable rates were 
processed food products growing by 4.1 times, textiles by 5 times. As for intermediate sectors rubber 
products grew at 48 times more after Pan-Euro RoO were implemented. More over in Table 2.3, there 
has been a significant increase in RVC for gross exports104with more pronounced results for the 
following sectors: Other Chemicals and Textiles at 40 and 45 percent respectively during 2008, in 
contrast to a lower percentage of 20 and 27 percent recorded respectively in 2004. This eventually 
signals to the improvement in the complexity and higher regional value-added content allowed for 
manufactures to culminate at a threshold of up to 50 percent from any (RoW) country and not 
necessarily European countries.  
As well the reference of Kruegar (2003) pointed to the correlation between MFN tariff and adoption 
of Pan-Euro RoO. This correlation signified that the higher will the ̒ Most Favoured Nations Tariff  ̓
105rates (MFN) be, the more incentives will appear for exporters to apply diagonal Pan-Euro RoO. 
                                                          
101 RVC Regional Value Content the threshold between [40%-50%] of value or components that is allowed 
to be accumulated or imported into the product or sector from outside the Pan-Euro diagonal RoO applicant 
countries  
 
102 LVC: Domestic Value Content the local or domestic component or a product that should originate  in the 
country and not from outside the Pan-Euro RoO applicants group and it has a threshold of between [ 50%-
60%] 
 
103 Petrochemical related industries for Agadir 4 exports to E.U. during 2008 was proportioned as follows: 
Industrial Chemicals at 42 percent  Other Chemicals at 30 percent , Minerals 6 percent , Rubber Products 
are 3 percent. (CEPII Gravity dataset 2010; Eurostats.un.org 2011; ATU 2009) 
 
104 Gross exports: stands to the classification of exports to two categories of value added and intermediate 
components and both can then be reclassified in to Domestic and foreign content for value added and 
intermediate product. (UNCOM trade database, 2011) 
 
105 Most Favored Nations Tariff Rates (MFN): high tariff rates that WTO countries are allowed on one another; 
in case of being a non-member of the PTA with the other country (World Bank) 
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For Table 2.3 average MFN tariff across all sectors exceeded 8 percent, this is considered a high 
premium encouraging trading partners to apply Pan-Euro diagonal RoO at a lower cost over the MFN 
tariff rates. In this case, the RoO average ‘Compliance Costs’106 for Agadir_4 to E.U. was lower 
than 6 percent for most of the sectors. The broad class of Petrochemical Industries with Industrial 
Chemicals, Other Chemicals and Minerals were grouped together at a common average MFN tariff 
rate higher than 6 percent107 and at the same time lower RoO compliance costs for those sectors, will 
allow for cost effectiveness in case of applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. Literature reviews earlier 
elaborated by Kruegar (1993) and Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) and Chase (2008) and 
Estevadoerdal, Harris and Suominen (2007), emphasized that RoO are divided into two components. 
The first will be the sector specific provisions for RoO and Regime harmonizing RoO. In this case 
petrochemicals will comply to sector specific RoO through the following changes in tariff rates and 
value-added content (C. S+C.H+V.C)108, As for the regime wide RoO component, it enjoys more 
flexibility, thus allowing to include regional value content from outside members and at the same 
time giving permissiveness to apply Pan-Euro diagonal RoO which will fulfil the purpose of our 
treatment approach in section 3.5 
Table 3.2: Some of the Sector Specific Exports, Intermediates, RVC and LVC, MFN tariff % and Sector 
Specific RoO applied between Agadir_4 and EU during 2004 and 2008 
 
 
                                                          
 
106 RoO Compliance Costs: they represent the costs of complying with rules of origin to be decomposed into 
distortionary costs (caused by changes in the production structure to enable compliance), in addition to 
administrative costs to prove origin. Total compliance costs were found to be 8% for EU rules of origin  
 
107 MFN tariff rate: when it is higher than 1.5 percent; this represents the threshold point for taking the decision 
to compare cost of compliance with PECS RoO versus payment of the MFN tariff rate. In this case a MFN tariff 
higher than 1.5 percent, indicates that a country prefers to apply PECS RoO which is less costly and will not 
exceed 1.5% (ATU 2009). 
 
108 (C.S+C.H+V.C): They represent three categories of C.S: change of subheading, C.H. :change of headings: 
and V.C, :Value added content change all grouped under the sector and product specific RoO applied for the 
group of petrochemical sectors (i.e. industrial and other chemicals and minerals). (European Commission 
regulations on RoO) 
 
2004
Sector G. E 2004 Intermediates  2004 RVC% LVC % R.V.A L.V.A MFN tariff % Sector  RoO provisions   
Machinery Spare Parts 5,084,348 1,932,052 5% 95% 157,615 2,994,681 7.67% C.S+V.C
Furniture 3,431,894 1,304,120 20% 80% 425,555 1,702,220 7.25% C.H+V.C
Other Chemicals 1,944,016 738,726 20% 80% 241,058 964,232 23.60% C.S+C.H+V.C
Petroluem Refineries 1,393,919 529,689 20% 80% 172,846 691,384 6.70% C.S+C.H+V.C
Paper 905,339 344,029 28% 72% 157,167 404,143 8.00% C.S+C.H+V.C
Food Products 677,207 257,339 10% 90% 306,504 113,365 33.60% C.S+CH+V.C+C.C
Textiles 660,380 250,945 27% 73% 110,548 298,888 13.00% C.S+C.H+V.C+C.C+TECH
Industrial Chemicals 383,138 145,592 27% 73% 64,137 173,408 5.70% C.S+C.H+V.C
Rubber Products 66,315 25,200 20% 80% 8,223 32,892 9.30% C.S+C.H+V.C
USD In Percentage USD In Percentage 
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Note: Agadir_4 agreement with E.U. for sector specific exports and intermediate flows included other small sector specific 
flows for petroleum refineries and wearing apparel.  Machinery Spare is here an aggregate to include transport, scientific and 
electric machinery spare-parts and accordingly its total flows during 2008 decreased but the breakdown of different spare 
parts have different values and impact of RoO)  
Source: (Estevadeordal 2000; ATU Statistics 2009; CEPII original data; Eurostat 2011) 
Figure 3.3 indicates to the contrast between Agadir’s 4 total final exports to the E.U. at two distinctive 
points during 2004 and 2008 versus the increase in regional value content. It also gives a justified 
explanation about the change in the spatial structure and composition between final and intermediate 
exports and how final and intermediate exports are correlated to RVC. In this figure, we are using 
precisely the percentage of RVC which was derived from the analysis, the higher is RVC to reach the 
threshold of 40 percent, the more effective will Pan-Euro diagonal RoO be (which is the treatment 
used in our econometric model work later) and higher intensity of export flows will emerge between 
Agadir_4 and E.U. The presence of more observations at lower values for part A of Figure 3.3 during 
2004, compared to a trend line with observations taking an increasing slope for higher values of final 
exports at Figure 3.3-part B during 2008, indicates to the fact that as RVC became higher, final exports 
will also increase. However, this relation is not equally evident for intermediate flows, as seen the 
observations are more dispersed and they take no trend in Figure 3.3 of part D and in this case higher 
RVC does not motivate intermediate flows to increase directly.  
 This relation between RVC and final and intermediate exports will be further investigated after 
treatment with diagonal PECS RoO, as part of the impact evaluation methodology of section 3.5 
 
 
 
 
 
2008
Sector G.E. 2008 Intermediates  2008 RVC % LVC% R.V.A L.V.A MFN tariff % Sector RoO provisions   
Machinery Spare Parts 2,909,524 1,105,619 40% 60% 721,562 1,082,343 7.20% C.S+V.C
Furniture 2,080,824 790,713 40% 60% 516,044 774,067 3.20% C.H+V.C
Other Chemicals 12,110,124 4,601,847 40% 60% 3,003,311 4,504,966 8.00% C.S+C.H+V.C
Food Products 2,791,924 1,060,931 27% 73% 467,368 1,263,625 16.70% C.S+C.H+V.C+C.C+W.O+TECH
Textiles 3,253,924 1,236,491 45% 55% 907,845 1,109,588 10.35% C.S+C.H+C.C+V.C+TECH
Industrial Chemicals 2,350,324 893,123 40% 60% 582,880 874,321 3.70% C.S+C.H+V.C
Rubber Products 3,869,824 1,470,533 31% 69% 743,780 1,655,511 7.90% C.S+C.H+V.C
Minerals 5,162,724 1,961,835 20% 80% 640,178 2,560,711 7.00% C.S+C.H+V.C
Leather 1,325,324 503,623 40% 60% 328,680 493,021 8.24% C.S +C.H
USD in Percentage USD In Percentage 
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Figure 3.3: Scatter Diagram of Agadir_4 Exports to E.U. versus the Increase in Regional Value Content 
2004/2008 
A - 2004                                                               B -   2008  
 
   C- 2004    D - 2008 
 
Own’s elaboration based on original source and ATU Statistics 2010. 
3.4 Cluster Analysis: Screening Sector Specific Exports between Agadir_4 & E.U   
3.4.1 Cluster Analysis Theoretical Background and Specifications  
Cluster analysis technique is a form of reducing data dimensionality and theoretically was initially 
built upon Porter’s (2010) data findings backed up by the ‘Complementarity opportunities109’ 
between manufacturing sectors. The cluster technique is usually used to organize multivariate data 
into groups (clusters) to maximize homogeneity between cluster members and heterogeneity between 
different clusters (Nenci and Motalbano, 2010). Clusters for trade and regional blocs analysis 
                                                          
109 Complementarity Opportunities: referring to the complementary relationship between different components or 
spare parts of the same industry or sector that could lead to the creation of industrial clusters with positive spillover 
effects (ATU Report 2009) 
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progressed to assess bilateral trade intensities, which started earlier by Duran and Odell (1974) and 
continued by Artist and Zhang (2001), when they linked countries by density linkage algorism to be 
clustered. In attempts to develop a similar study, Agadir Technical Unit Report (2009) conducted a 
business field survey for supply chain analysis between their sector specific final and intermediate 
trade flows. They also considered in their analysis the impact of applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO, 
however their results were not modelled empirically. 
The purpose of the ‘Cluster Analysis’110 in this chapter is to provide an empirically justified basis for 
selecting final and intermediate export flows between Agadir 4 and E.U. to be subject to Pan-Euro 
diagonal RoO later on the econometric section and to act as robustness check to the treatment with 
RoO. In order to proceed by choosing the appropriate number of final and intermediate sector specific 
export flows, we will apply ‘Hierarchal Cluster111’ Analysis to determine the number of groups under 
which sectors would be classified. Then we need to specify the basis on which sector observations 
will clustered and in our case, they were clustered based on RVC and export flows and intermediate 
flows are three chosen variables for clustering sectors due to their low correlation less 0.6 between the 
variables and their independence from sectoral breakdown. The analysis will be iterated once more by 
using a ‘Two-Step Cluster Analysis’112 to check for the consistency of hierarchal cluster results and 
as two- step can be used for large datasets that can take longer time to calculate by hierarchal cluster. 
Both hierarchal and two step cluster analysis were conducted using the underlying descriptive data 
covering 19 sectors, once at the initial phase before treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO during 
year 2004 and later-on during 2008 to demonstrate how sectors will be clustered after treatment with 
Pan-Euro RoO. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Cluster Analysis: identification and classification of a group of individuals that are similar to each other within 
their group peers, but different from each other compared to other groups. We have three types of cluster: First, 
K-means which is a non- hierarchal and cluster number is pre-determined before the analysis. 
 
111 Hierarchal Cluster: creating hierarchically related sets of clusters with one method known as agglomerative 
hierarchical cluster; beginning by each observation being considered as a separate cluster by itself and then 
combining the closest two groups together and this process continues until all observations belong to the same 
group(Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990) 
 
112 Two Step Cluster: grouping of similar individuals and usually common to use for large datasets and it uses a 
combination of hierarchical and non- hierarchical clusters; usually a pre-cluster technique is needed and it 
includes as well continuous and categorical variables in the cluster evaluation. (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990) 
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Table 3.3 Two-Step Cluster Distribution Table for Exports and Intermediates for  year 2008 
after treatment with RoO 
 
 Source: Own’s elaboration of Cluster Analysis from the original source and ATU database 
 2010. 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 both represent the Cluster results for final and intermediate exports between 
Agadir_4 and E.U. and those clusters will be later exposed to treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. 
The data regarding final and intermediate export flows were extracted for 2004 from Table 3.2 on the 
data analysis. Table 3.3 encompasses the number of observations for sector membership, and their 
percentage of total observations for each cluster groups as described. The preliminary results 
suggested the presence of three broad cluster categories based on exports after 2008 and they are 
Cluster 1: Petrochemicals, Cluster 2: Consumer Non-Durables and Cluster 3: Machinery spare parts 
and Components. This is quite a reasonable result compared to the smaller cluster groups; 
encompassing all sectoral flows and did not show any basis for classification for exports and 
intermediate during 2004. 
Cluster 1 is the biggest in size at 40 percent and composed of 6 sectors listed in Table 3.4 and it is 
classified as Petrochemicals cluster. As previously demonstrated in data analysis in Table 3.2, across 
all petrochemical sectors, the average RVC reached up to 25 percent during 2004; thus, allowing 
quarter of the sector’s inputs to be cumulated from outside the Pan-Euro group. This signifies that 
applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO would yield promising results for this cluster, especially after the 
Cluster’s group RVC threshold increased on average to 45% during 2008, after Pan-Euro diagonal 
RoO was applied. Cluster 2 composed of 3 sectors belonging to non-durable consumer goods exports, 
characterized by a moderate percentage of RVC during 2004 in reference to Table 3.2. The only 
problem with Textiles and processed Food, that they are subject to higher technical standards placed 
on their trade flows due to technical, sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions imposed by the E.U., 
which prevent them from applying Pan-Euro RoO effectively. Finally Cluster 3 under which 7 other 
sectors fall and is comprised of feeding and component sectors pouring into heavy duty machinery 
components, automotive spare parts, furniture, and leather. This cluster constituted the lowest 
N % of Combined % of Total
1 23,517 42.1% 40.0%
2 12,405 21.1% 20.0%
3 21,636 36.8% 35.0%
Combined 57,558 100.0% 95.0%
2,878 5.0%
58,793 100.0%
N % of Combined % of Total
1 21,753 42.1% 40.0%
2 15,167 26.3% 25.0%
3 18,223 31.6% 30.0%
Combined 55,143 100.0% 95.0%
2,757 5.0%
57,670 100.0%
Cluster
Excluded Cases
Total
Exports 
Cluster
Excluded Cases
Total
Intermediates 
CHAPTER 3  
3.1 What Happens to Trade Flow when Rules of Origin are relaxed? 
104 
permissiveness of RVC to be sourced out from outside the Pan-Euro RoO member countries during 
2004.  
Table 3.4 Sector Cluster Membership classified by Final and Intermediates Export Flows and RVC 
between Agadir_4 to E.U. 
 
Source: Own’s elaboration of model’s estimation based on original source, CEPII, 2010 & ATU 2010. 
As for intermediate goods shown on Table 3.4, they are clustered as well by RVC and could be 
classified as well into three clusters with different degrees of intermediate components: starting by 
cluster 3 made up of the lowest intermediate values and lowest RVC during 2004. Table 3.2. earlier. 
On the other hand, Cluster 1 having the highest intermediates and high RVC for other chemicals and 
especially for machinery spare parts, however food products had a lower RVC of 10 percent. This 
relation generally shows that the increase in RVC will gradually lead to higher export intensity of 
intermediate flows between Agadir_4 and the E.U but not for all sectors. The relation is evident for 
sectors such as machinery Spare parts and other chemicals., however, after the onset of diagonal 
RoO, rubber products intermediate flows increased substantially, yet the RVC for sector is still not 
high compared to other intermediates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrochemicals C1 Non- Durables  C2 Machinery S.P C3
Rubber Products Food Products Machinery Spare Parts 
Industrial Chemcials Textiles Electric Machinery S.P
Other Chemicals Wearing Apparel Transport Equipment S.P 
Paper Scientific Equipment S.P
Petroleum Refineries Furniture 
Minerals Leather 
Rubber Products 
Highest Intermediates  C1 Medium Intermediates C2  Less Intermediates  C3
Other Chemicals Industrial Chemicals Transport Equipment S.P 
Food Products  Furniture  Scientific Equipment S.P
Machinery S.P. Minerals Electric Machinery S.P.
Textiles Leather 
Transport Equipment S.P Rubber Products 
Paper 
Minerals 
Rubber Products 
Clustering Sectors by Intermediate Values bet. Agadir_4 and E.U.
  Clustering Sectors by Export Flow Values bet. Agadir_4 and E.U.
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Figure 3.4: Dendrogram of sectors from Agadir_4 to E.U. clustered by exports flows and RVC  
   
       Source:   Elaboration Cluster Analysis  
Below Figure 3.4 known as a ‘Dendrogram113’; which is a visual representation of the hierarchical 
cluster being plotted at distances through a group of sectors which are combined to form a cluster. It 
is usually read from left to right and the vertical lines show the overlap between clusters. The three 
clusters are evident with cluster 1 containing 6 sectors, and Cluster 2 having 3 sectors and finally the 
last cluster 3 with again 7 sectors. As for Figure 3.5, plotting intermediate exports in a scatter diagram 
to detect the correlation between intermediate export flows and regional value content through the 
employment of the ‘Nearest Neighbour Graphviii (Barchert and Titze and Kubis, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113 Dendrogram: visual representation of how a cluster is combined, it is read from left to right and the 
vertical lines show joined clusters and the line’s position on the scale indicates the distance to which 
clusters could be joined. Rescaled distances on a Dendrogram fall in a range of 1 to 25 and they are 
proportional to the data’s original distances. First vertical line corresponds to the smallest rescaled 
distance and so on 
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3.5: Nearest Neighbor Analysis to detect correlation between RVC and intermediate flows between 
Agadir_4 and E.U 
 
                         Source: Elaboration Cluster Analysis  
 
3.5 Methodological Approach using Gravity Equation  
3.5.1. Theoretical Foundation for Gravity model used in this Analysis: 
(Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator Silva & Tenreyro, 2006) 
 
Our gravity model in this chapter is conceptualized to be in line with the considerable realm of empirical 
literature, contributing to the enrichment of the theoretical framework of the gravity variables (Rose, 
2003; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 2005; Frankel, 2007; Baier and Bergstrand ,2007; Mitchell, 2007; Head 
and Mayer, 2009; Head and Mayer, 2012) and apart from that it will be calculated by the ‘Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator’ (PPML); based on Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This is 
especially due to its PPML’s multifunctional nature specialized in resolving for ‘Heteroskedasticity114’ 
problems of multiple error terms mostly common in nonlinear models with sector specific flows. 
Usually heteroskedasticity problems are unlikely to be resolved by the OLS estimator, as verified before 
                                                          
114 Heteroskedasticity: it is the state when the standard error component of the regression model assumed 
not to have constant variance across time and individual in the case of panel data. Although in this 
situation homoscedastic disturbances when heteroskedasticity exists will result in consistent estimates 
of regression coefficients, yet these estimates will not be efficient and should be corrected for. (Baltagi 
2005) 
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by Egger et al. (2009). PPML estimator further was proven from previous studies to yield consistent 
results with respect to adding exporters, importers, industry and time fixed effects (Fally 2013). Above 
all, PPML act as an efficient estimator, as it increases the observations base through accounting for the 
‘Zero Trade Flows’115’; and to verify for unbiased estimation results. As the Agadir_4 to E.U sector 
final and intermediate export flows subset sample is composed of a 30 percent zero flows and for that 
purpose PPML was fit for this estimation. The standard baseline model estimates the dependent variable 
which is Agadir_4 to E.U. export flows for one equation and intermediate export flows for a second 
equation. The dependent variable is estimated in levels and the regressors are in logarithms. The general 
framework of gravity model under PPML log linearization to treat for heteroscedasticity and 
inconsistent estimated through OLS and based on Silva and Tenreyro (2006) will be: 
Ln (𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑘 )= Ln 𝛽0+𝛽1ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖)+ 𝛽2ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗)+ 𝛽3ln (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) +𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜒0𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
eq. (3.1) 
The expected value of the log linearized equation: 
E[Ln (𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑘 )] = E[ Ln 𝛽0+𝛽1ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖)+ 𝛽2ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗)+ 𝛽3ln (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) +𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜒0𝑗 + (𝜀𝑖𝑗)] = 
E[Ln (𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑘 )] = E[ Ln 𝛽0 ]+[𝛽1𝐸[ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖 )]+  𝛽2𝐸[ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗 )]+  𝛽3𝐸[ln (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗)] +𝐸[𝜋0𝑖] + 
𝐸[𝜒0𝑗] +E[ (𝜀𝑖𝑗)] 
Since Ln E[ 𝜀𝑖𝑗] ≠E[ln(𝜀𝑖𝑗)] (Jensen inequalty ) thus the estimation through OLS will be misleading  
Table 3.5 below provides an executive summary of the classic and augmented variables of the gravity 
equation and the predicted signs and comportment of each variable in determining final or intermediate 
export flows. 
3.5.2) Gravity Variables Specifications:   
In this case, the dependent variable which will measure exports and intermediate flows between 
Agadir_4 and E.U denoted by 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  for sector specific(k) exports from country(i) to country(j) 
and for number of year time (t). The export flow data has been derived from United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization and Agadir Technical Unit statistical database 2010. Then 
Exporters and Importers economic size is reflected in their GDPs’;where 
gdpitand gdpjtdisaggregated by origin and destination countries could still be used as a viable 
proxy to estimate sector specific GDP; as previously employed by Feenstra et al (1998). Both 
                                                          
115 Zero Trade Flows: referring to zero bilateral trade flow between two countries, which are usually 
common in trade and investment flows and the model’s dependent variable cannot be transformed to a 
log linearized form under the presence of many zero trade values. .PPML serves as one of the estimators 
correcting for the zero trade value problem., obtained by the TOBIT estimator used in Eaton and Tamura 
.(Silva & Tenreyro 2006) 
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𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 are based on nominal values driven from CEPII Gravity dataset 2011 
(TRADPROD). Geographical distance is introduced as a dyad variable denoted by 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗  to 
reflect on geographical trade barriers between country pairs. As the Contiguity the dummy is 
approximated by 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 and takes value 1 when both countries i and j share a common border 
(Frankel and Stein and Wei, 2005; Frankel, 2007) .The set of augmented gravity variables are 
included to account for historical, cultural and, linguistic and regional trade areas affinities dummy 
variables and annotated as follows 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗  and 𝑟𝑡𝑎_𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑗respectively. 𝑟𝑡𝑎_𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑗 here 
will account for onset of regional trade agreement between Agadir_4 countries E.U. countries; 
which reserves value of one in case of membership in E.U. agreement and zero otherwise. (Baier 
and Bergstrand 2007). The augmented variables are adapted from CEPII’s Gravity Dataset 2011 
(TRADPROD) and in conformity with the theoretical background for unbalanced panel data in 
gravity modelling (Egger, 2000; Rose and Wincoop, 2001; Baltagi,2003; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 
2005; Frankel, 2007; Melitz, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2012). 
 
Finally, at this point and for the purpose of introducing treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO, 
the mfn tariff rate116 will be incorporated in baseline model as a dummy; defined by the bilateral 
tariff applied for sector specific agreements between Agadir_4 and E.U. countries. The MFN tariff 
determines whether the adoption of Pan-Euro diagonal RoOs are at higher cost or less than MFN 
tariffs applied, as motivated previously by Gasiorek and Augier and Lai-Tong (2008).  Lower 
MFN tariff rates, sweeps the incentives to apply diagonal RoO due to their high administrative 
compliance costs. In addition, we have introduced the fixed effects by origin 𝛿𝑖 , destination 𝛿𝑗, 
time 𝜆𝑡 ,and sector 𝛼𝑘 that are essential in that model to control for unobserved heterogeneities 
‘Multilateral Resistance’117  that are constant for a given exporter across all importers and vice 
versa and for time and sectors as well (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Chaney,2008; 
Helpmann et al., 2008; Baldwin and Tagiloni, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 MFN Tariff Rates: The ones applied for sectors and product groups between Agadir_4 trade flows to 
E.U. will be essentially important at this context; as it is a requisite, in order to contrast between costs of 
applying RoO and MFN tariff rates.   
 
117 Multilateral Resistance terms (MRT): After controlling for size of trading partners, there are other 
bilateral barriers between regions or trading partners that they are facing. MRT, as a function of distance 
and barrier dummies such being islands and landlocked (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003) 
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Baseline Gravity by using PPML Estimator for each Sector: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛽0
𝑘 + 𝛽1
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3
𝑘 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑙.𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7
𝑘  𝑟𝑡𝑎_𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑗  + 𝛽8
𝑘𝑚𝑓𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡]                     eq(3.2) 
Table 3.5: Variables of the Sector Specific Gravity Model 
Variable Description Database Expecte
d Sign 
𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘 𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒌  Exports from origin i to destination j for 
year t and in sector k 
Intermediate from origin i to destination j 
for year t and in sector k 
-Own Model’s 
estimation and  
-UNIDO 
-ATU 2009 
- 
𝒈𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 Nominal GDP in the origin country i 
(exporting) for year t.   
- CEPII 
Gravity 
dataset 2011 
(TRADPRO
D) 
+ve  
𝒈𝒅𝒑𝒋𝒕 Nominal GDP in the destination country j 
(importing) for year t. 
- CEPII 
Gravity 
dataset 2011 
(TRADPRO
D) 
+ve  
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒘𝒊𝒋 Bilateral Distance between from Origin i 
to destination j 
CEPII 
Gravity 
dataset 2011 
- ve  
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒈 𝒊𝒋 Dummy=1 if (i and j are contiguous; 
otherwise 0) 
-CEPII data 
base 
+ve  
𝑳𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒋 Dummy=1 if (i and j both have common 
language; otherwise 0) 
-CEPII data 
base 
+ve  
𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒋 Dummy=1 if (i and j both belonged to 
same colony; otherwise 0) 
-CEPII data 
base 
+ve  
𝒓𝒕𝒂_𝒊𝒋 Dummy=1 if (i and j both belonged to 
same regional trade area with E.U.; 
otherwise 0) 
Baier and 
Bergstrand 
(2007)  
+ve  
𝒎𝒇𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒋 
Bilateral Most Favored Tariff rate applied 
between origin i and destination j. 
-Augier et al 
(2007)  
-(WITS) 
database 
-ATU data 
2010  
-ve  
3.5.3 Gravity Model Data Specifications:  
For estimation purposes, the ‘Augmented Gravity model’118will be used with a dependent variable 
modelling sector specific final and intermediate export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U., starting with 
                                                          
118 Augmented gravity model: The default gravity model with classical variables, while, the rest of independent 
variables augment the model’s power and accuracy with addition of more variables and they are disaggregated 
into a set of dummy variables such contiguity, common language, colonial history, regional trade agreement’s 
pertinence, MFN tariff application, PECS diagonal RoO provisions ,besides a vector of origin , destination and 
time fixed effect  
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all 16 manufacturing sectors grouped into the three clusters obtained previously form the cluster 
analysis. Data calibration is based on the  ̒International Standards for Statistical Classifications ̓ (ISIC) 
bound to revision 4 and raw trade and production data were obtained from CEPII Gravity dataset 
(TRADPROD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization119 for years 2006 to 2010 and 
Agadir Technical Unit statistical database with sector specific flows (CEPII Gravity Dataset, 2011; 
UNIDO, 2011; Nicita and Olarreaga, 2007; Gaulier and Zignago, 2010; ATU Statistics, 2010). The 
model’s timeframe covered 2000 to 2010 and included  rta dummy to capture most of the bilateral trade 
agreementsix and initiatives taking place between the South Mediterranean countries and E.U countries, 
precisely after year 2000 onwards till 2010x. The model’s dataset allowed the classification into two 
comparative periods of six years prior to the adoption of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO and the other 5 years’ 
post diagonal RoO application for robust results. The bigger dataset covered 167 countries holding 
approx. 325,000 observations, meanwhile, the smaller one fitted to the purpose of estimating export 
flows between Agadir_4 to E.U. 26xi  and it covered 155,605 observations.  
3.5.4 Results for Baseline Model Using PPML:  
 
As exhibited in Table 3.6 most of the coefficients for PPML estimations were significant and carry the 
expected signs and magnitudes.  Importer’s and exporter’s GDP coefficients are closer to 1 in most of 
the estimations, however lower than OLS coefficients and sectors with the most remarkable exporter’s 
and importer’s GDP coefficients, are the ones showing  the highest export values between Agadir_4 and 
EU; especially for Food Products, Machinery Spare Parts, Leather and Paper for gdp_i coefficients 
reaching an average factor of 2.4 (=exp[0.9105***]) xii  ,meanwhile, Furniture, Beverage, Medical 
Equipment, Textiles and Transport components for gdp_j coefficients directly at an average factor of 
2.45 (=exp[0.892***]). The distance (Lndistw) with the inverse signs across all sectors and high levels 
of significance, indicating to the presence of trade barriers in the context of PPML estimations. 
Contiguity Border Effect120; had shown high sensitivity in controlling for inter-regional exports between 
Agadir_4 and E.U. countries at highly significant coefficients across most sectors. As well rta dummy, 
has shown high levels of significance of how bilateral trade agreements with E.U. increased exports 
flows by a factor of 1.62 (=exp [0.602]-1) at 62 percent across all sectors except for processed food 
products for which the agreement is partly ineffective due to presence of restrictive sanitary measures. 
                                                          
119 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO): An electronic database on production, trade 
and tariff data covering 67 countries and on the basis of 28 industries with the 3 digit level of the ISIC 
classification. The sector specific trade data is exposed to a software for data to be calibrated in concordance with 
the Harmonized System of 4-digit sectors and product RoO adoption.  
 
120 Border Effect in trade:" After controlling for size, trade between two countries depends on relative trade 
barriers and trade costs "(Anderson and  
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The two variables denoted by(𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗) and (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) respectivley  contributed to increasing export 
flows between country pairs sharing common colonial history and languages; given that most of Agadir 
countries were previous French and British colonies and their cultural proximity to European countries 
121 facilitated commercial relations. The mainstream literature relating trade to colonial ties was 
motivated by Head and Mayer and Ries (2010). The (𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗) dyad reported an average factor of 1.83 
(=exp [0.602]-1) along all sectors; thus, magnifying exports between country pairs122; sharing common 
colonial background by an increase of 83 percent and (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)  at a slightly lower factor of 1.18 
(=exp [0.78]). In this context and in consistency with the literature introducing bilateral MFN tariff term 
(𝑚𝑓𝑛_𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗) dummy does not appear to be of great significance to our PPML estimation and export 
flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. (Augier et al., 2007). 
3.5.5 Results for Baseline Model Estimated by PPML and using the three Clusters  
 
This comparative scenario as illustrated on Table 3.7  aims to replicate the normal PPML estimation 
performed previously for sector specific export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U, however by 
introducing the three clusters into the estimation chronologically as: Cluster1, Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 
to replace the 16 sectors representing export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. The estimated results 
were below unity for GDP coefficients of both countries i and j, however conforming with the expected 
signs. Distance as a proxy for trade barriers had inversely impacted export flows at high levels of 
significance with coefficients exceeding unity across all sectors and at an average factor of 2.85 (=exp 
[1.05]), (=exp [1.044]) and (=exp [1.033]) for the three clusters respectively. As well the set of historical 
and cultural affinity dummies on top of which are 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗  and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 increased the model’s 
explanatory power. More importantly the results of the three clusters analysis exhibited that a one level 
increase in their coefficients caused the export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. to rise by a factor of 
71.2 (=exp [4.266]) for cluster 1 of petrochemicals and 1.832 (=exp [0.626]) for Cluster 3 of machinery 
spare parts. Meanwhile a one level increase in the coefficient of the second cluster of consumer non-
durables, negatively impacted exports at a factor of 3.21 (=exp [1.174]) for this cluster. Those results 
maintained consistency with the previous cluster analysis for petrochemical cluster with all its 
underlying sectors, however, it contradicts the previous results for consumer non-durables sectors.  
                                                          
121 Two of the Agadir countries are from Maghreb region Tunisia and Morocco and at the same time 
were previous French colonies for so long, after gaining independence during 1947 and this was the very 
strong reason why European Union neighborhood Policy sought as one of its main objectives to 
strengthen political, cultural and commercial bonds with south Mediterranean countries . (Model’s 
output and dataset Gravity CEPII 2010) 
 
122 The formula to compute this increasing effect on trade flow for PPML estimation coefficient is as 
follows (𝑒𝑏𝑖 -  1) x100% where 𝑏𝑖 reserves the value of the estimated coefficient(Silva & Tenreyro 
2011). 
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Table 3.6 PPML: Base line Scenario PPML Estimation for Exports between Agadir_4 and E.U. 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based original source and ATU database, 2010  
Food Electric  Furniture  Rubber Industrial Leather Machinery Other Paper Scentific Medical Textiles Transport 
VARIABLES Products Machinery Products Chemicals  S.P Chemicals  Equipment Equipment Equipment 
Export Flows
lngdp_i 0.887*** 0.955*** 0.782** 0.846*** 0.709*** 0.924*** 0.873** 0.657** 0.822*** 0.681** 0.969** 0.800*** 0.957**
(0.0321) (0.0273) (0.0304) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0221) (0.0295) (0.0153) (0.0349) (0.0272) (0.0176) (0.0544)
lngdp_j 0.776*** 0.918*** 0.861*** 0.882** 0.549*** 0.852** 0.812*** 0.760** 0.832*** 0.828** 0.978** 0.819*** 0.895**
(0.0245) (0.0460) (0.0228) (0.0206) (0.0453) (0.0205) (0.0259) (0.0268) (0.0171) (0.0291) (0.0261) (0.0175) (0.0387)
lndistw -1.175*** -0.955*** -1.134*** -1.130*** -1.125*** -0.970*** -1.063*** -1.013*** -1.162*** -0.829*** -1.125*** -0.977*** -0.993*
(0.0459) (0.0362) (0.0569) (0.0512) (0.0249) (0.0531) (0.0422) (0.0488) (0.0559) (0.0999) (0.0722) (0.0524) (0.0521)
contig 1.357*** 0.327*** 0.111*** 0.499* 1.448*** 0.805*** 0.400*** 0.740*** 0.698*** 0.729*** 0.676*** 0.880*** 0.173***
(0.0316) (0.158) (0.151) (0.134) (0.025) (0.035) (0.070) (0.063) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.174)
comlang 0.816*** 0.276*** 0.799* 0.824*** 1.270*** 0.382*** 0.911*** 0.772*** 0.876*** 1.126*** 0.326*** 0.815*** 1.016***
(0.024) (0.0998) (0.132) (0.0899) (0.035) (0.115) (0.045) (0.122) (0.0865) (0.0141) (0.150) (0.020) (0.010)
rta_eu -0.0454 0.715*** 0.803*** 0.357*** 1.714**** -0.131 0.599*** 0.520*** 0.275*** 0.404*** 0.138*** 0.659*** 0.151***
(0.467) (0.054) (0.051) (0.037) (0.049) (0.027) (0.031) (0.176) (0.164) (0.172) (0.070) (0.117) (0.133)
Col -0.196 0.237*** 1.655*** 0.238* 1.337*** 0.494*** 0.991*** 0.896*** 0.678*** 0.599*** 0.00427 0.476*** 0.428***
(0.156) (0.179) (0.179) (0.137) (0.133) (0.193) (0.116) (0.144) (0.111) (0.129) (0.134) (0.123) (0.126)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141 -0.000906
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571) (0.320)
Constant -15.72 -8.747*** -11.10*** -7.399*** -15.50*** -6.925*** -5.429*** -9.768*** -7.766*** -3.225*** -9.222*** -10.66*** -12.47***
(1.116) (1.117) (0.884) (0.687) (1.119) (0.857) (1.251) (1.285) (0.703) (0.918) (0.788) (1.006) (0.717)
Observations 13,983 19,366 5,055 3,287 13,077 5,705 5,171 12,028 5,693 12,125 3,173 14508 20449
R-squared 0.967 0.997 1.000 0.985 0.997 0.987 0.976 0.991 0.975 0.960 0.996 0.967 0.991
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.7 Baseline Comparative Scenario PPML Estimation Exports from Agadir_4 to E.U. introducing 3 
Clusters 
      
  cluster_1 cluster_2 cluster_3  
 Variables  Total Exports 
Total 
Exports 
Total 
Exports        
 lngdp_i 0.503*** 0.501*** 0.498***  
  (0.0254) (0.0269) (0.0256)  
 lngdp_j 0.449*** 0.470*** 0.467***  
  (0.0302) (0.0326) (0.0316)  
 Lndistw -1.0504 -1.0446 -1.0341  
  (0.0810) (0.0888) (0.0876)  
 Contig 1.182*** 1.052*** 1.110***  
  (0.065) (0.074) (0.067)  
 Comlang 0.714*** 0.838*** 0.803***  
  (0.018) (0.029) (0.023)  
 rta_eu 1.243*** 1.472*** 1.461***  
  (0.181) (0.199) (0.189)  
 Col 0.900*** 1.032*** 1.015***  
  (0.053) (0.063) (0.065)  
 clus1 4.266***    
  (0.046)    
 clus2  -1.174***   
   (0.064)   
 clus3   0.626***  
   
-0.0045 
(0.890)  (0.107)  
 
 
Constant -9.020*** -5.171*** 
-
5.389***  
  (1.077) (0.785) (0.720)  
 Importers FE Yes Yes Yes  
 Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes  
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
 Sector FE Yes Yes Yes  
 Observations 156,155 156,155 156,155  
 R-squared 0.862 0.822 0.821  
     
 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based original source and ATU database, 2010 
3.6 Alternative Impact Evaluation Approaches: 
 Testing Pan-Euro Diagonal RoO on Sector Specific Exports for Treatment Groups I and II 
 
After considering the preliminary investigation derived from descriptive, cluster analysis and 
benchmark PPML estimation results, the next stage is to apply treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. 
More specifically we want to evaluate the two main groups of treatment and their counterfactual (i.e 
equally comparative two control groups) in all aspects but treatment. 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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• Treatment Group I: composed of 50 countries applying Pan_Euro Diagonal RoO to include RoW123 
applicants of Pan-Euro RoO  
• Treatment Group II: which includes Agadir_4 and E.U. countries at a total of 30 countries 
• Control Group I: composed of 50 countries outside the Pan-Euro Diagonal RoO rest of RoW and they 
are chosen by Nearest Neighboring analysis  
• Control II: Choosing four countries from MENA region [Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Syria]124 and 26 
E.U. countries  
 
The methodology used to measure accurately each treatment group’s exports (final + intermediate) 
responsiveness towards the introduction of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO as a public policy approach at this 
phase was performed through ‘Double Differences Estimation’125 (DID) and the methodology for 
DID is explained in the next section.  
3.6.1 Theoretical Foundation: Difference in Difference Estimations and Methodology:  
  
Double Differences Estimation̕ (DID) has served as convenient instrument in many investigations and 
precisely to evaluate the impact of public policies on specific economic variables (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2003). This estimation approach identifies a specific intervention policy applied to one 
of the two relatively comparative groups in all aspects except for the application phase of the policy 
This approach has rigorously been used in trade topics for the assessment of PTA’s, application of trade 
policies and RoO cumulation systems for some European countries as motivated by the literature 
(Hendersen and Millimet, 2004; Kheir El Din and Gohenim, 2005; Cadot and Melo, 2007; FEMISE126 
Research Centre, 2007; Augier, Gasoriek and Lai Tong, 2008; Millimet and Tchernis ,2009; Jurše and  
Logoižar and Vide,2010; Gauto, 2012) 
                                                          
123 Pan-Euro RoO includes some of other countries that are outside Europe and Mediterranean Chile, US, China, 
Canada and Australia.  
 
124 The control group II was chosen with 4 countries [ Lebanon, Libya, Algeria, Syria] members of bilateral PTA 
with E.U. countries, however they are still non-members Pan-Euro diagonal RoO and some of them are candidates 
to enter the Agadir Association Agreement.  
 
125 Difference in Difference Estimation (DID) known as Double Differences: One of the famous examples for the 
application of public policies intervention such as social insurance; as a means of raising unemployment insurance 
benefits to citizens in need.  It is applied on a specific population; where treated citizens are eligible for insurance 
and are classified as treatment group versus an equivalent group equal to the latter in all aspects with exception that 
it is not subject to the treatment and known as (control group). The difference between both groups demonstrates 
how this policy provoked changes in the unemployment duration for residents (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 
2003) 
 
126 FEMISE research centre: Centre of Planning and Economic research for Mediterranean countries.  
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Accordingly, the next step, we will identify the reasoning and parameters used to define treatment and 
control groups which will be subject to treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. This estimation method 
is supposed to align two comparative groups in all aspects except for the application of Pan-Euro 
Diagonal RoO. 
3.6.2 Identifying Treatment Groups I and II  
 
We can gain insight from Table 3.8 summarizing the mathematical intuition behind the DID approach 
for both treatment groups over two equal time intervals. Time is denoted by (P) in the model and period 
(0) covers years 2000 to 2005 and labelled as ex. ante 2006, meanwhile, period 1 continues onwards 
from 2005 to 2010 and is known by post 2006 (P).  The treated group is assigned the notation (D) and 
the (Interaction) variable combining between treatment and time appears and is labelled as (DP). This 
interaction term captures the cross effect of treatment and time together, when applying PECS diagonal 
RoO and it is the crucial term in determining impact of Pan-Euro RoO adoption.  
 
The general econometric equation applying DID approach is known accordingly: 
 
Є(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡,D,P) = exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2𝐷+𝛽3P+𝛽4D P+ ɛ)  …… 
Eq. (3.3) 
 (𝜷𝟐𝑫): assigned for treatment term with (D) signaling to treatment with diagonal RoO 
(𝜷𝟑P): given to period term with (P) covering time periods 0 and 1  
(𝜷𝟒D P): interaction term with DP combining between together treatment 
Table 3.8: Mathematical Derivation and Theoretical Foundation of the Double Differences Approac 
RoO Treatment 
Dummy = 
1: if country pertains 
to treatment group 
 
0: if country pertains 
to control group 
 
 
Time period for 
Treatment 
Dummy = 
1: If period within 
interval [2006-2010] 
 
0: if period within 
interval [2001-2005] 
 
 
Average 
Treatment for 
Treated Group 
(T.A127) After 
 
 
Treatment=1 & 
After 2006=1 
 
Є (𝑌𝑖𝑡, D=1, P=1) = 
 
exp(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2. 1+𝛽3.1+𝛽4.1+ ɛ) 
=exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4+ ɛ) …. (I) 
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(T.B128) Before 
 
Treatment=1& 
Before 2006=0 
 
Є (𝑌𝑖𝑡,D=1, P=0) = 
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2. 1 + ɛ) = 
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2 + ɛ)
 
.…. (II) 
 
ATT=
𝐓.𝐀−𝐓.𝐁
𝐓.𝐁
 
exp(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4+ ɛ)−exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2 + ɛ) 
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽2 + ɛ)
 = 
 exp (𝛽3 + 𝛽4) − 1   .. (III)                   
Average 
Treatment for 
Control Group 
(C.A129) After 
 
(C.B130) Before 
Control= 0 & After 
2006= 1 
Є (𝑌𝑖𝑡, D=0, P=1) = 
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽3+ ɛ) 
...(IV) 
 
Control=0 & Before 
2006=0 
  
Є (𝑌𝑖𝑡, D=0, P=0) = 
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+ ɛ)   .. (VI) 
ATC= 
𝐂.𝐀−𝐂.𝐁
𝐂.𝐁
 exp(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+𝛽3+ ɛ)−exp  (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+ ɛ)  
exp  (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑋1+ ɛ)       
 = exp  (𝛽3) −
1
      
     .(VII)      
Average 
treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
(
𝐓. 𝐀 − 𝐓. 𝐁
𝐓. 𝐁
) − (
𝐂. 𝐀 − 𝐂. 𝐁
𝐂. 𝐁
) = 
[exp (𝛽3 + 𝛽4) − 1]- [exp  (𝛽3) − 1]=exp (𝛽3 + 𝛽4) − exp  (𝛽3) = exp(𝛽4)   (VIII) Therefore, 
the partial change in the elasticity of coefficient𝑡 𝛽4 captures the interaction between treatment and 
time in the term (DP) 
3.6.3 Gravity Equation introducing variables for treatment with Pan-Euro RoO: 
 
Refers to Gravity Equation written to estimate final export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. by using 
PPML estimator will be iterated with the inclusion of variables to capture for treatment with Pan-Euro 
diagonal RoO and their impact on final and intermediate sector flows on the two treatment I and II 
groups defined previously. The first treatment variable dummy used and denoted by (𝜷𝟖
𝒌𝑫𝒊𝒋) ; as 
treatment term (𝑫𝒊𝒋) preserves the value 1 and second the time variable dummy will account for 
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timespan during which the diagonal Pan-Euro RoO are applied and known as (𝜷𝟗
𝒌𝑷𝒊𝒋) .Finally the 
interaction dummy  (𝜷𝟏𝟎
𝒌 𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒋) variable directly reflecting real treatment effect by capturing the impact 
of diagonal RoO on sector specific final and intermediate exports. This interaction term is the most 
crucial coefficient to identify the effect of treatment with Pan-Euro RoO on the export flows. Equation 
3.4 will be accordingly: 
 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 = [𝛽0
𝑘 + 𝛽1
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑝𝑑𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3
𝑘 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑙.𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7
𝑘  𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗  + 𝛽8
𝑘𝑚𝑓𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9
𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10
𝑘 𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11
𝑘 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛼𝑘 + 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡]  
 
Eq.(3.4) 
Where:  
𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒌 : reflects the overall impact on bilateral final and intermediate export flows on country i and j 
resulting after adoption of diagonal Pan-Euro RoO cumulation, for each t time and sector k 
𝛂, 𝛃, 𝛄𝐈, 𝛅𝐈: are all coefficients measuring the change terms resulting from diagonal Pan-Euro RoO  
t: denotes time before intervention if t=0, then period (ex. ante2006) and if t=1, then period (p)is (post 
2006).  
𝑫𝒊𝒋: denotes pertinence to treatment group of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO, when D=1 and otherwise D=0  
𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒋: signals to interaction term between treatment (D) and post2006 (P); showing combined effect of 
both  
3.6.4 Identifying Control Groups I and II not Subject to Diagonal RoO:  
 
Equivalently the control group I and II are selected based on the  ̒ Cluster of Nearest Neighbor 
Analysis̕ 131  which is a classification methodology for matching together cases or individuals with 
similar characteristics. In our case, we have control group I and II composed of 50 and 30 countries 
respectively132; to be comparable to treatment group I and II. Selecting similar countries for both 
                                                          
131 Nearest Neighbor Analysis: A method of classifying individuals or observations based on similarity between 
those individuals in many features and the Euclidean distance is the most common measurement estimate used 
to evaluate nearest neighbor, based on the fact that similar cases are near each other and dissimilar cases are 
distant from each other.  
 
132 38 control group countries are formed of the following: they are grouped into 38 countries belonging to the 
three  different Free trade areas : Latin American PTA as in  CACM,  Asian PTA as in ASEAN and finally 
African PTA’s as in AFTA, and their associated countries as in : Kenya, Nigeria, Djibouti, Mauritius, 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Swaziland, Lativa, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Armenia, Lebanon, 
Malawi, Pakistan, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sudan, Mozambique, Panama, Senegal, Russian 
Republic, Colombia, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bahamas, Lithuania, Mauritania,  Rwanda, Vietnam, 
Paraguay 
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Treatment and Control groups I, the ̒ Nearest Neighbor Selection Method  ̓ with a set of common 
characteristics to be matched for both treatment and control among which are (intermediate and export 
flows, MFN tariff rates, RVC percentages, RTA with other partners than E.U)133  
Gravity for control group I and II: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛽0
𝑘 + 𝛽1
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2
𝑘 ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3
𝑘 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6
𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑙.𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7
𝑘  𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗  + 𝛽8
𝑘𝑚𝑓𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9
𝑘𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10
𝑘 𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11
𝑘 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛼𝑘 +
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡]  
Eq.(3.5) 
Where:  
𝑭𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒌 : reflects the overall impact on bilateral export or intermediates not exposed to diagonal Pan-
Euro RoO cumulation, for each t time and sector k 
𝛂, 𝛃, 𝛄𝐈, 𝛅𝐈: are all coefficients measuring the change terms  
𝑷𝒊𝒋: denotes time before intervention if t=0, then period (ex. ante2006) and if t=1, then period (p)is 
(post 2006).  
𝑪𝒊𝒋: denotes pertinence to control group not applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO, when C=1 and otherwise 
C=0  
𝑪𝑷𝒊𝒋: signals to interaction term between control (C) and post2006 (P); showing combined effect in 
case treatment does not take place  
 
 
                                                          
133 Selection of Control groups I & II for by nearest neighbor Analysis: The true advantage of the nearest 
neighbor selection method is allowing for the inclusion of many countries; especially within the control group 
I of other preferential trade agreements like CACM, ASEAN, FAFTA and out of the bound of countries 
applying PECS diagonal RoO. As for Control group II comprised of 31 countries will include 26 European 
countries, in addition to 4 non- applicants of PECS diagonal RoO similar in all gravity characteristics (i.e. 
GDPs’ origin – destination, cultural background, colonial history and language) to Agadir countries and 
accordingly control II group will include Sudan, Lebanon, Libya and Algeria.  
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3.7 Key Results for final and intermediate Exports of Treatment Groups I and II  
Table 3.9 PPML: (Treatment Group I _50 for Exports Flows) 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on original source and ATU database 2010. 
3.7.1 Results for Treatment Group I of Final Exports  
 
Above all it is important to mention that throughout all Equations, the basic coefficients for gravity 
variables lngdp_i, lngdp_j, lndistw, Comlang, Col, Contig show the expected signs, magnitude and 
significance for RoO treatment group I, having Pan-Euro 50 membership for final export flows. Year, 
exporter, importer and sector fixed effects 𝝀𝒕, 𝜹𝒊𝜹𝒋, 𝜶𝒌 were added to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity across individuals and at the same time it prevented the omission of relevant information 
from the double differences estimation. In our context of evaluating the impact of Pan-Euro RoO fixed 
Final Exports Beverages Food Electric  Furniture Industrial Leather Machinery S.P Other Paper Scentific Medical Textiles Transport 
Products Machinery Chemicals Chemicals  Equipment  Equipment Machinery S/P 
DID_1
VARIABLES
lngdp_i 0.846*** 0.887*** 0.955*** 0.782*** 0.709*** 0.924*** 0.873*** 0.657*** 0.822*** 0.681*** 0.969*** 0.800*** 0.957***
(0.0191) (0.0121) (0.0609) (0.0304) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0221) (0.0295) (0.0153) (0.0349) (0.0272) (0.0176) (0.0544)
lngdp_j 0.882*** 0.776*** 0.918** 0.861*** 0.549*** 0.852*** 0.812*** 0.760*** 0.832*** 0.828*** 0.978*** 0.819*** 0.895***
(0.0206) (0.0106) (0.0460) (0.0228) (0.0453) (0.0205) (0.0259) (0.0268) (0.0171) (0.0291) (0.0261) (0.0175) (0.0387)
lndistw -1.250*** -0.754*** -0.855** -0.434*** -1.154*** -0.970*** -1.063*** -0.434**** -0.762*** -0.829*** -1.125*** -0.577*** -0.993***
(0.0512) (0.0012) (0.0762) (0.0569) (0.106) (0.0531) (0.0622) (0.0688) (0.0559) (0.0999) (0.0722) (0.0524) (0.0921)
contig 0.499*** 1.357** 0.327** 0.111* 1.448*** 0.805*** 0.400** 0.740** 0.698*** 0.729*** 0.676 0.880*** 0.173
(0.023) (0.034) (0.158) (0.151) (0.025) (0.035) (0.170) (0.163) (0.111) (0.021) (0.211) (0.123) (0.174)
Comlang 0.824*** 0.816*** 0.276*** 0.799** 1.270*** 0.382** 0.911** 0.772** 0.876*** 1.126*** 0.326* 0.815** 1.016***
(0.0899) (0.0099) (0.0998) (0.132) (0.035) (0.115) (0.145) (0.122) (0.0865) (0.041) (0.150) (0.110) (0.007)
rta_eu 0.357* -0.045*** 0.715*** 0.803** 1.714*** -0.131 0.599** 0.520** 0.275** 0.404** 0.138 0.659*** 0.151
(0.137) (0.013) (0.054) (0.151) (0.024) (0.127) (0.131) (0.176) (0.164) (0.172) (0.170) (0.071) (0.133)
Col 1.238*** 0.196** 0.237*** 1.655*** 1.337*** 0.494* 0.991** 0.896** 0.893** 0.599** 0.00427 0.476** 0.428**
(0.037) (0.137) (0.079) (0.019) (0.033) (0.193) (0.036) (0.144) (0.111) (0.129) (0.280) (0.123) (0.126)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141 -0.000906
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571) (0.320)
treatment (D) -0.750* -0.0315 -0.479** -0.282** 0.00990 -0.462*** -0.353** -0.383** -0.501* -0.899*** -1.017*** -0.525* -0.535*
(0.129) (0.029) (0.149) (0.141) (0.201) (0.0984) (0.121) (0.176) (0.107) (0.027) (0.016) (0.123) (0.109)
post2006 (P) -1.070** -1.341*** -0.0294 -0.891** -0.747* -0.277 -0.712** -0.515* -0.505** -1.342*** -0.764** -3.817*** -0.600*
(0.0206) (0.006) (0.231) (0.420) (0.398) (0.200) (0.034) (0.188) (0.015) (00.35) (0.325) (0.0039) (0.196)
interaction (DP) 0.952*** 0.739*** -0.177 1.287*** 1.022*** 0.152 0.499 1.425*** 0.377* 1.406*** 1.055*** 4.151*** 0.472
(0.0214) (0.024) (0.306) (0.0436) (0.047) (0.210) (0.360) (0.036) (0.174) (0.0407) (0.0343) (0.003) (0.200)
Constant -7.399*** -15.72*** -8.747*** -11.10*** -15.50*** -6.925*** -5.429*** -9.768*** -7.766*** -3.225*** -9.222*** -10.66*** -12.47***
(0.687) (0.687) (1.117) (0.884) (1.119) (0.857) (1.251) (1.285) (0.703) (0.918) (0.788) (1.006) (0.717)
Observations 27,287 39,983 26,366 32,055 22,077 25,705 30,171 25,028 27,693 32,125 25,173 30,508 30,449
R-squared 0.985 0.967 0.997 1.000 0.997 0.987 0.976 0.991 0.975 0.960 0.996 0.967 0.991
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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effects are also essential to control for ‘Reverse Causality’134 between exports flows and the entrance 
into Pan-Euro RoO. Apart from this, the rest of the analysis is dedicated to show the responsiveness of 
the treatment and interaction terms in determining the impact of entry into Pan-Euro RoO on export 
flows. The treatment dummy with Pan-Euro RoO has always shown negative and partially significant 
coefficients across all sectors, which is in line with the literature estimations for Augier and Gasiorek 
and Lai-Tong (2007). As for the interaction variable   (𝜷𝟏𝟎
𝒌 𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒋) demonstrated in Eq. (3.4) and Table 
3.9; which results from the multiplication of both the effect of treatment by time of adoption, it has 
shown remarkable influence on increasing final export flows between the 50 countries adopting Pan-
Euro RoO across 9 out of the 13 sectors. The coefficients for treatment are positive ones and highly 
significant. All significant sectors contributed directly to increase the group’s final exports on an 
average factor of 4.35 (=exp [1.45]). The same exercise was replicated again by putting the three 
clusters derived during the Cluster analysis to estimate impact of treatment with Pan-Euro diagonal 
RoO for clusters. As for Petrochemical cluster, it was composed of Industrial Chemicals and Other 
Chemicals and it contributed to final exports after treatment by an average factor of 4.05 points at (=exp 
[1.2235]) and finally Machinery Spare Parts cluster encompassed Transport, Scientific and Medical 
Equipment components and spare parts came in second position and recorded a factor of 3.4 (=exp 
[2.29]).   
3.7.2 Results for Treatment Group I of Intermediate Exports  
 
As for intermediates export flows of treatment group I of 50 countries demonstrated Table 3.10, the 
interaction coefficient had shown a lower average factor of 2.8 (=exp [1.04]) across 8 out of 13 sectors; 
meaning that one point increase in the interaction term measuring treatment and time, will induce an 
increase in intermediate export flows between the 50 Pan-Euro RoO applicant members. This effect 
was precisely highly significant for the following sectors: Leather, Rubber Products, Plastics, Industrial 
Chemicals, Petroleum Refineries, Transport, Machinery and Scientific Equipment Spare Parts. The 
treatment feature with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO and its permissiveness has already increased the margin 
RVC to be processed in the intermediates exports as also suggested by Bombarda and Gamberoni 
(2009). Those results are standard to the same results driven by Gosiorek, Augier and Tong (2007) and 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) on the increase in intermediate export flows for European Free 
Trade Area, when Pan-Euro diagonal RoO are applied 
 
                                                          
134 ‘Reverse Causality’: We mean by reverse causality here that final and intermediate export flows already 
existing between Agadir_4 to E.U. might have been the reason behind provoking the entrance of their 
countries under the membership of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO protocols and not vice versa.  
CHAPTER 3  
3.1 What Happens to Trade Flow when Rules of Origin are relaxed? 
121 
Table 3.10 PPML: (Treatment Group I for estimating Intermediate Exports) 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on original source & ATU database, 2010 
3.7.3 Results Treatment Group II for Final Exports  
To obtain more in-depth  results for the smaller treatment group II consisting of Agadir_4 and their 
final export flows to E.U illustrated by Table 3.11, the PPML estimation with Pan-Euro RoO treatment  
found out that the number of sector having partially significant coefficients have increased to 11 out of 
13 sectors, with most of the sectors concentrated in  Petrochemicals  and consumer non-durables and 
then came last machinery spare-parts, as they recorded an average factor of 2.72 (=exp[1.0026]). The 
results for petrochemical sector across all estimations has shown robustness in (Descriptive analysis. 
Cluster analysis, treatment group I and treatment group II), as they maintained their significance to 
capture most of final export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. countries; especially when they are 
treated with Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. The results also suggested that Pan-Euro diagonal RoO succeeded 
in increasing export flows across many sectors for more than 2.5 times than before the inception of 
Pan-Euro RoO. It is true that the results were not equally significant along all sectors, but only a few 
sectors between Agadir_4 to E.U. that lagged in significance for some categories of machinery spare 
parts and less categories of petrochemicals, which suggested that some of the adoption schemes do not 
yet have strong impacts on increasing export flows intensity between Agadir and E.U. countries, given 
also that Pan-Euro RoO is a relatively new scheme. (Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2007).  
  Beverages Food Furniture Industrial Leather Machinery Rubber Other Petroluem Scientific Textiles Transport
 Products  Chemicals Spare Parts  Products Chemicals Refineries  Equipment Machinery  S.P
Intermed.
VARIABLES
lngdp_i 0.990*** 0.831** 0.934*** 0.992** 0.988** 0.905*** 0.854*** -0.00341 0.998** 1.016** 0.870*** 0.991**
(0.023) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0242) (0.0344) (0.0194) (0.0161) (0.00465) (0.0280) (0.0270) (0.0153) (0.0376)
lngdp_j 0.946*** 0.907** 0.813*** 0.890*** 0.959*** 0.892*** 0.892*** 1.016*** 0.899*** 0.990*** 0.921*** 1.056***
(0.025) (0.0227) (0.0163) (0.0266) (0.0283) (0.0205) (0.0226) (0.00622) (0.0489) (0.0245) (0.0186) (0.0376)
lndistw -0.956*** -0.786** -0.825** -0.571* -0.922* -0.792** -0.767** -0.0932 -0.613* -0.850* -0.797** -0.888*
(0.031) (0.0585) (0.0481) (0.0981) (0.0784) (0.0513) (0.0508) (0.0207) (0.112) (0.0664) (0.0480) (0.0815)
contig 0.664*** 0.704** 0.207** 1.116*** 0.709*** 0.642*** 0.853** 0.127*** 1.540*** 0.683** 0.786** 0.833**
(0.023) (0.137) (0.119) (0.016) (0.130) (0.188) (0.148) (0.0914) (0.029) (0.164) (0.112) (0.0228)
Comlang 1.168*** 0.868** 0.265** 0.710** 0.454*** 1.198*** 0.526*** 0.103*** 1.061*** 1.201*** 0.546** 0.678**
(0.034) (0.0907) (0.0975) (0.118) (0.153) (0.022) (0.0969) (0.0306) (0.015) (0.012) (0.0939) (0.165)
rta_eu 0.357* -0.045***0.715*** 0.803** 1.714*** -0.131 0.599** 0.520** 0.275** 0.404** 0.138 0.659***
(0.137) (0.013) (0.054) (0.151) (0.024) (0.127) (0.131) (0.176) (0.164) (0.172) (0.170) (0.071)
Col 0.810*** 0.168* 0.324** 0.185* 1.061*** 0.314** 0.136* 0.148*** 0.206** 0.428** 0.106* 0.830***
(0.09) (0.125) (0.079) (0.158) (0.025) (0.178) (0.153) (0.0498) (0.078) (0.171) (0.116) (0.0234)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571)
treatment (D) -0.125*** -0.489** -0.133 -0.177 -0.884*** -0.223** -0.955** -0.143*** -0.0359 -0.666*** -0.699*** -1.269***
(0.003) (0.111) (0.118) (0.137) (0.089) (0.115) (0.124) (0.0309) (0.138) (0.045) (0.0956) (0.0125)
post2006 (P) -0.268 -0.416* -1.035*** -0.512* -0.715 -0.682*** -1.123*** -0.0485 -1.013*** -1.745*** -1.112*** -0.126
(0.267) (0.140) (0.108) (0.196) (0.447) (0.149) (0.136) (0.138) (0.155) (0.125) (0.117) (0.2337)
interaction (DP) 0.025 0.488** 0.370 1.076*** 1.372*** 0.183 1.162*** 0.136 1.162*** 1.110*** 0.654** 1.402***
(0) (0.023) (0.311) (0.019) (0.005) (0.483) (0.0127) (0.130) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.422) (0.0036)
Constant -15.75 -8.059***-7.963*** -13.43*** -10.95*** -12.92*** -8.896*** -12.16*** -12.01*** -9.021*** -10.60*** -13.66***
(0.524) (0.708) (0.662) (1.526) (1.453) (0.874) (0.695) (0.289) (1.083) (0.711) (0.875) (1.628)
Observations 27,287 39,983 26,366 32,055 22,077 25,705 30,171 25,028 27,693 32,125 25,173 30,508
R-squared 0.990 0.991 0.994 0.956 0.990 0.997 0.978 0.977 0.998 0.971 0.980 0.999
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11 PPML: Treatment Group II for Exports Agadir_4 to E.U. 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on original source & ATU database 
3.7.4 Results Treatment Group II for Intermediate Exports: 
 
Finally, when we come to look at the results of Agadir_4 intermediate exports to E.U. on Table 3.12 
after the Pan-Euro RoO were applied, we found that almost all coefficients had shown a high level of 
significance but not very high coefficients. This shows that one point increase in treatment with Pan-
Euro diagonal RoO , led to an increase in intermediate exports that reached a factor of 1.8 (exp [1.033]-
1) for Leather sector, 0.32 at (exp [0.2.84]-1) for rubber products and 0.30 at (exp [0.267]-1) for 
furniture. Although data for descriptive analysis has shown the intensity of intermediate export flows 
between Agadir_4 and E.U. since Pan-Euro RoO were adopted in sectors like Rubber Products, 
Food Electric  Furniture Rubber Industrial Leather Machinery Other Paper Scentific Medical Textiles Transport 
VARIABLES Products Machinery Products Chemicals  S.P Chemicals  Equipment Equipment Equipment 
Export Flows
lngdp_i 0.887*** 0.955*** 0.782** 0.846*** 0.709*** 0.924*** 0.873** 0.657** 0.822*** 0.681** 0.969** 0.800*** 0.957**
(0.0321) (0.0273) (0.0304) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0197) (0.0221) (0.0295) (0.0153) (0.0349) (0.0272) (0.0176) (0.0544)
lngdp_j 0.776*** 0.918*** 0.861*** 0.882** 0.549*** 0.852** 0.812*** 0.760** 0.832*** 0.828** 0.978** 0.819*** 0.895**
(0.0245) (0.0460) (0.0228) (0.0206) (0.0453) (0.0205) (0.0259) (0.0268) (0.0171) (0.0291) (0.0261) (0.0175) (0.0387)
lndistw -1.175*** -0.955*** -1.134*** -1.130*** -1.125*** -0.970*** -1.063*** -1.013*** -1.162*** -0.829*** -1.125*** -0.977*** -0.993***
(0.0459) (0.0362) (0.0569) (0.0512) (0.0249) (0.0531) (0.0422) (0.0488) (0.0559) (0.0999) (0.0722) (0.0524) (0.0521)
contig 1.357*** 0.327*** 0.111*** 0.499* 1.448*** 0.805*** 0.400*** 0.740*** 0.698*** 0.729*** 0.676*** 0.880*** 0.173***
(0.0316) (0.158) (0.151) (0.134) (0.025) (0.035) (0.070) (0.063) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.174)
comlang 0.816*** 0.276*** 0.799* 0.824*** 1.270*** 0.382*** 0.911*** 0.772*** 0.876*** 1.126*** 0.326*** 0.815*** 1.016***
(0.024) (0.0998) (0.132) (0.0899) (0.035) (0.115) (0.045) (0.122) (0.0865) (0.0141) (0.150) (0.020) (0.010)
rta_eu -0.0454 0.715*** 0.803*** 0.357*** 1.714**** -0.131 0.599*** 0.520*** 0.275*** 0.404*** 0.138*** 0.659*** 0.151***
(0.467) (0.054) (0.051) (0.037) (0.049) (0.027) (0.031) (0.176) (0.164) (0.172) (0.070) (0.117) (0.133)
Col 0.196*** 0.237*** 1.655*** 0.238* 1.337*** 0.494*** 0.991*** 0.896*** 0.678*** 0.599*** 0.00427 0.476*** 0.428***
(0.156) (0.179) (0.179) (0.137) (0.133) (0.193) (0.116) (0.144) (0.111) (0.129) (0.134) (0.123) (0.126)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141 -0.000906
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571) (0.320)
Treatment (D) -0.584** -0.587*** -0.479** -0.292 -0.459* -0.547*** -0.417** -0.588*** -0.459** -0.605*** -0.377** -0.594*** -0.535***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.198) (0.193) (0.194) (0.058) (0.021) (0.028) (0.194) (0.025) (0.182) '(0.022) (0.109)
post 2006 (P) -0.937** -0.979*** -0.992 -1.207*** -1.058*** -0.999** -1.200*** -0.944** -1.058*** -0.898** -1.021** -0.936** -0.600***
(0.055) (0) (0.234) (0.128) (0.238) (0.050) (0.021) (0.031) (0.238) (0.024) (0.0214) (0.021) (0.196)
interaction (DP) 1.005** 1.073*** 0.869*** 0.705** 0.821*** 1.012*** 0.882* 1.192*** 0.821** 1.113*** 0.592 0.931*** 0.472*
(0.034) (0) (0.024) (0.074) (0.087) (0.026) (0.051) (0.028) (0.071) (0.043) (0.431) (0.053) '(0.100)
Constant -15.72 -8.747*** -11.10*** -7.399*** -15.50*** -6.925*** -5.429*** -9.768*** -7.766*** -3.225*** -9.222*** -10.66*** -12.47***
(1.116) (1.117) (0.884) (0.687) (1.119) (0.857) (1.251) (1.285) (0.703) (0.918) (0.788) (1.006) (0.717)
Observations 13,983 19,366 5,055 3,287 13,077 5,705 5,171 12,028 5,693 12,125 3,173 14,508 20,449
R-squared 0.967 0.997 1.000 0.985 0.997 0.987 0.976 0.991 0.975 0.960 0.996 0.967 0.991
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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machinery spare parts and other chemicals, however, it has been clear and proven whether RoO helped 
in intensifying intermediate exports flows for those sectors  
Table 3.12 PPML: Treatment Group II intermediate Exports 
 
 
Own’s Elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on original source & ATU database 2010 
 
3.7.5 Comparative Results for Control Groups I and Control group II 
 
Control groups I & II as non-applicants of PECS diagonal RoO, with their results demonstrated in 
Tables 3.13 and Table 3,14; both exhibited lower partial increase and significance in their coefficients 
of sector specific final exports compared to those obtained through treatment groups I and II for both 
Control I (50 countries comparative to Pan-Euro applicants) known as non- applicants of Pan-Euro 
diagonal RoO. Only half of sectors approximately 5 of 12 had shown partial significance especially 
appearing for elements of cluster3 of Machinery and Equipment components and spare-parts, industrial 
chemicals, other chemicals and textiles compared to treatment group I when exposed to treatment with 
Food Furniture Industrial Leather Minerals Other Paper Petroleum Rubber Medical Textiles Transport 
Products Chemicals Chemicals Refineries Products Equipment S.P Machinery S.P.
Intemed. Export 
VARIABLES
lngdp_i 1.001*** 0.937*** 1.028*** 0.914*** 0.870*** 0.894*** 0.807*** 0.969*** 0.878*** 0.998** 1.557*** 0.998*
(0.0401) (0.0211) (0.0346) (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0149) (0.0276) (0.0153) (0.0277) (0.016) (0.0701)
lngdp_j 0.953*** 0.803*** 0.912*** 0.920*** 0.943*** 0.794*** 0.825*** 0.881** 0.842*** 0.978** 1.261*** 0.897**
(0.0352) (0.0167) (0.0280) (0.0201) (0.0219) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0436) (0.0193) (0.0276) (0.001) (0.0566)
lndistw -0.936*** -0.784*** -0.800** -0.807*** -0.826*** -0.779*** -0.752*** -0.451** -0.751*** -0.776** -1.253*** -0.961***
(0.0349) (0.0493) (0.0646) (0.0435) (0.0533) (0.0449) (0.0487) (0.100) (0.0468) (0.0621) (0.111) (0.0967)
contig 0.598** 0.299** 0.994** 0.352 0.102 0.604* 0.934* 1.544** 0.645* 0.900* 0.486 -0.0692
(0.05) (0.128) (0.018) (0.029) (0.128) (0.106) (0.105) (0.312) (0.134) (0.165) (0.822) (0.190)
comlang 0.972*** 0.326** 0.829*** 0.995*** 0.714** 0.264** 0.789** 0.982*** 0.586** 1.061* 0.981** 1.094***
(0.042) (0.102) (0.021) (0.018) (0.0986) (0.0853) (0.0877) (0.013) (0.0920) (0.126) (0.0296) (0.017)
rta_eu 0.165 0.176 0.284* 1.821*** 0.196 0.229 0.167 0.177 0.183 -0.354* 1.576** -0.616*
(0.172) (0.172) (0.169) (0.017) (0.175) (0.163) (0.168) (0.154) (0.151) (0.199) (0.0413) (0.160)
Col 0.459*** 0.218*** 0.836*** 0.694** 0.487* 0.104 0.119 0.723*** 0.884*** 0.510*** 0.928*** 0.782**
(0.046) (0.038) (0.063) (0.168) (0.135) (0.123) (0.113) (0.0314) (0.130) (0.0774) (0.062) (0.0789)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00482 -0.0160*** -0.00034* -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00051 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00141 -0.000906
(0.012) (0.662) (0.494) (0.609) (0.435) (0.571) (0.746) (0.765) (0.655) (0.167) (0.571) (0.320)
treatment (D) -0.812*** -0.425*** -0.740*** -0.940*** -0.941** -0.227** -0.332** 0.839*** -0.569** -0.0192 -0.0513 -0.0294
(0.0708) (0.0755) (0.0712) (0.023) -0.0782 (0.0725) (0.0767) (0.0396) (0.0758) (0.0776) (0.0723) (0.0775)
post2006 (P) -0.0485 -0.108 -0.105 -2.146 -0.118 -0.109 -0.0630 -0.0729 -0.0906 -0.111 0.0327 0.00331
(0.184) (0.182) (0.182) (0) (0.186) (0.175) (0.181) (0.168) (0.167) (0.186) (0.164) (0.178)
interaction (DP) 0.339** 0.267*** 0.250* 1.033*** 0.288* 0.284* 0.289* 0.307*** 0.284*** 0.295* 0.259* 0.295*
(0.092) (0.056) (0.098) (0.011) (0.101) (0.0986) (0.103) (0.032) (0.048) (0.102) (0.089) (0.094)
Constant -13.03*** -12.77*** -12.66*** -7.097 -12.67*** -13.39*** -12.81*** -14.73*** -14.87*** -13.11*** -13.09*** -13.28***
(0.579) (0.625) (0.521) (0) (0.563) (0.573) (0.554) (0.553) (0.560) (0.498) (0.486) (0.610)
Observations 13,953 5,055 13,077 5,705 4,453 12,028 5,693 4,565 3,287 3,173 14,,508 20.449
R-squared 0.968 0.969 0.964 0.997 0.969 0.969 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.969 0.967 0.967
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Pan-Euro RoO. This might suggest that it may be due to the nature of the sector. For some sectors, 
regardless the RoO scheme applied, they are still expected to have higher export intensity due to other 
omitted variables or the political interest dimension, of some industry groups designing agreements to 
fit their exports framework and interest of their sectors, as emphasized in regions from the studies 
developed by Duttagupta and Panagariya (2003) and Chase (2008). 
On the other hand, Control group II is equal to almost all aspects of significance to treatment group I 
in the number of sectors and flows. As well both treatment group II and Control group II have the same 
level of significance regarding the gravity’s economic size, inverse impact of distance on increasing 
trade barrier and decreasing export flows and even in terms of cultural common language ties and rta 
to E.U. The only substantial difference this time, is the interaction term which has seen to show no 
significance at all for all sectors under scrutiny. In consequence, this shows that bilateral normal lower  
tariff rates between E.U. and other comparative countries due to the PTA between E.U. and rest of 
Mediterranean members  that are not part of the Pan-Euro diagonal RoO , will not yield the same impact 
on the export flows and increase intensity of flows nor cause a significant change in the composition 
and structure of exports , as in the case of applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. 
 
The treatment premium (difference in coefficients between treatment and control groups) obtained from 
the average coefficients of all sectors for the treatment, time and interaction terms is almost a premium 
of 3 times at high degrees of partial significance.  The worse off results were evident for smaller control 
group II exports to E.U formed of the 4 countries mentioned earlier and 26 E.U. countries. Summarizing 
key results between treatment group II of Agadir 4 to E.U. compared to the 4 other countries of control 
group II. The difference between treatment and control groups II of interest was calculated by the 
difference in means between the two groups which was distant from zero. The null hypothesis  𝐻0 =0 
was refused against the alternative  𝐻𝑎 ≠ 0  with a significant increase of 58% growth for Agadir_4’s 
final exports to E.U, since the onset of both Agadir agreement together with adoption of Pan-Euro 
diagonal RoO; which came to the benefit of smaller association agreements such as Agadir 
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Table 3.13 PPML: Control Group I for final exports 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on the original source & ATU database 2010 
Table 3.14 PPML: Control Group II for final exports 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on CEPII gravity dataset 2010 & ATU 
database 2010 
Beverages Food Furniture Industrial Leather Machinery Other  Paper Scientific Medical Textiles Transport
Products Chemcials Spare Parts Chemcials Equipment Equipment Equipment S.P 
Control 
Exports 
VARIABLES
lngdp_i 1.003*** 0.882*** 0.929*** 1.059*** 0.926** 0.895** 0.903*** 0.912*** 0.914*** 0.916** 0.887*** 1.008*
(0.0213) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0475) (0.0206) (0.0252) (0.0193) (0.0266) (0.0183) (0.0278) (0.0160) (0.0679)
lngdp_j 0.943*** 0.908*** 0.812**** 0.879*** 0.934*** 0.923*** 0.844*** 0.843*** 0.818*** 0.858** 0.903*** 0.951***
(0.0213) (0.0208) (0.0156) (0.0301) (0.0207) (0.0300) (0.0161) (0.0241) (0.0180) (0.0262) (0.0183) (0.0617)
lndistw -0.955*** -0.835*** -0.812*** -0.802*** -0.840*** -0.882*** -0.791*** -0.828*** -0.861*** -0.812* -0.912*** -0.967***
(0.0451) (0.0517) (0.0438) (0.0627) (0.0452) (0.0804) (0.0439) (0.0686) (0.0433) (0.0741) (0.0448) (0.0927)
contig. 0.551*** 0.192** 0.160** 0.744** 0.259 0.592 0.519** 0.528** 0.404* 0.613* 0.662* -0.0826
(0.148) (0.127) (0.120) (0.194) (0.218) (0.206) (0.103) (0.043) (0.0878) (0.059) (0.122) (0.181)
ComLang. 1.026*** 0.675** 0.244** 0.792** 1.040*** 0.851*** 0.367** 0.696*** 0.696* 0.747** 0.542*** 1.178***
(0.078) (0.0979) (0.0982) (0.056) (0.022) (0.07) (0.0843) (0.063) (0.117) (0.05) (0.0882) (0.017)
rta-eu -0.15 -0.0893 0.570* 1.166** -0.143 0.0594 0.356* 1.517*** 0.758** 1.419*** 0.792** 0.493*
(0.234) (0.161) (0.106) (0.023) (0.166) (0.220) (0.124) (0.218) (0.028) (0.233) (0.065) (0.196)
Col 0.438* 0.820* 0.283* 0.427* 0.105 0.203 0.151 0.378* 0.597** 0.421* 0.872*** -0.553*
(0.167) (0.127) (0.226) (0.169) (0.175) (0.266) (0.121) (0.126) (0.154) (0.081) (0.027) (0.161)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571)
Control (C) 0.102 0.427* -0.0192 0.353 0.301* 0.249 0.0458 -0.188 0.265* -0.147 -0.135 0.178
(0.112) (0.149) (0.172) (0.232) (0.177) (0.164) (0.116) (0.119) (0.119) (0.130) (0.149) (0.166)
Postc2006 (P) 0.292 0.186 0.649* 1.276** 0.0425 -0.0238 0.189 1.514*** 0.808* 1.387*** 0.578* 0.145
(0.125) (0.190) (0.155) (0.027) (0.185) (0.260) (0.142) (0.210) (0.158) (0.225) (0.180) (0.241)
Interaction (CP) 0.103 0.215 0.238 0.439*** -0.249 0.454*** 0.319*** 0.0516 0.0341 0.114 0.761*** 0.454**
(0.198) (0.182) (0.207) (0.048) (0.225) (0.039) (0.071) (0.156) (0.163) (0.167) (0.021) (0.196)
Constant -14.21 -9.773*** -8.922*** -11.11*** -11.79*** -11.40*** -11.20*** -12.04*** -9.026*** -12.36*** -10.22*** -13.00***
(0.789) (0.569) (0.662) (1.513) (0.848) (1.386) (1.176) (0.961) (0.614) (0.959) (0.800) (0.883)
Observations 27,287 39983 26,366 32,055 22,077 25,705 30,171 27,693 25,028 12,125 27,693 32,125
R-squared 0.992 0.996 0.995 0.964 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.567 0.995 0.511 0.985 0.995
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Food Furniture Industrial Leather Minerals Other Paper Petroleum Rubber & Plas. Medical Textiles Transport 
Control II Products Chemicals Chemicals  Refineries Products Equipment Machinery  S.P.
Export Flows Control
VARIABLES Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports 
lngdp_i 0.929*** 0.919*** 0.938*** 0.929*** 0.910*** 0.938*** 0.912*** 0.916*** 0.923*** 0.916*** 0.913*** 0.924***
(0.0287) (0.0304) (0.0331) (0.0287) (0.0274) (0.0260) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0261) (0.0278) (0.0259) (0.0276)
lngdp_j 0.869*** 0.829*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.850*** 0.869*** 0.843*** 0.857*** 0.847*** 0.858*** 0.844*** 0.863***
(0.0265) (0.0289) (0.0252) (0.0265) (0.0257) ('0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0259) (0.0251) (0.0262) (0.0251) (0.0263)
lndistw -0.870*** -0.804*** -0.778*** -0.870*** -0.840*** -0.827*** -0.828*** -0.856*** -0.853*** -0.812*** -0.861*** -0.807***
(0.0688) (0.0760) (0.0681) (0.0688) (0.0736) (0.0669) (0.0686) (0.0720) (0.0703) (0.0741) (0.0706) (0.0715)
contig 0.492* 0.631** 0.613* 0.492* 0.557* 0.689** 0.528** 0.486* 0.555* 0.613* 0.557** 0.597*
(0.092) (0.025) (0.066) (0.192) (0.204) (0.057) (0.043) (0.093) (0.186) (0.059) (0.052) (0.066)
ComLang 0.726** 0.539* 0.734** 0.726* 0.704* 0.655* 0.696** 0.754* 0.675* 0.747** 0.714** 0.778**
(0.025) (0.067) (0.045) (0.115) (0.111) (0.074) (0.06) (0.113) (0.116) (0.05) (0.032) (0.023)
rta_e.u 1.349*** 1.467*** 1.475*** 1.349*** 1.411*** 1.456*** 1.517*** 1.397*** 1.371*** 1.419*** 1.221*** 1.458***
(0.216) (0.220) (0.208) (0.216) (0.236) (0.236) (0.218) (0.229) (0.227) (0.233) (0.210) (0.230)
Col 0.399** 0.342* 0.403* 0.399* 0.425* 0.238* 0.378* 0.381* 0.387* 0.421* 0.485** 0.325*
(0.054) (0.077) (0.123) (0.134) (0.127) (0.136) (0.126) (0.141) (0.131) (0.081) (0.059) (0.134)
MFN_Tarrif -0.000999 -0.00995 -0.00245 -0.0160*** -0.0133 -0.00383 -0.00961 -0.00482 -0.00517 -0.0227*** -0.00495 -0.00141
(0.012) (0.662) (0.455) (0.609) (0.901) (0.571) (0.746) (0.494) (0.655) (0.167) (0.151) (0.571)
Control (C) -0.114 -0.127 -0.171 0.00204 0.00158 0.0396 -0.188 -0.170 0.0016 -0.147 -0.188 -0.189
(0.131) (0.130) (0.120) (0.0599) (0.0643) (0.120) (0.119) (0.132) (0.063) (0.130) (0.126) (0.120)
Post (P) 1.527*** 1.494*** 1.404*** 1.527*** 1.437*** 1.404*** 1.514*** 1.397*** 1.430*** 1.387*** 1.271*** 1.367***
(0.224) (0.227) (0.217) (0.224) (0.229) (0.217) (0.210) (0.227) (0.224) (0.225) (0.203) (0.225)
Interaction (CP) 0.0758 0.0570 0.0654 0.0758 0.0817 0.0779 0.0516 0.139 0.0934 0.114 0.190 0.164
(0.159) (0.162) (0.159) (0.159) (0.166) (0.165) (0.156) (0.166) (0.159) (0.167) (0.158) (0.155)
Constant -15.61*** -17.66*** -12.95*** -15.61*** -11.99*** -14.81*** -12.04*** -14.20*** -14.02*** -12.36*** -11.22*** -12.43***
(1.041) (1.175) (0.942) (1.041) (1.014) (1.231) (0.961) (1.214) (1.101) (0.959) (0.891) (1.009)
Observations 13,983 19,366 5,055 3,287 13,077 5,705 5,171 12,028 5,693 12,125 3,173 14,508
R-squared 0.756 0.679 0.662 0.789 0.662 0.789 0.567 0.643 0.980 0.511 0.797 0.781
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.8 Discussion across Results and Estimation Approaches:  
 
In turn, parallel results obtained from descriptive data and Cluster analysis, PPML and DID across all 
estimations indicated, as seen in the matrix of results on Table 3.15 to the significance of 6 key sectors 
(Industrial Chemicals, Processed Food Products, Other Chemicals, Transport Equipment Spare Parts, 
Machinery and Scientific Spare Parts) for which final export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. 
countries have grown since the adoption of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO. One of the robustness checks used 
was the cluster and descriptive analysis; which both identified similar results with export flows 
increasing for the following three clusters of sectors: Cluster 1; classified by petrochemicals, Cluster 2 
consumer non-durables and finally Cluster 3 under which falls all machinery spare parts and 
components. As well for greater degrees of robustness, the 3 clusters that resulted were treated by Pan-
Euro diagonal RoO introduced and results maintained the same trends with: Petrochemical cluster one 
showing the highest level of significance and recorded an extremely elevated factor of 71 [exp(4.266)] 
and then followed by machinery spare parts are at factor of 1.87. 
 
Further when Pan-Euro diagonal RoO were applied between Agadir_4 countries and the E.U. there has 
been an obvious increase in final exports starting by the highest chronologically: factor of 3.2 [exp 
(1.19)], 2.75 at [exp (1.0121)], 2.38 [exp (0.8690] and 2.92 [exp (1.073)] for Petroleum Refineries, 
Other chemicals, Industrial Chemicals and furniture respectively after adopting Pan-Euro diagonal 
RoO. As well comes in the second category for Agadir_4 to E.U. medical and transport equipment 
spare parts both at highly significant levels and factors of 3 at [exp (1.113)] and 2.53 at [exp (0,931] 
respectively, which is a result similar to and justified by the Agadir Technical unit report on automotive 
component parts industry between Agadir countries and the E.U. (ATU report, 2009) 
  
Although as seen through matrix results of that intermediate export flows appeared after RoO were 
adopted and this was not only on the level of Agadir_4 countries with the E.U. but as well for the 
amplified group of 50 countries adopting Pan-Euro RoO schemes. Among the most significant sectors 
impacted by treatment were Industrial chemicals, other chemicals, Rubber products, petroleum 
refineries, equipment spare parts, textiles and leather. However, the significance for intermediate 
exports of treatment group II between Agadir_4 and E.U. has been at a lower scale at less sector specific 
intermediate export flows affected by treatment. The sectors are shown in matrix Table 3.15 to be: 
Furniture, leather, rubber products, and petroleum refineries.  
 
Another fact is the evident change in the agreement’s export structure and composition either for the 
intensity of export flows or quality since the onset of Pan-Euro Rules of origin. The introduction of 
Pan-Euro RoO induced the growth of regional value-added content to be more permissive and allow 
sourcing out of inputs at more efficient prices. This created an incentive for Pan-Euro applicants to 
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adopt the RoO and was itself an incentive for the emergence of new intermediate export categories 
between Agadir_4 countries and the E.U. such as Rubber Products (at grew at 48 times after 2006), 
leather and minerals  
 
According to our best knowledge of the literature review and econometric pitfalls that could appear, 
there existed a thin thread between separating both effects: the onset of the Agadir agreement in 2005 
and adoption diagonal RoO 2006. Although fixed effects of country of origin and destination and sector 
were introduced to control for any unobserved heterogeneities and a dummy for rta to capture bilateral 
initiatives between Agadir countries and E.U., yet it was nearly impossible to differentiate between 
both.  In order to totally separate the impact of Agadir’s agreement onset and applying Pan-Euro RoO, 
this requires extensive work beyond the scope of this investigation, larger time frame for both the 
agreement’s performance and sector specific data on Pan-Euro RoO implementation and as well a 
detailed dialysis of the product categories and chapters, heading and sub-headings existing within each 
sector to reach solid results with respect to the separation between Agadir agreement for its purpose 
and adoption of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO.  
 
There might be several technicalities challenging the application of RoO for final and intermediate 
export sectors between Agadir_4 to E.U., such as what was evident for the textile sector and food 
products for failure of some RoO to be adopted in some instances. As well for those sectors precisely 
food products, the coefficient of rta reversed to a negative sign, indicating that these technicalities might 
negatively impact export flows instead of employing regional trade areas to intensify trade, which runs 
counter-intuitive to the literature.  
 
The applicability of diagonal RoO will give more room for manoeuvring and specialization for 
members to apply RoO effectively and acquire inputs from other external regions at competitive prices 
for their production. Furthermore, sectors of high regional value-added content between Agadir_4 and 
E.U, will open the door in-front of easier, unified and standardized RoO without any inefficiencies 
caused by their high costs and conflicting RoO. This will certainly cause a gradual shift in the export 
content of Agadir_4 to E.U. to be realized through intermediate flows, besides the growth of smaller 
feeding sectors serving for final exports.  
 
 This exercise has shown an attempt to measure the sector specific final and intermediate export flows 
between Agadir_4 and the E.U.; which gives more insight to some of the inter-regional initiatives 
between MENA countries (Agadir_4) and E.U. and to prove that one of the reasons Agadir agreement 
did not fail, was due to the adoption of Pan-Euro diagonal RoO; which led to raising the value-added 
content of Agadir’s countries flow the E.U.  
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All the previous results  do not have their implications only on intensifying trade intensity on an inter-
regional level for MENA countries, however what we are really seeking out of this agreement at the 
bottom line is to encourage multinationals and investments to find opportunities to grow under the 
framework  of what an agreement like Agadir offers benefits of flexible RoO and granting 
permissiveness for cumulating products at least costs possible , increasing the quality and value added 
content and manufacturing complexity of exports. 
Table 3.15 Matrix of Results Across all sectors and estimations 
 
Own’s elaboration of PPML gravity Model estimations based on CEPII gravity dataset 2010 & ATU 
database 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 7 Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 12 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 17 Sector 18 Sector 22 Sector 23 Sector 24 Sector 26 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Matrix of Results across  the different models Beverages Food Electric  FurnitureIndustrial Leather Machinery Rubber Other Paper Petroleum Scentific Medical Textiles Transport Petro Consumer Machinery 
Products Machinery Chemicals S.P Products Chemicals Refineries  Equipment  Equipment Equipment  chemicals Durables S.P.
Interaction  terms /signficance 
DID Treatment Group I (Export Flows) 0.952** 0.739** -0.177 1.287** 1.022** 0.152 0.499 none 1.425** 0.377* none 1.406** 1.055** 4.151*** 0.472
Sig. (0.0214) (0.024) (0.306) (0.0436) (0.047) (0.210) (0.360) none (0.036) (0.174) none (0.0407) (0.0343) (0.003) (0.200)
DID Treatment Group I Clusters none none none none none none none none none none none none none none none 1.298*** -0.582*** 0.400***
Sig. none none none none none none none none none none none none none none none (0.0975) (0.175) (0.0965)
 DID Treatment Group I (Intermediate Flows) 0.025 0.488** none 0.370 1.076*** 1.372*** 0.183 1.162*** -0.136 none 1.162*** 1.110*** none 0.654** 1.402***
Sig. (0) (0.023) none -0.311 (0.019) (0.005) (0.483) (0.0127) (0.130) none (0.0145) (0.0135) none (0.422) (0.0036)
Marginal Effects Treatment Group I (Exports Flows) 0.0758 0.929** 1.030** -1.257** 1.728** 1.878** 0.226 none -0.0164 1.007** none 0.523* 0.963** -0.609* 0.373*
Sig. (0) (0.042) (0) (0.025) (0.029) (0.054) (0.237) none (0.210) (0) none -0.293 (0) (0.244) (0.170)
DID Treatment Group II  (Export Flows) none 1.005** none 1.073*** 0.869* 0.705* none 0.821* 1.012** 0.882** 1.192** none 1.113** 0.592 0.931*
Sig. none (0.034) none (0) (0.024) (0.074) none (0.071) (0.026) (0.051) (0.028) none (0.043) (0.431) (0.053)
DID Treatment Group II Clusters none none none none none none none none none none none none none none none 4.266*** -1.174*** 0.626*
Sig. none none none none none none none none none none none none none none none (0.067) (0.034) (0.107)
DID Treatment Group II (Intermediate Flows) none 0.339* none 0.267* 0.250* 1.033*** none 0.284* 0.284* 0.289* 0.307* none 0.295* 0.259* 0.295*
Sig. none (0.092) none (0.096) (0.098) (0) none (0.0988) (0.0986) (0.103) (0.0992) none (0.102) (0.0989) (0.0994)
Marginal Effects Treatment Group II (Export Flows) none 1.030*** none 0.647 1.033* 1.047*** none 1.296*** 0.982* 1.183*** 1.296*** none 1.018* 1.326** 1.035***
Sig. none (0) none (0.564) (0.165) (0.059) none (0.029) (0.585) (0.015) (0) none (0.595) (0.029) (0)
 DID Control Group I (Export Flows) -0.103 -0.215* -0.479* 0.238 -0.439* -0.249 0.454* none 0.319* 0.343** none -0.0341 0.778** 0.761*** 0.454**
Sig. (0) (0.182) (0.149) (0.207) (0.247) (0.225) (0.039) none (0.071) (0.065) none (0.163) (0.032) (0.021) (0.196)
DID  Contorl Group II (Exports Flows) 0.00640 -0.0758 none 0.0570 0.0654 -0.0758 none 0.0934 -0.0779 0.0516 0.139 none 0.114 0.190 0.164
Sig. (0.162) (0.159) none (0.162) (0.159) (0.159) none (0.159) (0.165) (0.156) (0.166) none (0.167) (0.158) (0.155)
 PSM Treatment Group II (Export Flows) N-N 0.18 0.359 none -0.7 0.181 0.18 none none 0.414 0.475 -0.221 none 0.203 0.221 0.351
Sig. (0.241) (0.038) none 0.368 (0.186) 0.241 none none (0.034) 0.026 0.049 none 0.301 0.076 0.383
 PSM Treatment Group II (Export Flows)  Kernel 0.18 0.32 none -0.63 0.12 0.21 none none 0.456 0.369 -0.507 none 0.54 0.358 0.599
Sig. (0.024) (0.03) none 0.309 0.145 0.051 none none 0.205 0.151 0.302 none 0.266 0.204 0.171
Standard Errors in Parenthesis are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.16 Literature review on combining Gravity model and DID treatment approaches  
     
 
Author 
Publication 
Year  
Journal  Citation   
 Kruegar, A. 1993 
Journal of 
Development 
Economics  313 
 Krishna, K. & Kruegar,A. 1995 
University of Michigan 
Press 251 
 Hanson G. 1996 
European Economic 
Review  259 
 Falvey R. and Reed G 2000 
Journal of International 
Economic Review  109 
 Brenton, P.  and Manchin, M.  2002 
The World Economy 
Wiley BlackWell 343 
 Cadot,O. et al. 2002 Journal of World Trade  87 
 Duttagupta, R. and Panagariya, A.  2003 
Journal of Economics 
and Politics  74 
 Ghoneim, A 2003 Journal of World Trade  31 
 Estevadeordal, A. and Suominen, K.  2004 Journal of World Trade  114 
 Augier, P. and Gasoriek, M.  2005 
Journal of International 
Economics  199 
 Cadot O. et al.  2006 World Trade Review  107 
 
Suominen, K. Gretton P. and Gali J. 
2005 2006 
University of 
Melbourne  13 
 El-Megharbel, N. 2006 
 United Nations  
Economic Commission 
for Africa  21 
 
Augier, P. and Gasoriek,M. and Lai 
Tong,C.  2007 
Journal of North 
African  Studies 
(FEMISE) 10 
 Jurše, M. Logožar, K. and Vide, R 2008 
Journal of International 
Business Studies  13 
 Bombarda, P. and Gamberoni, E. 2009 
International Economic 
Review 39 
 
Estevadeordal, A. and  Harris,J. and 
and Suominen,K. 2009 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 13 
 Steafano.,I 2009 
Cambridge University 
Press 3 
 
 
Bensassi, S. and Márquez-Ramos,L. 
and Martínez-Zarzoso,I. 2010 
Journal of North 
African Studies  33 
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 Lee, H.  2013 
The Korean Economic 
Review  25 
 Trade Gravity Models, Polic ,Impact Evaluation , and PPML Estimator 
 Anderson, J. and Wincoop Van, E. 2004 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  3,400 
 Silva, S. and Tenreyero, S.  2006 
The Review of 
Economics and 
Statistics  2,889 
 H. Harou, H. 2007 
Journal of Economic 
Integration  10 
 
Helpman E.,and Meltiz M. and 
Rubinstein,Y. 2008 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics  2,407 
 Henderson, D. and Millimet, D. 2008 
Journal of Applied 
Econometrics  119 
 Baier, S.and Bergstrand, J. 2009 
Journal of International 
Economics  200 
 Millimet D., and Tchernis R.  2009 
Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics  65 
 Egger, P. et al.  2011 
American Economic 
Journal  179 
 
Source all literature review used in references and cited from academic and trade Journals  
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Around 50 countries above all the E.U and their affiliated Free Trade agreements with Mediterranean and 
Eastern European countries started applying PANEURO cumulation system PECS since 1997. One of 
significant features of PECS system is the assimilation of a RVC from outside the PTA reaching up till 40 
percent; thus, introducing flexibility in sourcing inputs at more efficient costs and certainly opening new 
channels in front of E.U. South Mediterranean neighbors and partners to move up the global chain of value 
added final and intermediate exports. The focus of this chapter was about proving the effectiveness of 
applying Pan-Euro diagonal RoO for small association agreements affiliated to the E.U. such as the Agadir 
Association agreement and to assess whether diagonal RoO succeeded in changing and increasing final and 
intermediate export flows between Agadir 4 countries and E.U. community. Previously several sector 
specific studies for export flows led by Agadir Technical Unit report (ATU, 2009) could demonstrate 
through field survey analysis that diagonal RoO, if applied correctly, is supposed to intensify flows between 
Agadir_4 and E.U. As well to increase the exports of intermediates and component industries between both 
partners for different sectors, however, fewer evidence of empirical analysis were provided regarding 
Agadir Agreement and evaluating its trade intensity through adoption of Pan-Euro RoO 
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In order to proceed with a precise estimation of adopting diagonal RoO and how it would boost export 
flows for Agadir agreement countries, it was necessary to lay down the foundation to be supported by 
descriptive analysis and Cluster Analysis. The cluster results led to the emergence of three key categories 
of sectors upon which nearly 90 percent of Agadir_4 to E.U exports flows revolved and they were as 
follows: Cluster 1 Petrochemicals cluster with Industrial Chemicals and all other related Chemicals. Cluster 
2, non- durable consumer goods cluster which encompassed Food Products, Beverages and Textiles. Cluster 
3, Heavy Duty and Machinery Spare Parts and components cluster comprised of Transport Equipment, 
Scientific Equipment, Medical Equipment and Furniture. After the identification of key categories of sector 
from the cluster analysis, their sector specific export flows were introduced into an augmented gravity 
model; those final and intermediate export flows were subject to treatment with Pan-Euro Diagonal RoO 
through impact evaluation approach of DID and for robustness checks, the Cluster Analysis was also 
employed.  
Treatment was decomposed into treatment groups I of 50 member applicants of Pan-Euro RoO versus 
treatment II of Agadir_4 countries and 26 E.U. members. Counterfactual both Control I and II groups 
similar in all the characteristics of treatment groups I and II except for treatment. Most significant results 
after Pan-Euro RoO treatment indicated that the coefficients of gravity variables for several sectors 
remarkably impacted final and intermediate export flows between Agadir 4 to E.U. at highly significant 
coefficients of 11 and 6 out of the 12 sectors, through the interaction variable estimating the crossed effect 
between treatment and time known as  (β10
k DPij) term. The most significant results with high coefficient 
emerged for final exports of treatment group II. Furthermore, this result strongly suggested that the 
treatment premium is almost 2.5 times higher between the treatment and control groups with the partial 
significance of their sector’s coefficients weighting at much higher factors for treatment with diagonal RoO 
for both clusters petrochemicals and machinery spare-parts.  
Besides the fact that treatment with diagonal RoO contributed to the emergence of a different structure and 
composition for final and intermediate export flows between Agadir_4 and the E.U._26 countries. Finally 
results across all approaches suggested the significance of 6 key sectors (, industrial chemicals, other 
chemicals, transport equipment spare parts, food products, machinery and medical spare parts) for which 
final export flows has grown since the adoption diagonal RoO between Agadir 4 countries and E.U.   
On the promising side, the emergence of intermediate trade flows between Pan-Euro Diagonal RoO 
applicants and at a smaller scale for Agadir 4 to the EU and existence of new feeding sectors such as rubber 
products, leathers, petroleum refineries, and paper to pour into the manufactures of the three main clusters 
signals to the gradual shift in the export content of Agadir_4 to E.U from basic semi manufactures and 
unprocessed materials to another level of sophisticated manufactures with  higher value added content.  
CHAPTER 3  
3.1 What Happens to Trade Flow when Rules of Origin are relaxed? 
132 
There is no doubt as well that flexing threshold of regional value content for final and intermediates flows, 
allows permissiveness of higher foreign content to be out sourced efficiently and at same time increasing 
competitiveness and facilitating more specialization and development of ‘smaller feeding industries’.  
As per se more investigation should be dedicated to the resolution of technical barriers facing the 
implementation of diagonal RoO in sectors like textiles and processed food products. Furthermore, there 
should be a well-studied strategy for linking between exports of manufactures and their intermediates in 
specific sectors between Agadir 4 and E.U. at one hand and the promotion for those sectors as the targeted 
and ones with incentives to attract multinationals and small and medium investments. Accordingly, chapter 
4 of this work will be devoted to the analysis of FDI growth in key sectors motivated by the Agadir 4 export 
flows and European and other foreign investors. It is expected to employ another alternative research 
methodology which is the qualitative research by introducing, designing and analysing empirically a 
questionnaire directed to FDIs’ in Egypt as a study case; to reflect upon the situation of investments in Arab 
countries in light of the latest political, economic and institutional instabilities and wave of upheavals which 
started during 2011.  
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Will the Quality of Institutions Determine Egypt’s Investment Climate? 
A Qualitative Questionnaire and In-depth Interviews on the case of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Egypt 
4.1 Introduction:  
Many countries have witnessed turning points in their political and economic systemsxiii during 
the last 40 years, which led them to pass through the 4 stages of transition known by the 
‘Transition Paradigm’. These stages chronologically start with the ‘Opening Stage135’ then the 
‘Breakthrough Stage136’ followed by the ‘Transitional Stage137’ finally the ‘Consolidation 
Stage 138 ’ (Carothers, 2000; Linz and Stepan, 2009). The transitional stage based on the 
experiences of many regions is when countries re-build their institutions and economies, in 
attempts to retrieve investors’ confidence and encourage FDI to return or open the door wide to 
new investment opportunities (Carothers, 2000). It is true that investors give priority to the quality 
of institutions when they evaluate transition economies, however they use well-grounded 
theoretical models such as the ‘Dunning’ Eclectic Paradigm’xiv (1997) ̓ of ‘OLI model’ to 
rationalize their decision to invest in a specific destination. (Dunning, 2001; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Caleiro and Caetano, 2009). The three triangular advantages of OLI model stand 
for “O” for ‘Ownership Advantage’139, “I” known as the ‘Internationalization Advantage140’ 
and “L” denotes ‘Location Advantage141’ and they act as a checklist for investors to formulate 
their investment decisions. Apart from this checklist, relationship between quality of institutions 
and its impact on FDI climate has been under scrutiny by many authors; especially for economies 
in transition. (Alesina et al., 1996; Onyeiwu, 2000; Todaro, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Asiedu, 2005; 
                                                          
135 Opening Stage: when cracks appear in governing regime of a country 
 
136 Breakthrough Stage: which signals to the collapse of the regime and emergence of other more democratic 
alternatives.   
 
137 Transitional Stage: which is re-adaptation of the country’s institutions to conform to the new regime’s 
changes  
 
138 Consolidation Stage: which works on reinforcing those institutional changes 
 
139 Ownership Advantage: which reflects on the know-how, market niche and transferred technology 
 
140 Internationalization Advantage: which signals to the competitive ownership of know-how and its 
exclusivity 
 
141 Location Advantage: which grant firms’ investment incentives in certain markets, activities or regions 
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Caleriro and Caetano, 2009; Aisen and Veiga, 2010; Caetano and Galego, 2009; Barhim and 
Rachdi, 2014).  
The Middle East and North African region had its share of exposure to the waves of transition 
since the 1990’s and some of its countries are still going through those transitions until now. Most 
of the mainstream literature reviewing this topic pointed to the fragility of political and economic 
institutions in MENA to be the main cause behind discrepancies in their performance and to 
negatively impact the region’s FDI flows (Onyeiwu, 2003; Méon and Sekkat, 2004; Chan and 
Gemayel; 2004; Kamaly ,2007; Caetano and Galego, 2009).  More recently after the 2011 Arab 
turmoil pro-claimed as ‘Arab Spring’, the situation for attracting FDIs’ in their countries has 
become worse and many regional analysts suggest that those countries should go through rigorous 
reforms to avoid the precipitated loss of investors ‘confidence in their region (Ishay, 2013; 
Khandelwal and Rotiman, 2013). Accordingly, this chapter refers to the case of FDI in Egypt; as 
one of the typical Arab countries going through the same transition the Arab countries suffered; 
given Egypt represents 25 percent of MENA region’s market capacity. Besides it recovered up 
to 61 percent of its FDI flows 4 years after the revolts and its involvement in a considerable 
number of regional investment agreements with many partners, should leave it at an advantageous 
position to be a recipient of higher FDI flows (UNDP, 2014; GAFI, 2015; IMF Survey 2015). 
The study focuses on the quality of institutions in Egypt during the transition and its impact on 
FDI climate. Its originality lies in the fact that we have designed a comprehensive questionnaire 
gathering a novel dataset on FDIs in Egypt after 2011 turmoil. Moreover, the chapter includes 12 
in-depth interviews on specific sectors. It is true that the qualitative research data methodology 
assessing FDI climate is still in its nascent stages, yet recently there has been a boom of studies 
in this framework supported by qualitative research (i.e. targeted questionnaires, elite interviews, 
case studies and focus groups) to compensate for the lack of quantitative data in cases of transition 
economies. (Ziacik, 2000; Bastos and Nasir, 2004; Tridico, 2006; Klaus and Saul and Kumar and 
Mike, 2009; Hotho and Pederson,2012; Garridoet al., 2013; Hanafy, 2015).  
The qualitative questionnaire on FDI’s in Egypt in this context covered a sample of 92 Small and 
Medium Investors (SMI) and we designed it to include three parts. The first part incorporated 
data demographics about FDIs, meanwhile, through the second and third parts, we introduced 
questions to assess the quality of institutions and how they determined FDI climate. The 
questionnaire’s main objective is to distinguish between the behaviour of foreign and Egyptian 
FDI’s during the time of transition.  How did foreign investors react after the turmoil? Did they 
prefer to hold their investments or just left after the turbulences started?  
After the gathering, coding and preparing the 92 questionnaires data, a Principal Component 
Analysis was conducted to reduce the dimension of variables used in the Logistic regression with 
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categorical and ordinal variables. The regression results confirmed that a one standard deviation 
increase in the categories of the following variables: protection of investors’ rights, doing 
business enablers and quality of macroeconomic institutions; led to 70 percent increase in Egypt’s 
investment climate at high degrees of significance. In parallel, the 12 in-depth interviews on 
sector specific results of FDIs in Egypt had shown great consistency with the results driven from 
the econometric analysis. The results had shown that 60 percent of top ranked foreign managers 
of the interviewed FDIs commented that they prefer to “Wait and Hold” their investments in 
Egypt and do not take the initiative to undertake further expansions during the transition. 
Interviewees as well were concerned about protection of their property rights, giving them more 
privileges and securing a stable macroeconomic climate for investors to continue in a productive 
investment climate. The chapter is structured in the following manner: Section 1 introduces the 
relation between FDI climate and institutions and the motivation behind the topic. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the theoretical and empirical literature exploring the relationship between quality of 
institutions and FDI climate. Section 3 Analysis of the questionnaire and in-depth interviews 
demographics and descriptive data. Section 4 focuses on the econometric methodology. Section 
5. Presents the annex of results for questionnaires and interviews. Section 6. Contrasts the 
communalities between the questionnaires and in-depth interviews, and interviewees’ quotes. 
Then section 7 presents policy implications and conclusion. 
4. 2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review linking between quality of 
Institutions and FDI climate 
4.2.1 Types of Institutions and their relation to FDI Climate   
 
The main stream literature relating the quality of institutions to FDI outcomes advocated that 
political factors were foremost to determining FDI. Stable Political institutions based on 
conserving investors property rights and regulating policies and legislations to incentivize 
investors are indispensable to healthy FDI climate. The literature review also reflected on 
incidences of violence and political turbulence that resulted in expropriation and nationalization 
in some Eastern European economies; as a means of capital control and which led to higher risks 
endured by investors. (Alesina et al, 1992; Barro, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 199;) Wei, 2000; 
Jensen, 2003; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Prüfer and Tondle, 2009). In complementarity to 
the quality of political institutions, many authors assumed that several economic factors are not 
of less importance to further illustrate the relationship between economic institutions and FDI 
climate. In a nutshell, the most significant ones are trade freedom, business freedom, investment 
freedom, infrastructure connectedness, market size, foreign and domestic capital mobilization, 
inflation, foreign exchange fluctuations, taxations systems, all together according to evidence 
from literature are factors contributing to a consolidated investment climate (Gastanaga et al, 
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1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Onyeiwu, 2000; Asiedu, 2005; Caetano and Galego, 2009; 
Barhim and Rachdi, 2014). More recently innovative approaches developed by Caetano and 
Calero (2009) have been employed to prove the existence of a stronger correlation between 
economic freedom and inwards FDI performance through employing the ‘Fuzzy Cluster Logic 
Approach’142 
 
In fact, the impact of both economic and political institutions are inseparable in determining 
investment climate and they both overlap with each other on certain criteria. This notion was 
conveyed by Wheeler and Moody (1992) and Singh and Jun (1995) and Porter et al. (1999), when 
they combined all determinants of the desirable investment climate characterized by business-
friendly regulations, lower bureaucracy, less red tape, protection of property rights, reduced 
corruption and consolidated quality of legal systems (North and Weingast,1989; Olsen, 1991; 
Stein, 2001). Empirical studies using gravity models had their share of supporting how the quality 
of institutions, when captured through the relevant variables (institutional, legal and political 
factors)143 would lead to significant impact on FDI climate in MENA countries (Kamaly, 2002; 
Estrin and Bevan, 2004.Quéré et al., 2005; Gammoudi,2007; Onyeiwu,2008).  
 
In a closer perspective on the literature regarding investment in Egypt, Khalil (2015) identified 
the variables influencing investment climate in Egypt through the co-integration equation to be 
GDP, household expenditure, in addition to trade and exchange rate policies. In parallel, the use 
of indices in accounting for the quality of institutions and how they can adjust for FDI climate 
has been extensively used in the literature. Three of the most prominent indices commonly used 
as indicators were: ‘The worldwide Governance Indicators’ developed by the World Bank. ‘Ease 
of Doing Business Index’ originally created by IFC and finally the ‘Index of Economic Freedom’ 
motivated by Heritage Foundation. (Kuafman et al, 2010; Gwartney et al., 2015; The World Bank 
Doing Business Report, 2016). 
More recently one of the most novel methodological approaches to modelling relationship 
between institutions and FDI, has been the qualitative and mixed economic methodologies. Those 
approaches mainly relied on surveys and questionnaires to be conducted in all cases and precisely 
                                                          
142 Fuzzy Cluster Logic Approach: It uses a kind of fuzzy logic to construct clusters in space; where a country’s 
position in space will be determined by index of economic freedom on one vertex and FDI index on the other 
and the logic of crisp sets is the degree to which a country belongs to is 1 and if it does not belong to the set 
is zero. The identification of the fuzzy set is defined by the group of countries belonging together in compact 
spacing. For example, a country with economic freedom index of 5 can be considered high, normal or 
depending on the degree of membership function of the fuzzy set (Caetano and Calero 2009). 
 
 
143 Institutional Freedom variables:  Institutional freedom variables in our context is inclusive of both types 
of political and economic institutional freedom indicators 
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in transition economies (Ziacik,2000; Batra et al. ,2003).  Moreover, the new scope of qualitative 
literature has been more advanced to focus on detailed sub-factors within indices and how they 
can be extracted from surveys and questionnaires.  This is evident in the case of Troilo (2015), 
when he collected specific sub-components and indicators from Multinational companies’ 
surveys to assess how they influenced FDI climate. As an example, he used the speed and 
enforcement of verdicts taken by courts to measure the impact of dispute settlement on FDI 
climate, instead of just relying on the qualitative scale and preference categories of the survey. 
4.2.2 Quality of Institutions and their Impact on FDI Climate in Arab Countries in 
Transition (ACTs) 
 
Long before the recent upheavals in MENA countries, the literature detected the fine thread 
between political and economic institutions and precisely the adverse effects of political instability 
on economic indicators such as high inflation rate and currency devaluation in developing 
countries. (Alesina et al’, 1996; Alesina and Perott, 1996; Barro and Azam et al., 1996; Aisen and 
Veiga, 2006; Jong-a-Pin, 2009; Aisen and Veiga,2011). When the series of political turmoil and 
incidences first struck the region like a ‘Domino Effect Theory’144   ; the resultant was that 
governments were overthrown in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and the Republic of Yemen. Civil wars 
broke out in Libya and Syria and major turbulences extended to Bahrain, Turkey and Lebanon 
(Ferragina 2014). Thought leaders and even international organizations and policy think tanks (the 
European Institutions, IMF, World Bank) identified the region’s wave of turmoil to be originally 
provoked by the absence of healthy, democratic and independent political institutions145 based on 
the rule of law (Behr and Sasnal, 2012; Kausch, 2013; Khader, 2013). 
4.2.3 Egypt’s Institutions and FDI Climate after the 2011 incidents:  
 
Egypt as one of the region’s countries hardly hit by those waves of upheavals, lost the biggest 
portion of its foreign investments at nearly 80 percent during 2010 based on Egyptian Central 
Bank Statistics (2016).  As shown in Figure 4.1, Egypt reached a trough and reversal point of de-
                                                          
144 Domino Effect Revolts: it signifies that revolts in Arab countries affected one country and its contagion 
spread to the rest and that the spill-over effects of hardly hit countries spread to their neighbor and caused 
disturbances and lack of security in their production, economic activities and above all tourism industry, trade 
and foreign investments.  
 
145 Problems of Political institutions in MENA region are the following: In some of the MENA countries 
state officials, government and their one party dominated parliaments are in control of the three branches of 
the country’s political powers: executive, legislative and judiciary power. In reality, each power should be 
handled independently from different officials. Judges and supreme courts should be fully responsible for the 
state’s judiciary power, without any intervention from the parliament’s legislative board or the government’s 
executive power (Frontini & Janning 2012).   
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investments during 2011 with the onset of the political upheavals and revolts. The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency MIGA report (2014) anticipated that Arab Spring countries to 
include Egypt will be placed on the warrant status and will receive ‘Wait and Watch’ evaluation 
by FDIs.  On a brighter scenario, the level of FDIs in Egypt during 2014 returned to half its original 
FDI inflows before the revolts to increase by 61 percent. Since then talks were initiated regarding 
serious reforms in the investment law during 2014 and effectively by end of February 2015, new 
amendments to the investment law responding to investor’s demands were approved only by the 
‘General Authority for Investment’ (GAFI).  
The amendments of Egypt’s investment law 17 of 2015146targeted many aspects of institutional 
reforms to enhance the country’s investment climate: namely through Companies law, taxation 
laws, disputes settlement and arbitration, ownership rights, investment regulatory, legislative 
framework and income taxes. In addition, guarantees and incentives were all altered to create the 
suitable climate to enable doing business in Egypt. One of the amendments results that came 
along before the law was finally ratified by the parliament and came to light on May 2017, were 
reductions in the corporate tax rates to reach a maximum of 22.5 percent being much lower than 
world average tax rate. (UNDP, 2014; GAFI, 2015; IMF Survey 2015). 
Figure 4.1: Egypt’s FDI in Millions of Dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Descriptive Data of the Qualitative Questionnaire and 12 in-depth interviews  
 
Our qualitative questionnaire sought to gather data on factors affecting FDI climate in Egypt from 
investors perspective. It was a much reliable methodology used from a practical point of view, as 
                                                          
146 Amendments Investment Law number law 17 for 2015 generally aimed at enhancing the investment 
climate in Egypt, which has been hit hard by political and economic instability during the last 4 years 
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it presented one guaranteed approach to interpret investors needs into statistical data and at the 
same time to resolve the challenging task of finding data on the region under the severe limitations 
it is passing through. The questionnaire was split into three parts: to start by first part giving some 
descriptive data on the questionnaire demographics, and sample selection criteria. Both parts II 
and III of the questionnaire were designed to include all the institutional factors that we believed 
to have an impact FDI climate in Egypt. It also reflected on the difference between top 
management of Egyptian and foreign FDIs and how they reacted to 2011 incidents.  Above all the 
questionnaire variables were designed in line with factors reflecting upon Ease of doing business 
criteria, economic freedom factors and worldwide governance indicators . 
 
4.3.1 Sample Selection Criteria and Design of Egypt’s FDI Questionnaire 
 
 Based on Mahdy and Louis (2003), it is possible to select a representative sample of respondents 
for the questionnaire on FDIs through a multifaceted sampling technique.  This was the case of 
FDI data gathered for Egypt; as it was comprised of 50 face-to face questionnaires given to 54 
percent of the FDI respondents of small and medium multinationals. In addition to 42 other 
questionnaires sent online or left for respondents to be filled, in consistency with the approved 
qualitative research methodologies (Caserta et al, 1985). The latest UNCTAD report on Egypt 
(2015), indicated that 200 FDIs were registered at an ownership of less than 10 percent of their 
investments and abdicated under the investment law no. 8/1997 recently amended by Presidential 
decree 17/2015.  Our team of researchers could reach up to 120 147active FDIs in Egypt, which 
was in consistency with statistics given by UCTAD FDI database on Egypt (2013). Therefore, 
finally total sample encompassed 92 active multinational foreign investors after discounting (FDIs 
that did not respond, or imaginary FDIs found only on the records and registries). Out of a 
population of 120 existing FDIs, our sample encompassed 77 percent of the FDI population of this 
category in Egypt.  
 
The definition used for FDIs in this context; was strictly derived from ̒ Central Agency for Public 
mobilization and Statistics ̓ (CAPMAS) and it referred to the possession of a foreign investor 
for assets or a production line in a firm affiliated to a country other than home country. Based on 
the definition, FDI should meet the following criteria: i) Foreign ownership of FDI could exceed 
50 percent ii) The investment law under which the FDI was established and legal entity should be 
defined iii) Number of employees in the range of [100 – 250] employees. IV) revenues less than 
                                                          
147 The real Population 120 FDI’s found in Egypt: 50 of them were given the questionnaire and 42 the 
questionnaire was emailed to them, meanwhile , the rest 28 FDIs’:  10 FDIs left the country  and 18 
others we tried to contact them 7 did not answer and could not be reached and 11 refused to collaborate. 
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USD 10 million. V) the presence of limited liability or partnership between both Foreign versus 
Egyptian investors to be specified. The style of questions on the first part of the questionnaire were 
based on a close– ended technique and they gathered descriptive data on FDIs’ sectors, ownership, 
location, number of employees and revenues.  
 
Almost 82 percent of interviewed small and medium foreign investors in Egypt were concentrated 
in the manufacturing sector.  As much as possible targeted FDIs were chosen with an ownership 
exceeding 50 percent to guarantee their autonomous decision making and behavior independent 
of any vested interests.  Based on CAPMAS Small investors were bound to revenue bracket which 
does not exceed EGP 50 million and medium investors were categorized in the revenue range 
exceeding 50 million Egyptian pounds but less than 250 million Egyptian Pounds. The targeted 
segment of FDI’s were the ones identified to have at least a minimum of 100 employees for small 
FDIs and between 100 –500 for medium ones (Kushir,2007).   
 
 
Figure 4.2: Sector Specific Breakdown of FDI’s in Egypt 
 
 
Own’s elaboration based Descriptive Data Derived from FDI Questionnaire on Egypt  
 
As seen in Figure 4.2 the largest portion of FDIs in Egypt were dominated by the petrochemical 
sector and other oil and gas related services at 28 multinationals from which 31 percent of FDIs 
specialized in the oil and gas sector148.  As for agribusiness FDIs they amounted to 20 FDIs and a 
                                                          
148 In Egypt most FDI’s are concentrated in the petrochemical sector precisely oil and gas, with 50 international 
petroleum companies during 2012 were operating in Egypt for exploration, digging and oil extraction 
CHAPTER 4:  
4.1 Will the Quality of Institutions Determine Egypt’s Investment Climate?  
146 
lower number of 15 FDIs in pharmaceuticals. Both together electronics and electro domestics added 
to 12 FDIs and equally true for automotive component parts, and finally 8 textiles. 
Table 4.1: Topology of Respondents Demographic FDI Questionnaire data in Egypt  
Nationality # Frequency % Percent 
American  39 42.4 
European  32 34.8 
Multinational  16 17.4 
Asian   3 3.3 
Gulf Region   2 2.2 
Enterprise Structure  #Frequency  % Percent  
Partnership 1 1.1 
Limited Partnership 9 9.8 
Corporation 67 72.8 
Limited liability 10 10.9 
Subsidiary of Foreign Company 4 4.3 
Public Sector 1 1.1 
Location  # Frequency  % Percent  
6th of October  11 12.0 
10th of Ramadan  5 5.4 
Cairo  56 60.9 
New Cairo  10 10.9 
Al Obour   1 1.1 
Giza  6 6.5 
Alexandria   2 2.2 
Upper Egypt   1 1.1 
Ownership  # Frequency  % Percent 
More than 50% 36 38.0 
Less than 50% 56 60.9 
Legal Entity  # Frequency  % Percent  
Urban Development 
Institution Law 
 
 2 2.2 
Law 159 for 1981  36 39.1 
Law 203 for 1989  17 18.5 
Law 95 for 1992  18 19.6 
Law 8 for 1997  6 6.5 
Law 83 for 2002  7 7.6 
Others  6 6.5 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  
4.1 Will the Quality of Institutions Determine Egypt’s Investment Climate?  
147 
Employees  # Frequency % Percent 
Less than 100 employees  23 25 
from (100-250) employees  41 44.6 
More than 250 employees  16 17.4 
More than 1000 employees  12 13.0 
Other Establishments   # Frequency  % Percent  
West Europe  29 31.5 
North America  10 10.9 
East Europe  7 7.6 
Asia  10 10.9 
Middle East and North of 
Africa  
30 32.6 
Central and South Africa  6 6.5 
Sector   # Frequency  % Percent  
Agriculture, Fisheries and L  4 4.3 
Food and Beverages  16 17.4 
Metal products  2 2.2 
Electro domestics   4 4.3 
Textiles   2 2.2 
Furniture   2 2.2 
Automotive  8 8.7 
Petrochemicals  23 25 
Electronics  3 3.3 
Public Utilities   2 2.2 
Precision Industries  5 5.4 
Construction and Development  1 1 
Other Services  5 5.4 
Pharmaceuticals   15 16.3 
Source: Own’s elaboration based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Question 
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4.3.2 Phase Two: Exploration and Mining of FDI Questionnaire Data and its structure  
 
  On this phase of data exploration and inferential statistics149, we rely on estimating the interaction 
between variables tested by using ̒ Pearson correlations II’. This correlation associates between two 
or more variables through both ̒ Phi Coefficient’150  and  ‘Spearman’s rho’ 151 
 
A) Part I of the Questionnaire: Investors FDIs Topology and Demographic Data  
 
This part of the questionnaire consists of 11 ̒ Close-Ended Questions̓ 152;  already shown on Table 
4.1. These questions provide a detailed overview of the investors’ profiles, registry form, legal entity 
in Egypt, foreign versus local ownership percentages, sector classification, headquarters and 
horizontal expansion in other parts of the MENA region. Demographically and with more relevance 
to regional investment agreements, American and European FDIs grabbed the lion’s share of 30 and 
25 respectively out of the 92 FDI. In third place came equally Egyptian and Asian multinationals at 
14 investors and finally a lower number of Gulf and Arab investors of 8 FDIs in the sample. Almost 
37 FDI’s in the corresponding sample are enlisted under the framework of ‘Urban Development 
Law No. 159 of 1981’153, which allowed foreign investors to have an ownership that exceeded 50 
percent. On the other hand, the rest of FDIs at around 45 are abdicated under ‘Law No. 8 for 
1997’154with the latter law granting more financial and fiscal incentives to investors.  
 
We detected through Table 4.2, that 24 out of the 43 FDIs at an ownership category exceeding 50 
percent, have a higher number of employees exceeding 250. Contrary to the intuition behind the new 
amended laws; giving incentives to investors in Upper Egypt, 76 FDI’s were located around Cairo 
                                                          
149 Inferential Statistics: They are used to draw inferences about the conditions that exist in a population from 
studying the sample drawn from the population. 
 
150 Phi Coefficient: involves a correlation between two qualitative and dichotomous variables such as sectors 
classification and ownership. 
151 Spearman’s rho: when correlation is measured for two variables that are in ranks  
 
152 Close ended questions: are questions that limit the answers of a respondent to a set of choices he can select 
from , these type of questions are time-efficient and easier for coding and interpretations and their examples 
are dichotomous or two type questions, multiple choice and scaled questions. 
 
153 Law No. 159 of 1981: This law permitted automatic company registration upon presentation of an 
application to GAFI, besides it additional advantages for the removal of the restriction that 49% of 
shareholders should be Egyptians. 
 
154 Law No. 8 for 1997:  It is the law unifying one authority GAFI to be responsible for investor’s incentives 
and guarantees and the grouping of 20 exemptions and incentives under one law. It also allowed 100% foreign 
ownership of ventures and guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital. 
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and Giza, Alexandria and the outskirts of upper Cairo and Giza. There were agglomerations of FDIs 
in industrial zones found in new Cairo and 6th of October than other regions due to the existence of 
tighter security measures, infrastructure and services around those areas.  
 
Table 4.2: Cross Tabulation between Numbers of Employees versus % of Foreign Ownership 
   Employees Total 
Less than 
100 
employees  
From 
(100-250)  
Employees 
from  
(250-250) 
employees 
More  
than 250 
employees 
More 
than 1000 
employees 
 
Ownership 
Did not want to emphasize  0 7 12 0 4 23 
Less than 50% Foreigners 2 3 5 8 8 26 
More than 50% Foreigners 0 11 24 8 0 43 
Tota l 2 21 41 16 12 92 
Source: Own’s elaboration based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire Output 2015 
 
 
Table 4.3 has shown that over 72 percent of management positions of the 92 FDI’s questionnaires had 
foreign management versus 21percent managed by Egyptian. The cross tabulation conducted between 
the percentage of foreign management and their decision to expand or downsize their investments in 
Egypt had shown that 10 percent of foreign managers announced the expansion of their next investment 
phase versus 84 percent refusing to proceed with any expansions during the transition. 
 
Table 4.3: Cross Tabulation between Management and Expanding Investments in Egypt 
Management * Expand Investment in Egypt Crosstabulation 
 
 Expand Investments 155 Total 
Yes No Under 
Investigation 
Not aware of 
Management 
Foreign Management 7 56 2 2 67 
Egyptian Management 0 20 0 0 20 
Joint Management 1 4 0 0 5 
Total 8 80 2 2 92 
                                                          
155 Source: Own’s elaboration based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire 
Output  
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B) Part II of the Questionnaire: Doing Business Enablers 
 
Moving onto section 2 of this questionnaire composed of 4 close-ended questions and 1 ‘Open-Ended’156  
‘Likert Scale’157Matrix applied to identify the relationship between doing business and their impact on 
FDI climate in Egypt.  Likert scale respondents were asked to rank a series of factors in each category on 
a scale of one to five. It was detected in chronological order of importance through the cross variable 
references in Table 4.4: first that 67 percent of investors agreed that they suffered from the presence of 
high tariff and duties; especially for pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals importing a considerable portion 
of their inputs and intermediates.  
Second, 54 percent of respondents favored the provision of suitable funding facilities from banks i.e., 
letters of credit or guarantees, as an incentive for investment and they asked for fair and quicker Conflict 
resolution and dispute settlement procedures. Already the numbers of cases filed against Egypt before the 
‘International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (ICSID) reached 14 since 2011. As well 
facilitating paper-work for FDIs of labor intensive sectors, infrastructure, establishment licenses and 
concession rights (in case of petrochemicals and automotive) was a top priority to 42 investors. Finally, 
around 29 investors across those sectors: processed food, beverages, pharmaceuticals and automotive 
sectors agreed that they suffered from illegal competition faced by bigger private and public monopolies. 
The questionnaire inferences in this part came in consistency with Salah and Dermarker (2015) qualitative 
results. 
Table 4.4: Cross Tabulation between Sectors and Business Enabling Factors 
Source: Own’s elaboration based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire Output 
2015 
                                                          
156 Open- ended questions: Some of the categories of the open - ended questions include questions with no predefined 
options; where the respondent can devise their own answers and it guarantees accurate responses to some specific 
problems and true reflection about the subject, however, it is time consuming and involves difficulty in coding. (statistical 
Service Centre, 2001) 
 
157 Likert Scale: open ended question in which respondents are presented with one or more attitudinal statements and 
asked to score each statement on a multi-point scale.  (Mathers and Fox and Hunn 2009) 
 
Food & 
Beverages
Metal 
products
Heavy 
Duty 
Equipment
Mills
Textiles and 
Ready made 
Garments
Furniture 
and 
Wooden 
Products
Automotive Petrochemicals Electronics
Public 
Utilities 
Precision 
Industries
Export   
& 
Imports
Construction 
Other 
Services
Other 
Sectors
Gurantees and Funding 16 3 4 2 2 0 8 25 2 4 4 2 6 5 9
Illegal Competition 29 0 3 2 2 2 12 25 0 0 4 2 2 4 5
Contracts & dispute Settlement 22 3 4 2 4 0 2 31 2 0 8 2 2 1 9
Land Accessibility & Pricing 20 3 4 2 2 2 4 41 2 4 4 0 0 2 2
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C) Part III of the Questionnaire: Quality of Political and Economic Institutions  
 
The last part covered 5 close-ended multiple choice and 3 open-ended Likert matrix questions and they 
all included variables determining the quality of Egypt’s political and economic institutions. Around 96 
percent of respondents perceived restrictions placed on Foreign exchange conversions, inflation, 
volatility in foreign exchange fluctuations and how fiscal policy works, as the main macroeconomic 
determinants affecting their enterprises in Egypt  
Second Macroeconomic factors were given a substantial dimension by investors, as 62 percent of 
investors gave taxation system a high tanking. This came supported by the precise open-ended 
commentaries of 10 FDI’s, lobbying for the regulation of corporate taxes to be subject to ‘Anti- Double 
Taxation Treaties’158,  as an incentive to accelerate tax refunds and rebates to encourage investors.  
As demonstrated from Table 4.5, 80 percent of respondents at higher revenue brackets above 50 million 
Egyptian Pounds per annum pointed to demonstrations, terrorist acts, violence and loss of government 
credibility to be the crucial political factors determining the investment climate and their continuity in 
Egypt  
Table 4.5: Cross Tabulation for FDIs Revenue Streams against Demonstrations and Instability in Egypt 
 
 Demonstration & 
Instability 
Total 
.0 1.0 
Revenues 
less than 50 million LE per annum 6 22 28 
More than 50 million LE per annum 25 39 64 
Total 31 61 92 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire Output 2015 
 
More importantly in Table 4.6, shows that over 77 percent of FDIs had set trade openness as a priority to 
them; given that they had already established bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements 
between Egypt and their countries. The trade openness came to show significance for sectors such as: 
petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, vehicle spare parts and automotive, textiles and processed food having 
the largest share of trade and investments with European Community, United States under the framework 
of QIZ agreement and finally Agadir Agreement countries.  
                                                          
158 Anti-double Taxation treaties: an instrument of fiscal policy exposing corporate businesses and FDI’s; especially  
international investments to a double tax on the income generated by this company in its operational site  and as well 
from where it’s capital and investments originate.  
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Table 4.6: Cross-Tabulation between Trade Openness an important Element of Investment Climate 
Investment 
Climate 
Trade Openness Total 
Super 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Important Less 
Important 
Unimportant  
 
Super Important 26 4 10 9 1 50 
Very Important 2 10 13 0 4 29 
Important 2 2 2 4 3 13 
Total 30 16 25 11 8 92 
 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire Output 2015 
4.3.3 In-depth interviews conducted with 12 Targeted FDI Respondents 
A) Methodology of Twelve In-depth Interviews Conducted:  
 
An in-depth interview is an open-ended qualitative research approach focused on conducting individual 
interactive interviews with a small number of respondents. It depends on open ended and less structural 
protocols that gives more flexibility to respondents. Moreover, in-depth interviews provide detailed and 
quality information that can’t be gathered through other qualitative research methods, versus, its 
drawbacks of being a time consuming analysis and how it is based on a smaller sample (Kaar, 2007; 
Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013). This type of interview explores and narrows down the focus on a specific 
research topic to capture rich, descriptive and analytical data about a certain research topic. The process 
started by conducting the in-depth interviews on an individual basis.  
 
The types of questions asked during in-depth interviews were proactive, ideal, interpretative and 
leading159.Then after the questioning phase, we performed the data transcription manually or by software 
(Atlas.ti), reviewing data provided by interviewees and giving codes to data strings. The transcription 
was introduced to the Atlas.ti software to further assign numerical codes to important information and 
quotations. The Atlas.ti software gave the ‘Codes Report Output’ to verify results and determine 
common code categories or patterns between all Interviewees. Graphical networks and a summary table 
derived from interviews results were a necessity to disseminate and support findings of the questionnaire 
(Nigatu, 2009). According to Boyee and Neale (2006), the selected sample of in-depth interviewees do 
                                                          
159 Types of Questions used for In-depth interviews: Provocative probing the interviewee to spill out information, he isn’t 
aware of. Interpretative: what do you mean you have port congestion problems? Giving more specific details, examples 
and incidents and finally (Nigatu ,2009) 
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not necessarily have to be composed of CEO’s, but respondents are preferred to be at one of the highest 
managerial positions in the enterprise.  
 
The topology of the in-depth interviews on Table 4.7, has shown that the majority of in-depth interviews 
with FDI are bound under law 159 for 1989 with more flexibility granted to all types of investments 
classified under partnerships shareholders, limited liability and representative offices. The percentage of 
foreign managers and CEOs reached a breakdown of 58 percent foreigners versus 42 percent Egyptian 
managers and only 4 out of 12 interviewees did not have other investments in ACT countries except for 
Egypt and if available in other ACTs; they are mainly located in U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and 
Morocco. Around 7 out of the 12 interviewees had intentions to upgrade their production capacities in 
Egypt, however, they don’t confirm their intentions of building new facilities and this was evident for the 
cases of petrochemicals, and energy sector, which necessitate large investments   
 
The main results and data of the in-depth interviews will be discussed on the next page  
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Table 4.7: Topology of Descriptive demographics of 12 in-depth Interviews 
 
Respondents Sector Location Branches Activities Employees Revenues Ownership 
 &Legal  
Invest. 
ACT´s 
Respondent 1 Agri. 
business 
Alexandria 2 facilities Grains 
Processing 
75 More than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
- Law 159 
for 1981 
-Local 
investor 
 
Morocco 
Respondent 2 Automotive  
Mo 
Cairo 4 branches Car 
Production 
Assembly 
1200 More than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
-Law 159 
for 1981 
-domestic 
- government 
U.A.E 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Respondent 3 Petro. 
Chemicals 
New Cairo 1 branch Natural gas 300 More than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
- Law 159 
for 1981 
-private 
-government 
None 
Respondent 4 Heavy  
Machinery 
Alexandria 11 centers Importation 
& assembly 
machinery 
250 More than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
- Law 159 
for 1981 
-Private 
-Domestic 
- U.A.E. 
-Tunisia 
-
Lebano
n 
Respondent 5 Pharma. Cairo More than 30 
sales points 
Production 
of pharma. 
885 Less than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
- Law 159 for 
1981 
-government 
-domestic 
- U.A.E 
- Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Respondent 6 Pharma. Cairo & 
other 
governorat
es 
17 sales outlets Production 
of pharma. 
1500 Less than 
50 million 
LE per 
annum 
- Law 159 
for 1981 
- Foreigner 
-Domestic 
None 
Respondent 7 Chemicals 6th of 
October 
24 centers Chemical 
industries 
350 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
-Law 8 for 
1997 
-Private 
-domestic 
None 
Respondent 8 Automotive 6th of 
October 
9 branches Assembly 
and manuf. 
Of cars 
1500 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
- Law 159 
for 1981 
-Domestic 
-U.A.E 
-Saudi 
Arabia 
Respondent 9 Heavy 
 Industries 
Asyut One big 
facility 
Cement 
and 
building 
material 
2500 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
-Law 159 
for 1981 
- private 
 
- U.A.E 
 
Respondent 10 Consumer  
goods 
Cairo & 6th 
of October 
2 big facilities Consumer 
goods and 
chemicals 
750 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
- Law 203 
for 1989 
-Domestic 
 
- U.A.E 
-Libya 
- KSA 
Respondent 11 Electronics and 
energy 
Cairo, 
Alex. Beni 
Suef, 
2 big facilities Electronics 200 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
-Law 159 
for 1981 
- Private 
-Domestic 
-Tunisia 
- 
Algeria 
Respondent 12 Agribusiness Giza 3 facilities Grains and 
animals 
fodder 
100 More than 
50 million 
per annum 
- Law 203 
for 1989 
-None 
         
In-depth interviews series with FDI’s in Egypt 2015/201 
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4.4 Econometric Analysis of the 92 Qualitative Questionnaires  
4.4.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies to Estimate importance of FDI Climate in Egypt 
  
The methodology used in this chapter will follow a two-fold approach. It starts with the coding of 
qualitative preference categories emanating from Questionnaire respondents into quantitative data. The 
presence of many independent variables derived from the questionnaire will lead to multicollinearity and 
absence of precision in highlighting the specific determinants of the investment climate. This problem will 
be mitigated through the first step of the methodology, which will introduce a ‘Principal Component 
Analysis ̕ (PCA) originally motivated by Manly (1994) to downsize the number of variables into 
categories of factors. Once variables are summarized by means of the PCA series, then the second step 
will be to perform multiple logistic regression to arrive at the subset of factors that are mostly significant 
to investment climate in Egypt. Apart from this, the 12 in-depth interviews will further extrapolate 
investment climate determinants at the sector specific level.  
4.4.2 Questionnaire Data Coding  
 
Data coding for a questionnaire is a necessary step which transfers qualitative data and ranking scales into 
numerical and ordinal quantitative codes. This is done through the inspection of each question separately 
and assigning a numerical code to responses. (Mathers et al., 2009). In our questionnaire, we use both 
coding techniques nominal and ordinal data coding approaches. On one hand, the ‘Nominal data ̓ allocated 
nominal numerical codes without any reserved order to data categories. An example from the questionnaire 
will be that reflecting on the percentage of foreign ownership of FDIs in Egypt; which is numerically 
classified into two categories: the first having less than 50 percent ownership for the FDI and coded as 1 
and the second category holding more than 50 percent ownership for FDI, and it reserves the value 2. Both 
codes 1 & 2 do not signify anything and are mutually exclusive. 
 
On the other hand, for ‘Ordinal Data’, the answer codes are arranged in order of rankings or categories of 
ordered data and this coding technique is used for the Likert-Scale Matrix questions. Likert scale questions 
with open-ended entries, enrich datasets with more detailed answers and information of respondents. The 
in-depth Interviews as well relied an alternative coding technique similar to that developed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990); known by ‘Open Coding’. The open coding was built upon converting verbal responses 
and text strings into numerical codes or text to detect common threads between respondents and it was used 
for the in-depth interviews. 
4.4.3 Econometric specification:  
 
First step of this econometric analysis is to specify the dependent variable which will be the investment 
climate as per Bastos and Nasir (2004), meanwhile, the set of independent variables included 26 variables 
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among which are FDI’s demographic data such as employees, enterprise entity and percentage of 
ownership, in addition to doing business enablers, factors capturing economic and political quality of 
Institutions derived from questionnaire coding ranks. The econometric estimations used followed two steps 
of analysis and they are:  
 
A) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
PCA is the preparatory step to proceed with the regression analysis phase. Based on Wheeler and Mody 
(1992), the PCA represents a statistical approach conducted to examine the interrelations among a set of 
variables and identify the underlying structure of those variables. It helps Investigators construct one or 
more artificial series underpinning the behavior of a group of variables. It is computed so that the first or 
second components together should account for as much of the possible variability in results. It treats at the 
same time for multicollinearity and possible correlations between the underlying variables by detecting the 
correlation and reducing the variables into smaller components that are not linearly dependent160  (Basto 
and Pereira, 2012) 
 
B) The Logistic Regression Model Analysis 
  
Logistic regression with categorical and ordinal variables assigns numerical values to the data to result in 
the best fit of linear regression model for the transformed variables. It allows as well for more than one 
category of both dependent and independent variables through the maximum likelihood estimation to be 
accounted for. Categorical regression reduces multicollinearity; given that the reference category for the 
dummy variable does not linearly depend on the intercept term since linear dependency leads to unstable 
regression estimates. Other virtues of logistic regression is to determine if omission of a variable from 
the model with all other predictors significantly worsens the predictive power of the model to prevent 
omitted variables. (Stockburger, 1998; Belsely et al., 2004; Wissmann et al., 2007). The by-products of 
Logistic regression with categorical variables will result in the Multiple R161 and coefficients and general 
framework of the equation 4.1 is written as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖
′ = 𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑋2𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖     Eq.(4.1) 
  
Where 𝑌𝑖
′ : is the transposed vector of dependent variable with two or more categories  
 
                                                          
160 The eigenvalues associated with each of the principal components are greater than one, while those associated with 
each of the second components and third components are considered in the regression as they are greater than one. 
 
161 Multiple R: includes the 𝑅2and adjusted 𝑅2 through optimal scaling. 
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 “b” are called regression weights and computed to minimize the sum of squared deviations    
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑁 (𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖
′)2 
𝑋1𝑖, 𝑋2𝑖 … … 𝑋𝑘𝑖 represent the set of independent variables transferred into dummy variables with two or 
more categories or intervals. 
 
Table 4.8: Set of Independent Variables that are Subject to PCA: 
Variables Description Expected 
Sign 
1) Ownership of FDI Ordinal Intervals  +ve 
2) Revenues Ordinal Intervals  +ve 
3) Illegal Competition  Ordinal Likert scale  -ve 
4) Rigidity of Investment Climate  Ordinal Likert Scale  -ve 
5) Taxation System  Ordinal Likert Scale   +ve 
6) Ownership Rights  Ordinal Likert Scale +ve 
7) Contracts enforcement & Dispute Settlement  Ordinal Likert Scale  +ve 
8)   Land Accessibility & Pricing  Ordinal Likert Scale  +ve 
9) Access to Infrastructure Ordinal Likert Scale  +ve 
10) Trade Openness  Ordinal Likert Scale +ve 
11) Currency FX Fluctuations  Ordinal Likert Scale         -ve /mixed 
12) Political Stability  Ordinal Likert Scale +ve 
13) Inflation  Ordinal Likert Scale  -ve 
14) Management  Binary  Mixed 
15) Employees  Ordinal Intervals -ve 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and PCA output  
4.5 Discussion of Questionnaire Main Results  
 
Table 4.8 gave an overview of the variables that will be subject to PCA analysis introduced to the 
logistic regression and their expected signs and responsiveness towards variability and improvement 
of investment climate in Egypt based on questionnaire data coding. PCA results indicated first that 
‘Egen Value -Based Criteria’; which is a benchmark measure or cut off point at less than 100 percent 
to represent how many components or group of variables explain the variability of investment climate. 
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At this point for Table 4.9 of the PCA, 3 components with their uploaded variables explained 55 percent 
variance of the original data considering a breakdown of first component explaining 23 percent of 
variation, second and third components at 17 and 15 percent respectively. 
 
First component included all variables determining protection of investors and property rights; 
especially for minority investor’s rights and all issues related to dispute settlement and contract breach 
and enforcement. As well political stability dimension is included on this component due to its close 
relevance to security of investors.  The second component included all factors facilitating the ease of 
investing and doing business in Egypt, such as administrative and routine paper work and procedures 
accompanied with taxation reforms and especially those relevant to Double Taxation agreements. 
Finally, the third component covered all aspects of macroeconomic stability in Egypt such as 
inflation and FX currency regulation affecting investors.  Finally, the output of this Table 4.10 is 
known by the ‘Rotated Component Matrix’; which gives a listing of the three principal components 
that explain most of the variability in FDI Climate and its underlying variables of each category.   
 
The results obtained for the three components in Table 4.9 were in line with those motivated previously 
by Júlio et al (2013) and Wernick et al (2014) and Dumludag (2015) for other countries and regions 
through PCA components. As well all above-mentioned authors asserted to property rights, fiscal 
freedom, political risks and government stability as the most significant variables affecting investment 
climate in other regions. 
Table 4.9: Total Variance Explained Extraction Method of PCA 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.661 26.152 26.152 3.661 26.152 26.152 3.049 21.782 21.782 
2 2.108 15.056 41.208 2.108 15.056 41.208 2.373 16.952 38.734 
3 1.824 13.030 54.237 1.824 13.030 54.237 2.170 15.503 54.237 
 Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and PCA output. 
CHAPTER 4:  
4.1 Will the Quality of Institutions Determine Egypt’s Investment Climate?  
159 
 
Table 4.10 The Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 
Owner ship rights .727 
  
Competition .702   
Contracts & Disputes settlement .612 .529  
Access to Infrastructure .610  -.555 
Institutional Political Stability .608   
Employees .545   
Economic Institutional Risks    
Facilitating registry   
 .823  
Taxation system  .801  
Management 
Trade openness  
 .595 
.593 
 
 
Access to Land and Pricing   -.809 
Currency & FX Flows 
Inflation 
  .617 
.592 
Revenues   .529 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and PCA output. 
 
The next step involved the results derived from the logistic regression of Table 4.11, when the three 
PCA were introduced to the model to estimate the influence of the components on Egypt’s 
investment climate.  Table 4.11 resulted in a multiple 𝑅2 𝑜𝑓 0.744 ; suggesting that the predictors 
have been relatively a fair fit in explaining the model.  It also indicated that economic stability, 
protection of ownership and investors property rights and legal and fiscal framework are explaining 
74 percent of variance in the preference rankings of the investment climate in Egypt. In this case 
Table 4.12, referred to the most significant component to investors as the macroeconomic instability 
at highly significant levels which encompassed the increase in foreign exchange fluctuations and 
inflation rate and how they both decreased the preference ranking of investment climate. The second 
component in significance was protection of investors rights relevant to all factors of ownership 
rights, political stability and contract enforcement. Finally, incentives given to investors in 
facilitating investment registry, access to infrastructure and taxation incentives came at third 
position in preference according to investors.  
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Similar results were motivated by Anghel (2004), as he obtained that one standard deviation increase 
on the indices measuring investors ownership rights and political stability led to a 1.07 percent in 
improving FDI climate and flows. The remarkable impact of property rights variables (revolutions, 
coups, assassinations, property rights and demonstrations) were re-emphasized Asiedu (2006) and 
Harksoon (2010). As a robustness check Kobeissi (2003), Chan and Gemayel (2004), Méon and Sekkat 
(2005) and Kamaly (2007) had proven robustness with our questionnaire results, when they shed the 
light on macroeconomic instability and how inflation should be controlled and taxes reformed to attract 
investors.  
Table 4.11: Model Summary for Regression 
 
Multiple 
R 
R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Apparent 
Prediction 
Error 
Expected Prediction Error 
Estimatea Std. 
Error 
Nb 
.744 .554 .424 .446 .561 .086 74 
Dependent Variable: Investment Climate 
Predictors: REGR factor score   Macroeconomic Stability, Ease of doing business and Investors Rights 
 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and Catreg Output  
Table 4.12: Categorical regression coefficients: Estimating Investment Climate 
 Standardized Coefficients df F Sig. 
Beta Bootstrap (1000) Estimate of 
Std. Error 
   
Macroeconomic Instability PCA 3  -.746 .162 6 21.257 .000 
Fiscal and legal frame work PCA 2 .514 .343 8 2.241 .034 
Investors Rights PCA 1 .420 .090 6 21.890 .000 
Dependent Variable: Investment Climate 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and Catreg Output  
Another important result extracted from Table 4.13 will distinguish between behavior FDIs managed by 
foreigners or Egyptians and which are the factors that mostly affect their decisions when they invest in 
Egypt after the transition. In this case, a second regression will treat foreign management of FDI, as a 
binary dependent variable to see which of the three PCA 1, 2, 3 factors are mostly crucial to foreign 
management in FDI companies. As previously mentioned, those components are summarized as follows: 
PCA1 for protection of Investors’ property and ownership rights, PCA2 for legal and fiscal incentives 
granted to investors and finally PCA 3 for macroeconomic factors and finally Based on Table 4.13, almost 
73 percent of variability in behavior between foreign and domestic managers of FDIs’ was explained by 
the importance of legal and fiscal incentives to investors. 
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Table 4.13: Categorical Regression Coefficients: Estimating which Principal Component factors are 
important to Management 
Coefficients 
 Standardized Coefficients Df F Sig. 
Beta Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. 
Error 
   
Macroeconomic stability PCA 3               .366 .310 9 1.391 .209 
Fiscal and legal frame work PCA 2 .734 .243 10 9.118 .000 
Investors Rights PCA1 .364 .240 2 2.301 .108 
Dependent Variable: management 
Source: Based on primary raw data from Egypt’s FDI Qualitative Questionnaire and Catreg Output  
Foreign investors in this context were mainly concerned with the time frame in which they can register 
their investments and how their taxation system will be dealt with. As for investors rights and 
macroeconomic stability, both explained mostly the rest of variability at 37 percent of investment 
climate. In other words, this result interpreted that the higher the percentage of foreign management 
in FDIs located in Egypt, the more they are seeking for tax incentives, registry fees and procedures 
that are essential elements of motivating them to remain or hold their investments. This occurs 
regardless of the political situation and how the transition is perceived. The results of in-depth 
interviews will focus on sector specific factors and how they affected investors. 
4.6 Policy recommendations driven by commonalities between both in-depth interviews 
and Questionnaire  
 In-depth Interview Analysis Results and Commonalities with the Questionnaire  
All information of in-depth interviews was gathered from the transcription of excerpts done manually 
and by software to be given text groups and codes on Table 4.14 of the appendix. In this context, the 
12 in-depth interviews were used as well to complement some missing information that was not 
clarified through the 92 questionnaires about investors. This formation searched meticulous details 
such as sector profiles and their long-term strategies, market plans and challenges faced by 
interviewees of FDIs through their daily operations. As well it was favorable to use some of the 
quotations of top ranked officials and management of FDI firms to obtain insightful comments and 
opinions. It is important at this stage to highlight the common results and findings of the 12 in-depth 
interviews compared to the results of the 92 previous questionnaires which are the following:  
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Land Registry and Access to infrastructure in the Agribusiness Sector  
 
The transcribed software recorded 9 codes from interviewees agreeing to that the access to public 
utilities and infrastructure is one of principal investment obstacles they are facing in Egypt; especially 
for agribusiness. They stressed on the need to expand ports, cold supply chains and storage capacity 
for grains and fresh products. Equally true for the common factor chosen by questionnaire 
respondents and referred to by the in-depth interviewees which was about land registration, pricing 
and more effective access to utilities by agribusinesses. A highly-ranked interviewee in an 
agribusiness FDI commented ‘We need ports expansion to be able to reduce congestion and 
maintain lower prices’  
 
Concession Rights and contract breach and Disputes Settlement for Petrochemicals  
 
A different perspective was emphasized by petrochemical and heavy industries, as they assured that 
for them to work at their full capacity, they needed a highly integrated multimodal transportation 
network that is easily accessed and less costly. In addition to smooth and continuous sources of energy 
to be supplied such as LNG used intensively in the petrochemicals, since its shortage previously led 
to production bottlenecks. Six codes were commonly derived between FDIs interviewees in 
petrochemicals and other heavy material sectors. They commented that the length of time to obtain a 
license for a new project is still long, and concession rights for drilling and natural gas extraction are 
very tedious and lengthy.  
One of the obstacles facing this sector was particular to the breach of contracts and disputes 
settlement, which according to interviewees took longer timing that reached up to years through 
passing into the Egyptian judicial system.  The courts were always known for their integrity and 
unbiasedness, however, they have extremely slow mechanism, causing cases to remain pending in 
the system for several years.  Interviewees from petrochemical sector are optimistic that the new 
adaptation in the investment law 2015, will simplify the settlement of investment disputes by means 
of international arbitration  ̒ICSID Convention and New York Convention ̓. This mechanism works 
on giving the opportunity to other state members apart from the Egyptian courts to be arbitrating to 
resolve investment disputes between the government and foreign investors. The questionnaire as well 
highlighted on dispute settlement and arbitration as one of prime factors determining investors 
protection rights at a coefficient of 0.61 demonstrating high degrees of significance 
 
Intellectual Property Rights for Pharmaceuticals and others  
 
Intellectual and ownership rights were one of the pronounced obstacles facing the pharmaceuticals 
and other sectors with major challenges related to the infringement of copyrights and patents laws 
enforced. Based on highly ranked management of pharmaceutical FDIs, they suffered from the 
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existence of counterfeit in active ingredients. In addition, some medicine components are offered by 
specific public companies at lower prices, besides the requirement of tedious and long registry 
procedures for new medicines to reach up to three years. Six interviewees gave the same answer 
regarding this factor and its impact on Egypt’s FDI climate. It was also evident, that through the 
econometric analysis of the questionnaire results, investment property rights caused almost 42 
percent variability in the preference ranking of investment climate in Egypt at high significance.  
 
Foreign Exchange Fluctuations Across all sectors  
 
The common threads and responses between in-depth interviewees on the macroeconomic stability 
factor reached 8 codes across all sectors.  One of the highly evident risks showing considerable 
variability in preference category of investment climate in Egypt at nearly 61 percent was about the 
fluctuation of foreign currency , the 12 in-depth interviewees had shown consensus on how the 
instability of foreign exchange and liquidity shortage could harm their investments and prevent them 
from getting access to banking credit; especially when competing with state-owned firms. The same 
results were motivated by the respondents of 92 questionnaire, when FX fluctuations caused a 61 
percent increase in the variability of macroeconomic factors affecting investment climate in Egypt  
 
The FX shortage emerged in the pharmaceuticals; as it suffered volatility and exposure to FX losses, 
especially after the unpredicted increase in prices of their imported active ingredients were raised 
after the devaluation. According to one of the top officials in a pharmaceutical company and his 
quotation emphasized that ‘The current economic situation has prompted some multinationals 
to consider existing the Egyptian market; especially those with localized facilities’. Both, the 12 
in-depth interviewees and the U.S. Foreign commercial service (2015) latest report on doing business 
in Egypt, argued that foreign investors are often suffering from a lack of foreign exchange, which 
causes a delay of payments and continuous arrears of foreign exchange debts accumulating each 
month. On this respect investors called for more transparency regarding the Central Bank’s long-term 
plans for the country’s currency regime.  
 
Illegal Competition in Pharmaceuticals and Automotive   
 
Competition came out as a significant factor for both the questionnaire empirical results and for in-
depth interviews respondents at already 6 of FDIs affirmed that they were suffering from illegal y 
competitive practices.  Monopoly was exercised by some of the state owned public companies; 
especially for pharmaceutical and automotive sectors. This conclusion was driven from the 
impression of one of the top managers in an automotive FDI about severe competition they face, 
when he stated, ‘It is normal to see new companies enter the market and others exist due to their  
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inability to compete, stay or afford to launch different services.’ As well for pharmaceuticals 
FDIs they confessed that they were exposed to a natural monopoly; as the prices of their highly 
effective imported active ingredients and pharmaceuticals are higher due to FX fluctuations and 
import duties compared to the public sector’s subsidized medicines. Historically for many state 
owned public enterprises utilities such as energy, electricity and water were always subsidized 
compared to other private FDIs and this in turn intensified illegal competition.   
 
Management    
 
The difference between the behavior of foreign and domestic management and how they reacted 
during transition, conveyed through previous econometric estimations, that incentives given to 
investors to finish their paper work, legal and fiscal status and access to finance caused a 73 percent 
variability in the decision taken by foreign managers to invest in Egypt. The ease of registry of their 
activities and businesses, prompt paperwork, incentives offered to investors in access and pricing of 
land and fair taxation system were all factors encouraging foreign management to strategically decide 
to relocate to Egypt. One example would be how the foreign management of a heavy constructor and 
building material FDI had to re- schedule its debts with over 55 banks and institutions; when it bought 
a heavily indebted business. They were not satisfied with the double taxation agreement imposed and 
they started negotiating taxation agreement with government officials to reach a compromise. In 
addition, to quotes from in-depth interviewees which pointed to how foreign management aimed at 
changing the cultural perception and their corporate social responsibility as investors In Egypt. For 
example, highly ranked official of a pharmaceutical FDI assured that ‘We have a bigger and leading 
role, as we promote an integrated approach from early diagnosis, treatment, care and disease 
management’.  
 
Political instability across all sectors: 
 
Moving on to the quality of political institutions, almost 90 percent of FDI respondents on the 
questionnaire, in addition to 10 common codes derived from the in-depth interviewees has shown 
that during late 2011 till 2013 demonstrations and violent acts caused a real shock in the economy.  
Some investors had to experience halts in daily activities and interruptions in the normal flow of their 
operations and shortages in some of the imported inputs. One top manager in an agribusiness FDI 
commented ‘Definitely ports congestion has been pronounced in Egypt since the three years of 
political incidents started and the currency crisis since this time made it hard to finance food 
and fuel imports.’  
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The political stability had it direct implications on some sectors more than others, such as automotive 
which suffered from loss of revenues streaming from tourism transportation. For petrochemical and 
gas sector, the years of turmoil turned Egypt from a net exporter to an importer, meanwhile, the 
arrears of debts of oil investors by the government, caused the delay of new drilling and production 
investments. One of the side-effects of the political turmoil caused the deprecation of the Egyptian 
pound due to shortages in production and lower receipts from tourism and accordingly the country’s 
foreign reserves were depleted. As well there has been an evident difference between how foreign 
and Egyptian managers and administrative bodies of FDIs perceived the impact of 2011 incidents on 
their performance. Egyptian managers were prepared and mentally convinced that this is a hard 
transition and they will suffer to some extent, however, they believed that they should proceed with 
their operations in a conservative manner without going into new initiatives to expand their facilities 
and investments except after the conditions in Egypt are more stable.  One of their key quotes asserted 
that ‘We will adopt a long-term strategy to investing in Egypt and we follow an ambitious plan 
to expand across Egypt, when the political situation cools down’ Another Heavy equipment FDI 
management team for oil services commented ‘We have seen many cycles over the years and as a 
business we try to navigate through those cycles.’  
 
Most of the in-depth interviewees apart from 2 respondents stressed on the fact that they will be 
holding their investments in Egypt and most ACTs for the medium term of two years and, they will 
follow  a  ̒‘Wait and hold Approach  ̓without intentions to expand their investments in the short 
term. They would expand conditional on the improvement of macroeconomic climate and efficiency 
of regulatory framework governing institutions. During this transition, respondents believed that 
there are different means to mitigate their short-term risks; as entering in partnerships and joint 
ventures with other investors, horizontal diversification into other markets and sectors, which was as 
well illustrated by Lewandowski (1997) to protect against exposure to risks. In fact, one highly ranked 
managers in a heavy equipment FDI oriented to serve petrochemicals emphasized, ‘During 2010, we 
thought of diversifying our risks by 10 deals to include investments in millennium offshore 
services outside MENA region’.  
 
In summary, the main common results for in-depth interviews and questionnaire that both foreign 
and Egyptian investors agreed on the three main criteria: protecting their property rights and interests 
where they invest, giving them fiscal and paperwork stimulus and providing stable macroeconomic 
performance as indispensable for their investment decision and relocation in Egypt. At the same time, 
in-depth interviewees provided 10 common answers that political instability and the return of turmoil 
could deeply threaten their activities, meanwhile, the 92 questionnaire respondents exhibited a strong 
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consensus on macroeconomic environment at 70 percent variability on affecting the business climate 
in Egypt. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that the political turmoil MENA region is passing came after years of absence and 
fragility of its countries institutions. The impact of the most recent turmoil in the region were contagious, 
when symptoms of bad governance led to macroeconomic instability and subdued growth rates and high-
income disparities across the region’s countries. They also had their negative repercussions on FDI 
performance and climate, which was evident in all countries including Egypt. This paper attempted to 
investigate the reaction of small and medium FDI, in light of the fragility of Egypt’s economic and political 
institutions that were intensified during the transition. In this chapter, we addressed different approaches 
through the employment of a qualitative questionnaire covering 92 respondents directed to Medium-sized 
FDI’s in Egypt. To complement the questionnaires, we conducted 12 in-depth interviews held with a 
selected group of FDIs across different sectors.  
 
After the questionnaires were conducted, and data was empirically coded, the econometric methodologies 
were employed. The estimations resulted in three categories of factors which were mostly significant: 
investors property rights, incentives granted to investors and finally macroeconomic stability influencing 
investment climate. When those three components were introduced to the logistic regression, they all 
caused a 74 percent variability in Egypt’s investment climate and rest of variance was explained by the 
difference between the behaviour of foreign and Egyptian management in perceiving their investments.  
 
Similar results were obtained by the 12- in-depth interviews; however; with emphasis on sector 
specific problems facing investors such as illegal competition, property and ownership rights very 
evident in pharmaceutical and automotive sectors. Concession rights, contract breach and disputes 
settlement to be seriously considered for petrochemicals. As well agribusinesses suffered from long 
land registry procedures and lack of access to infrastructure and soaring energy. Therefore, 70 percent 
of in-depth interview respondents in Egypt preferred to go for a ̔ Wait and Watch Approach  ̕rather 
than expand their investments; especially after the 2011 revolts and during the transition. The recent 
amendments in Egypt’s investment law 17 of 2015 are taking serious steps towards removal of many 
obstacles facing investors and the results motivated by this chapter suggest that they should focus as 
well on protecting investors property rights, granting worthwhile fiscal, financial and procedural 
stimulus to encourage FDIs, especially in remote and underserviced areas. Finally, the close 
monitoring of the macroeconomic conditions; especially with respect to FX fluctuations, transfer of 
capital and prices of imported inputs is essentially needed for a healthy acceptable investment climate 
as supported previously by questionnaire results  
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Future research avenues are wide open and still has so much to identify and treat such as sector specific 
and general regulatory obstacles facing multinationals in underinvested areas in MENA countries and 
generally economies going through transition. One of the additional research prospective that could 
contribute to this topic, is the use of precise variables and data to deal with cases of particular countries. 
Data extracted from the number of filed cases against investors’ rights violation and breach or the 
threshold of FX transfers, import duties imposed on inputs and so forth across several sectors could 
help to detect, the reason behind failure of institutions to accommodate to investors’ needs. As well 
investment laws and regulations should take into consideration the theory of OLI and how it affects 
the rationale behavior of investors.  As long as investments are secured, protected, motivated and work 
with well-regulated institutions designed to embrace and fulfil their requirements, investment climate 
will always remain enticing to FDIs under any circumstances. We all agree that many countries pass 
through transitions and shifts at one moment of their history and this does not prevent investors from 
choosing to invest in those countries, however what really causes a problem is the existence of a gap 
between the requirements of investors and what the country’s institutions offers them, as in the case 
of Egypt. 
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 yb detacitnehtua dna tpygE ni slanoitanitluM IDF 29 rof desu eriannoitseuq lanigirO eht si sihT
 )SAMPAC( scitsitatS dna noitaziliboM cilbuP rof ycnegA lartneC
 دعم و تطوير مناخ الإستثمار بمصر 
 دورالمؤسسات السياسية والإقتصادية المصرية للنهوض بالإستثمارالمحلى و الأجنبى 
 "مسح المنشآت الاقتصادية متوسطة الحجم"
ساسى من هذا الإستبيان هو بلورة و توضيح بعض المقومات الأساسية التي تساعد على  توفير المناخ الصحي لنمو الإستثمارات المحلية الهدف الأ 
 ارات كأحدوالأجنبية للمنشآت متوسطة و كبيرة الحجم بجمهورية مصر العربية وأثرها على تطوير و تحسين الأداء الإقتصادى  المصرى و زيادة الإستثم
على اهم  ركائز نمو الدخل القومى المصرى . كما يهدف الإستبيان لكشف أولويات المستثمر عند إختيار البيئة الخصبة للإستثمار بجانب تسليط الضوء
بيان بتقديم بعض العوامل التى تساعد على نموالإستثمارات المحلية و الأجنبية بمختلف القطاعات الصناعية والخدمية بمصر. من المنتظر ان يقوم الإست
بشكل عام.  التوصيات التى تساعد على تهيئة مناخ أفضل للإستثمار بجمهورية مصر، بالإضافة الى معالجة و تذليل بعض العقبات التى تواجه المستثمرين
عربية فقط. نؤكد السرية التامة من الأفضل ان تكون اجاباتكم عن الإستبيان مقصورة على تجربتكم الخاصة كمنشآت فى أداء الأعمال بمصر و الدول ال
 ن.للبيانات والمعلومات المجمعة من الإستبيان وانه لن يتم إستخدام أو نشر أسمائكم أو أسماء منشأتكم فى أى وثيقة تنتج عن هذا الإستبيا
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 الاختيار المناسب: من فضلك إختار الاجابة الصحيحة التى تتناسب مع بيانات منشأتك بوضع علامة أمام
 الجزء الاول: معلومات عامة عن المنشآة :
 (يمكنك الجمع بين إختيارين) ما هو الكيان القانونى الحالى لمنشأتك؟ -1
 اسم المنشأة..............................................................................................
 ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐...............................................................الكود 
 .....................................عنوان النشأة ..............................................
 المدينة.............................................................................................
 ☐☐☐كم عددها ☐نعم  مصانع أو فروع إذا وجد ؟
  ☐☐☐كود للقطاع   CISI.....نشاط المنشأة بالتفصيل.............................................
 توزيع نسب الأنشطة التالية من إجمالى دخل المنشأة:
 أخرى ...........%         التجارة........%    الصناعة.........%        الخدمات..........%
 ما إجمالى عدد العاملين بالمنشأة............عامل 
 
 "البيانات سرية و لا تستخدم فى غير أغراض البحث العلمى"
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  ☐      فردية
   ☐    تضامن 
  ☐   توسطية بسيطة 
             ☐      مساهمة
  ☐   ذات مسؤلية محدودة
 ☐   فرع لشركة أجنبية 
 ☐   شركة قطاع عام 
  ☐   أخرى حددها 
 
  حدد القانون الذى تتبع له منشأتك ؟ -2
 ☐ قانون هيئة المجتمعات العمرانية الجديدة 
 ☐  1891لسنة  951قانون 
 ☐  9891لسنة  302قانون 
 ☐   2991لسنة  59قانون 
 ☐   7991لسنة  8قانون 
 ☐   2002لسنة  38قانون 
  ☐  ا)...............أخرى (حدده
 
 (يمكنك الجمع بين إختيارين) ما هى نسب المساهمة فى ملكية منشأتك؟ -3
 
 ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من %  خاص 
 ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من %  محلى
 ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من %  عربى 
 ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من %  أجنبى 
 ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من %  حكومى 
  ☐05أكثر من % ☐ 05أقل من % أخرى حددها ..................
 
  )حدد العدد التقريبى للمنشآت التابعة التى تمتلكها منشأتك فى مصر مثل: (يمكنك الجمع بين إختيارين -4
 ☐03أكثر من  ☐ 03أقل من   متاجر: 
  ☐03أكثر من  ☐ 03أقل من  مراكز خدمة: 
 ☐03أكثر من  ☐ 03أقل من   نافذ بيع :م
 
 حدد بأى مكان بالعالم يوجد المقر الرئيسى لنشاط منشأتك؟ -5
 ☐   غرب أوروبا 
 ☐   أمريكا الشمالية 
 ☐   شرق أوروبا 
 ☐    آسيا 
 ☐   الشرق الاوسط و شمال أفريقيا
 ☐  أفريقيا الوسطى و جنوب أفريقيا 
  ☐   أمريكا الجنوبية 
  
 
 ما هو اجمالى عدد العاملين بالمنشأة ؟ -6
 ☐   عامل 001أقل من 
 ☐  عامل 052الى  001أكثر من 
 ☐   عامل 005الى  052أكثر من 
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 (المنشآت متعددة النشاطات يمكن ان تختار أكثر من إختيار) الى أى قطاع ينتمى النشاط الاساسى للمنشأة ؟  -7
 ☐ الزراعة و المزراع السمكيةاستصلاح الاراضى و 
 ☐    الاغذية و المشروبات 
 ☐   المطاط  و المواد البلاستكية
 ☐    المنتجات المعدنية
 ☐    معدات النقل الثقيلة
 ☐     الاتصالات 
 ☐ الصناعات الثقيلة (الاسمنت ،الرخام، التعدين والمحاجر)
 ☐     المطاحن 
 ☐   الملابس الجاهزة المنسوجات و
 ☐     الجلود
 ☐   المنتجات الخشبية والأساس 
 ☐   التعدين و مشتقاته من منتجات 
 ☐    منتجات الفحم
 ☐    الألكترونيات 
 ☐   الكهرباء والمياه و الغاز الطبيعى
  ☐    الصناعات الدقيقة
 ☐    التصدير و الإستيراد 
 ☐     السياحة
 ☐     التعليم
 ☐    الفندقة و المطاعم
 ☐     المقاولات 
 ☐    الإسكان والتعمير
 ☐   القطاع المصرفى والخدمات المالية
 ☐     التأمين
 ☐    الخدمات الاخرى 
 
 بأى فئة يمكنك تصنيف حجم إيرادات منشأتك حاليا؟-8
 
 ☐  جنيهمليون  05إيرادات سنوية أقل من 
 ☐  مليون جنيه 05إيرادات سنوية أكثر من 
 
 هل لدى منشأتكم شركات تابعة بدول عربية أخرى؟ (يمكنك إختيار أكثر من إجابة فى حال وجود استثمارات بأكثر من دولة)  -9
 ☐     المغرب
 ☐     الكويت
 ☐     الإمارات
 ☐     الاردن 
 ☐     ليبيا
 ☐     البحرين
 ☐     قطر
 ☐     تونس
 ☐   المملكة العربية السعودية 
 ☐     سوريا 
 ☐     الجزائر
 ☐     جيبوتى
 ☐     العراق 
 ☐     موروتانيا 
   ☐   الضفة و الاراضى المحتلة 
 ☐     لبنان 
 
 أو غيرها؟ 10041 OSI,1009 OSIرة مثل هل حصلت منشأتك على أحد شهادات الجودة و الإدا -01
 ☐   نعم 
 ☐   لا
 ☐  جارى الطلب عليها
  ☐   لا أعلم
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تسجيله بإسم  هل قامت منشأتك خلال العامين الماضيين بإبتكار طريقة إنتاج جديدة أو إنتاج منتج جديد أو الحصول على براءة إختراع و-11
 المنشأة؟
 
 ☐   نعم
 ☐   لا
 ☐  تاج منتج جديدجارى إن
 ☐  مرحلة البحث العلمى 
 ☐ جارى تسجيل براءة المنتج
  ☐  لا أعلم شيئ عن الامر
 
 الجزء الثانى: معلومات عن المعوقات العامة التى تعرقل نمو الاستثمارات بمصر
 
 تضمن الخمس نقاط التالية  :يرجى تحديد درجة صعوبة العوائق التى تواجه تشغيل و نمو منشأتك عن طريق مقياس تدريجى ي
 
 1لا توجد مشكلة =
 2عائق صغير=
 3عائق متوسط=
 4عائق كبير=
 5عائق معرقل للنشاط =
 
 إى مدى تمثل هذه العوامل معوقات بالنسبة لإستثماراتك و تشغيل منشأتك بمصر خلال العامين القادمين ؟-21
 
 
 المعوقات
لا 
توجد 
 مشكلة
عائق 
 صغير
عائق 
 متوسط
 عائق
 يركب 
عائق 
معرقل 
 للنشاط
 الحصول على التمويل 
 (مثل الضمانات)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 المنافسة غير القانونية
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 القوانين المقيدة للاستثمار 
زيادة الإجراءات الروتينية لإنشاء وتشغيل 
 الشركة 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 الفساد
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 معدلات و إجراءات الضرائب
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 الجمارك وصلابة بعض من القوانين التجارية
 فرص السوق محدودة 
 (احتكار أو عدد محدود من المنافسين)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 عامة و الفكريةإنتهاك حقوق الملكية ال
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 العقود و قوانين تسوية النزاعات 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 قوانين العاملين و التأمينات الاجتماعية
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 الحصول على الاراضى و تسعيرها 
 إدخال المرافق العامة مثل
 لكهرباء و الانترنت)(المياه و ا
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1
 أذا كان لديكم معوقات أخرى برجاء تحديدها 
 ..........................                     
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1
 
 واحد فقط)ما هى خطة الإنتاج والنشاطات المتوقعة لمنشأتكم خلال العامين القادمين؟ (يرجى أن يكون إختيار  -31
 ☐   توسيع القدرة الإنتاجية
 ☐  البقاء على الوضع الحالى
 ☐   تقليل القدرة الإنتاجية
 ☐   لا أعرف لعدم وضوح الرؤية
 
ربيع إذا كان لديكم إستثمارات بدول عربية أخرى و خاصتا المتأثرة بالأحداث السياسية المتصاعدة خلال الثلاث أعوام الاخيرة مثل ثورات ال -14
 العربية (بتونس و سوريا واليمن و ليبيا. هل أدت الإضطرابات السياسية الأخيرة الى تغير خطة إستثماراتكم بهذه الدول؟
 ☐   زيادة الإستثمارات 
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 ☐   تثبيت الإستثمارات
 ☐   سحب الإستثمارات 
 ☐  لا أعرف لعدم وضوح الرؤية
 ☐  ليس لدينا إستثمارات بهذه الدول 
 
 
أعوام إذا كان لديكم إستثمارات بدول عربية أخرى بجانب مصر ولكن لم تتأثر شديدا بالأحداث السياسية المتصاعدة بالعالم العربى خلال الثلاث  -51
ستثماراتكم بهذه الأخيرة مثل ثورات الربيع العربية (المغرب و الاردن و لبنان و الدول الخليجية) ؟ هل  أدت الإضطرابات السياسية الى تغير خطة إ
 الدول؟
 ☐   زيادة الإستثمارات 
 ☐   تثبيت الإستثمارات
 ☐   سحب الإستثمارات 
 ☐  لا أعرف لعدم وضوح الرؤية
  ☐  ليس لدينا إستثمارات بهذه الدول 
 )إختيارين بين الجمع يمكنك( هل تخطط منشأتك الى إتخاذ أى من المبادارات التالية خلال العامين القادمين؟ -61
 ☐    إنشاء خط إنتاج جديد.
 ☐ خطة توسع فى بعض خطوط الإنتاج والمنشآت الحالية
 ☐وقف استمرار بعض خطوط الإنتاج لبعض المنتجات غير المربحة 
 ☐ مبادرة مشروع إنتاجى مشترك جديد مع شريك محلى
 ☐ مبادرة مشروع إنتاجى مشترك مع شريك أجنبى
 ☐ لنشاط الإنتاجى للفترة الحالية والمستقبل القريبإنكماش فى ا
 ص جديدة لمنتج أو براءة إختراعالحصول على إتفاقية ترخي
 
 
 
 الجزء الثالث: دورالمؤسسات السياسية والاقتصادية المصرية للنهوض بالاستثمار
 
ى نمو منشأتك عن طريق مقياس تدريجى يتضمن الخمس نقاط يرجى تحديد درجة الأهمية للعوامل المحفزة للإستثمار بمصر و تأثيرها الواضح عل
 التالية  :
 1ذات أهمية قصوى=
 2هام جدا=
 3متوسط الأهمية =
 4قليل الأهمية=
 5غير مؤثر=
 
 إذكر أهم العوامل الإجابية التالية المحفزة على زيادة إستثماراتك بمصر خلال العامين القادمين  -71
 
 ستثمارالعوامل الإجابية المحفزة للإ
 
ذات أهمية 
 قصوى
 
 هام جدا
 
متوسط 
 الأهمية
 
قليل 
 الأهمية
 
 
 غير مؤثر 
 زيادة و سهولة مصادر التمويل
  بنكية إئتمانية) تسهيلات( 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
سهولة و سرعة الحصول على المرافق 
 العامة لمنشأتك
 (مياه , كهرباء و طرق بالمدن الجديدة) 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 قلة التكاليف الجانبية لتسهيل الإجراءات 
 (بالجمارك و الضرائب و التراخيص)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
تحسن  مؤسسات الدولة مثل الهيئات 
 الجمركية 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
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 استقرار المؤشرات الإقتصادية الرئيسية 
 (التضخم و سعر الصرف)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
زيادة مصدقية بتطبيق قوانين 
الإستثمارالصحيحة خاصتا بفض 
 المنزاعات التجارية 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
الحرص على حماية حقوق الملكية العامة  
و الخاصة و الفكرية و سرية بيانات 
 المنشآت 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
خلق سياسة إعلامية لتشجيع الاستثمارين   
 الى الاستثمار بالدولة
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
تسهيل إجراءات إنشاء الشركة و قوانين 
 التعاقد 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
شفافية و سهولة الحصول على البيانات 
 المصرح بها
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1  تطبيق قوانين العاملين 
إذكرها  عوامل أخرى ،
 ......................
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 
 
 )إختيارات  3بين  الجمع يمكنك(أى من عوائق الإستقرارالسياسى يعتبر أكثر تأثيرا على إستثماراتك بأى مكان بشكل مباشر ؟  -81
 ☐   تعديلات بقوانين الإستثمار
 ☐ ةالإخلال بقوانين العقود و سحب الضمانات الحكومي
 ☐القيود على بعض القوانين المصرفية للحوالات بعملات أجنبية 
 ☐ الوقفات الإحتجاجية و الإضطرابات المدنية المتكررة
 ☐    فقد مصدقية الدولة 
 ☐    التأميم و المصادرة 
 ☐   أعمال العنف و الارهاب
    ☐     الحروب
 ى غالبية ممتلكتها؟هل منشأتك لجأت للتأمين عل -91
 ☐ نعم تأمين جزئى (جزء من الممتلكات)
 ☐  تأمين كامل (كل الممتلكات)  
 ☐  ليس لدى علم بهذا الامر   
 
 هل احتجت لتوظيف شركة إستشارية محلية أو أجنبية لتسهيل إجراءات التسجيل لمنشأتك-02
 ☐    نعم
 ☐    لا
  ☐   لا أعلم عن هذا الامر 
 
يرجى تحديد درجة الأهمية للمخاطرالإقتصادية التى من الممكن أن تتعرض لها منشأتك عن طريق مقياس تدريجى يتضمن الخمس نقاط التالية   -12
 :
 1مخاطر ذات أهمية قصوى=
 2مخاطر هامة=
 3متوسط الخطورة =
 4قليل الخطورة=
 5غير مؤثرة بالنسبة لى=
 
المخاطر الإقتصادية التى من الممكن أن 
 تتعرض لها منشأتك
 
ذات 
أهمية 
 قصوى
 
هام 
 جدا
 
متوسط 
 الأهمية
 
قليل 
 الأهمية
 
 
غير 
 مؤثر 
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التقليل من نسبة الإعفاء  الضريبى على 
 الشريحة التى تنتمى لها منشأتك 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1  رفع سعر فائدة الإقتراض على الإستثمارات  
التمويلى و المصرفى المحفز  قلة الدعم
 للمستثمرين 
 (الضمانات البنكية للمشروعات الصغيرة)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
التضخم و زيادة أسعار مدخلات المنتج مثل 
 المواد الخام و الطاقة والمرافق و العمالة
 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
صرامة قوانين العمل ورفع باقات التأمينات 
ماعية و التأمين الصحى و المعاشات الإجت
 للعاملين
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
أزمات السيولة و إرتفاع سعر الصرف 
 للعملات الأجنبية
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
زيادة نسبة التكاليف الجانبية أو الزائدة  
 بهدف تسهيل إجراءات الإنشاء للشركة 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
موعة من جماعات الضغط و وجود مج
الشركات الكبيرة تقوم بإحتكار السوق و 
 عرقلة صغار المستثمرين من الدخول به
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 مخاطر أخرى
 ..........................
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 
 أتك؟اذكر أهم سببين أساسيين للتأثير على زيادة أو نقص حجم العمالة بمنش -22
 ☐ الانظمة و القوانين المتعلقة بالتوظيف والاستغناء عن العاملين
 ☐   أتفاقيات و ضغوط إتحاد العمال
 ☐    الحد الادنى للأجور
 ☐  كثرة الضمانات و التأمينات الإجتماعية 
 ☐ الوقفات الإحتجاجية و الإضطربات المتكررة  للعمال 
 ☐    أسباب أخرى
ديد درجة أهمية الوسائل الوقائية لمنشأتك من تأثيرات ضعف الإستقرار السياسى و تأثيره الواضح على نمو منشأتك عن طريق مقياس تدريجى يرجى تح
 يتضمن الخمس نقاط التالية  :
 1ذات أهمية قصوى=
 2هام جدا=
 3متوسط الأهمية =
 4قليل الأهمية=
 5غير مؤثر=
 
 وسائل المحفزة لمناخ الاستثمار بشكل عام؟ما هى بالنسبة لمنشأتك أهم ال -32
 
 الوسائل الوقائية المحفزة للاستثمار 
 
ذات 
أهمية 
 قصوى
 
هام 
 جدا
 
متوسط 
 الأهمية
 
قليل 
 الأهمية
 
 
غير 
 مؤثر 
الدخول بمشروع مشترك أو تحالف مع 
 شريك محلى أو أجنبى
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
بل دراسات جدوى جدية لعوامل المخاطرة ق
 الإستثمار فى أى مكان  
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
الإستثمارالتدريجى المتحفظ أو دخول السوق 
 تدريجيا بالإستثمارات 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
التعاقد مع مؤسسة إستشارية متخصصة 
 لإدارة إستثماراتك 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 
ات و إحترام سيادة القانون و لوائح الشرك
 التعاون للصالح العام 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
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تخصيص علاوة تأمينية تحمى من مخاطر 
 السوق (مثل مخصصات للظروف الطارئة)
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
 tluafeD tiderCمبادلة مخاطر الإئتمان
(يقوم صاحب المنشأة بشراء مبادلة  pawS
يض له مالية تضمن ان يقوم البائع بدفع تعو
 فى حالة تخلفه عن سداد ديونه 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
التغطية والتحوط ضد مخاطرالسوق 
 المستقبلية 
عن طريق التوسع بعدد من الاسواق 
 الاخرى 
 5☐ ☐4 ☐3 ☐2 ☐1 
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Academic Survey Supporting Foreign Direct Investment Climate in Egypt: The Role of Political and 
Economic institutions in promoting Foreign Direct Investments 
“Sample of Small and Medium Enterprises” 
 
This is an academic face to face and online questionnaire designed to highlight the main determinants of 
Foreign Direct investment climate in Egypt, especially during its political transition and to discover 
strategies, preferences, and factors encouraging investors to enter or hold investments in a specific market. 
The survey targets the increase of FDI inflows in Egypt and it aims at seeking alternative strategies, policies 
and approaches to help in improving the Egyptian investment climate. It helps in detecting the investor’s 
incentives and the adequate legislations in the host country’s best interest, as well as, increasing investor’s 
confidence and willingness to invest. The information contained in this survey will be subject to information 
privacy laws and is not to be used except for academic purposes and under the consent and written permission 
of interviewed enterprises. We are not to disseminate company’s information that was not publicly 
announced or published, such as the company’s profile, names, officials, financials, innovations and press 
releases. If you have any technical problems or difficulty in understanding any of the questions, please 
contact at esmat.kamel76@gmail.com. References used in the survey’s design are the following: Central 
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), CEPII paper on institutional Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investments, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 2013 and UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2014 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Enterprise Name 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
-Enterprise Code : ...........................................................☐ ☐☐☐☐☐ ☐ 
-Address: ...................................................................................  
-City .................................................................................... 
-Subsidiaries or Branches: If exists?  Yes  ☐  and How many are they  ☐ ☐☐  
-The Enterprise’s main activity ............................................  ISIC Code ☐☐☐ 
-Enterprise Activities % shares:  
Industrial ……….%  Commercial ………….%  Services……….% Others………… 
-Enterprise’s total number of employee……………………………………….. 
 
Disclaimer: Unless you have purchased this right, it is an infringement of copyright and breach of licence to use this 
document without the credit and link. 
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Kindly choose the convenient answer that matches with the information of your enterprise by ticking in the 
box in-front 
 
Part I: Information on the Enterprise: 
1- Indicate the legal structure of your enterprise. (More than one choice is acceptable)   
Sole Proprietorship   ☐ 
Corporation    ☐   
Limited Partnership Corporation ☐  
Joint Stock Company         ☐  
Limited Liability    ☐    
Subsidiary of foreign company ☐ 
Public enterprise  ☐ 
Others specify                 ☐  
 
2- Indicate the law under which your enterprise works  
 
The New law of for Authority of Urban Communities    
Law # 159 for 1981   ☐ 
Law # 293 for 1989  ☐ 
Laws # 95 for 1992  ☐ 
Law # 8 for 1997  ☐ 
Law # 83 for 2002  ☐ 
Others (specify…….)               ☐  
  
3- How are the percentages of ownership distributed in your enterprise? (More than one choice is 
acceptable)   
 
Private      less than 50% ☐  more than 50% ☐  
Local    less than 50% ☐                                more than 50% ☐  
Gulf     less than 50% ☐           more than 50% ☐  
Foreigners   less than 50% ☐                                 more than 50% ☐  
Public   less than 50% ☐                                 more than 50% ☐ 
Others specify … less than 50% ☐                                more than 50% ☐  
 
4- Identify the approximate number of subsidiaries that your enterprise owns in Egypt (More than one 
choice is acceptable) 
 
Retail Store  less than 30☐   more than 30 ☐  
Service Centre   less than 30☐   more than 30 ☐  
Sales point   less than 30☐   more than 30 ☐ 
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5- Mention the location of your headquarters world-wide (More than one choice is acceptable)  
 
West Europe    ☐ 
North America   ☐ 
East Europe    ☐ 
Asia     ☐ 
Middle East and North Africa ☐ 
Central and South Africa ☐ 
South America    ☐  
 
6- The total number of employees in your enterprise  
Less than 100 employees   ☐ 
More than 100 but less than 250 employees  ☐ 
More than 250 but less than 500 employees   ☐ 
 
7- The Main activity and sector under which your enterprise is classified (More than one choice is 
acceptable) 
Agricultural, forestry or fishing  ☐ 
Food, beverages and tobacco  ☐  
Rubber and plastics    ☐ 
Metallurgical products    ☐  
Transport equipment   ☐   
Telecommunications   ☐ 
Heavy industries   ☐ 
(cement, marvel, mining and quarrying)  
Textile and clothing    ☐ 
Leather     ☐ 
Wooden products    ☐ 
Petroleum related products  ☐  
Coke products     ☐ 
Electronics     ☐ 
Electricity, water and gas   ☐ 
Precision industries    ☐  
Trade      ☐ 
Tourism     ☐ 
Education    ☐ 
Hotels and restaurants    ☐ 
Construction     ☐ 
Other services                                          ☐ 
8- Under which category will your revenues fall? 
Annual Revenues less than 50 million Egyptian pounds       ☐  
Annual Revenues more than 50 million Egyptian Pounds     ☐  
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9- Does your enterprise have subsidiaries in others Arab countries? (More than one choice is 
acceptable) 
Morocco    ☐     
Kuwait    ☐     
United Arab Emirates   ☐ 
Egypt     ☐ 
Jordan     ☐ 
Libya     ☐  
Bahrain    ☐ 
Qatar    ☐  
Tunisia    ☐ 
Saudi Arabia    ☐  
Syria     ☐ 
Algeria    ☐ 
Djibouti    ☐ 
Iraq     ☐ 
Palestine and West Bank  ☐ 
Lebanon    ☐ 
Mauritania    ☐ 
 
10- Did your enterprise receive the ISO  9001 and ISO 14001 certificates of Quality and Management 
or others? 
Yes     ☐ 
No    ☐ 
In progress   ☐ 
I am not aware   ☐ 
 
11- Over the last two years, did your enterprise develop a new product, production line or receive any 
patent and copy right for an invention? 
Yes      ☐ 
No     ☐ 
New Product     ☐ 
Scientific investigations  ☐ 
Patent of a new product              ☐ 
I am not aware    ☐  
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Part II: Obstacles hindering Foreign Direct Investments Climate in Egypt 
 
Kindly mark the level of obstacles facing the growth of your enterprise based on the Likert graded scales 
which encompasses 5 scales as follows: 
 
No obstacle at all=1 
Minor Obstacle=2 
Normal Obstacle=3 
Considerable Obstacle=4 
Major Obstacle =5 
 
12- To what extent those factors are considered obstacles hindering your investments and operation of 
your Enterprise in Egypt over the next two years? 
Major 
Obstacle 
Considerable 
Obstacle 
Normal 
Obstacle 
Minor 
Obstacle 
No  
Obstacle 
Obstacles 
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Lack of Access to 
Finance 
(Guarantees)  
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Illegal Competition 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Restrictive 
regulations 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Bureaucratic 
procedures to 
establishment of 
enterprise 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Corruption 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ High Taxes rates 
procedures 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ High custom duties 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Limited market 
access 
(Monopoly) 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Abuse of property 
rights 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Contracts and 
disputes settlement 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Employees laws 
social security 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Access to land and its 
pricing 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Lack of Public 
Utilities 
(water, electricity 
and gas) 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Other obstacles 
(specify) 
.......................... 
 
 
13- What are your production plans and upcoming activities of your enterprise over the next two 
years? 
Increasing the production capacity    ☐ 
Holding all investments                       ☐ 
Reducing production capacity   ☐ 
I don’t know       ☐ 
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14-If you have other investments in other Arab countries and especially Arab countries in transition 
impacted by political upheavals over the last three years (Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, …); given 
the latest political disruptions in those countries, did it affect your investment plan in those 
countries? 
 
Increase Investments        ☐ 
Hold Investments               ☐  
Withdraw Investments       ☐  
I can’t clearly indicate        ☐ 
No investments        ☐  
 
 
15- Are you planning to take any new initiatives over the next coming years? 
 
Establishing a new production line                                                                                 ☐   
Expansions plan in any of the production lines and facilities  ☐  
Halts of some unprofitable products                                                                             ☐  
Expansion plan with a new local partner                                                                ☐  
Expansions plan with a new foreign partner                                                     ☐  
Diminishing production over the three coming years                         ☐  
Licensing a new product, patent or copy right.                                             ☐  
 
 
Part III: Role of Political and Economic Institutions in Determining Foreign Direct Investment 
Climate in Egypt 
 
Kindly mark the level of importance of the factors determining your incentives to invest in Egypt and the 
growth of your enterprise based on the Likert graded scale which encompasses 5 scales as follows: 
 
Significantly Important =1 
Very Important =2 
 Important = 3 
Less Important =4 
Not Important =5 
 
 
16- Select from the matrix below the most significant factors which will give you incentives to invest in  
Egypt over the next two years  
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Not 
Important 
Less 
Important  
Important Very 
Important 
Significantly 
Important  
Incentives  
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐  Facility and 
access to 
Financing  
(banking 
guarantees) 
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☒ 1 ☐ Access to Public 
infrastructure  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Less bribes  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Improving 
public 
institutions  
(custom duties)  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Stability of 
economic 
indicators 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Increasing 
credibility 
through 
investment 
regulations 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Protecting 
investors and 
property rights  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Media campaign 
to encourage 
investments  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Facilitate the 
establishment of 
new enterprises 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Transparency 
and access to 
information 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Enforcement of 
employees’ laws 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Others  
 
17- Select which of the following factors concerning political instability negatively impacts your 
investments directly (More than one choice is acceptable) 
 
Amendments in the investment law                                          ☐  
Dishonouring of contracts and withdrawal of guarantees                ☐     
Restrictions on monetary regulations of foreign currency                ☐ 
Demonstrations and riots                                         ☐ 
Loss of institutions’ credibility                                                 ☐ 
Nationalization and expropriations                                                ☐ 
Terrorism and violent acts                                                ☐ 
Wars                                      ☐ 
 
18- Do you have a full coverage security policy for your establishments? 
 
Yes, partial security for (part of my facilities) ☐ 
Full Coverage security (all facilities) ☐ 
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Not that I am aware of    ☐  
   
19- Did you need the consultancy of local or foreign investment companies to facilitate the procedures of 
registry of your establishments? 
Yes    ☐  
No    ☐ 
Not that I am aware of ☐ 
 
20- Select from the matrix below the most significant economic risks which your enterprise and investments 
could be exposed to incentives to in Egypt over the next two years  
 
Extremely Risky =1 
Very Risky =2 
Risky = 3 
Less Risky =4 
Not Risky =5 
 
 
Not Risky  Less Risky  Risky  Very Risky  Extremely 
Risky   
Economic 
Risks 
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Reducing the tax 
exemptions  
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☒ 1 ☐ Increasing 
interest rates on 
loans 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Less banking 
incentives to 
investors  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐  Inflation rate 
and rising prices 
of inputs  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Increasing social 
security pay for 
employees 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Liquidity and 
Foreign exchange 
shortage  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Sunk costs of 
establishment  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Presence of cartels 
and monopolies   
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Other risks  
 
 
 
21- Choose the most two important factors influencing the increase or decrease of employees in your 
enterprise? (More than one choice is acceptable) 
 
 
Laws and regulations concerned with employment and firing of employees          ☐       
Agreements and pressure groups from employee’s syndicates                                           ☐   
Minimum legal wages                                                                                                                                  ☐   
Presence of many guarantees and social security measures                                     ☐   
Demonstration and repeated riots of employees                                                                                   ☐   
Other factors                                                                                                                                ☐    
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22- Select from the matrix below the most essential instruments through which you can mitigate risks on 
your enterprise and investments in Egypt over the next two years  
Extremely essential =1 
Very essential =2 
essential = 3 
Less essential=4 
Not essential =5 
 
No Essential   Less Essential  Essential  Very 
Essential  
Extremely 
Essential  
Essential  
Instruments  
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Entry into joint 
partnerships with 
other investors  
5 ☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☒ 1 ☐ Accurate 
feasibility studies 
for risks 
assessment  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Gradual 
conservative 
investment 
strategy  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Hiring 
Investments 
Portfolio 
management  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Respecting 
investment laws 
and regulations  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Provisions for 
extraordinary 
circumstances  
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Credit Default 
Swap 162 
5☐ 4 ☐ 3☐ 2 ☐ 1 ☐ Horizontal 
diversification in 
other markets and 
countries  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
162 Credit Default Swap: It is a type of financial security instrument providing the buyer of the contract who 
owns the underlying credit with protection against default in return the seller of the contract assumes the credit 
risk that the buyer does not wish to shoulder in exchange for a periodic protection fee similar to insurance 
premium 
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Appendix of Chapter 4: 
 
Table 4.14: In-depth interview excerpts to detect quality of economic and political institutions on FDI flows in 
Egypt  
Respondents Sector Insure Invest. 
Obstacles in 
Egypt 
Invest. 
incentives 
Egypt 
Quality 
Political 
Institutio
ns 
Quality 
economic 
institutions 
Invest. 
Tools to 
mitigate 
risk  
Respondent 
1  
Agri. 
Business  
Full  -Difficulty in 
obtaining license for 
a new project  
 
-Infrastructure  
Expanding ports 
capacity 
-Custom 
authorities 
 
-Registry  
procedures for 
start-ups  
 
-Macroeconomic 
stability 
-Political 
turmoil 
triggered 
currency 
crisis  
- Currency crisis  
 
-Higher prices 
of food & fuel 
imports 
-Partnerships 
 
-Conservative 
investments 
 
-Investment 
Consultancy 
services  
 
-Horizontal 
expansion 
Respondent 
2 
Agri. 
Business   
Full - Supply chain 
infrastructure  
 
-Proper storage & 
transport. 
 
-Growth of retail 
sector. 
 
- Mechanization 
knowhow and R&D 
to increase 
productivity 
  
-Organization & 
consolidation of 
farmers  
-Custom 
authorities  
-Stability of 
economic 
indicators FX 
- Credibility 
& 
transparency 
government’s 
decisions  
- Holistic 
approach of 
financing to 
agribusiness  
Producers  
-Conservative 
investments 
  
-Investment 
Consultancy 
services  
 
Respondent 
3 
Petro 
Chemicals 
Full     -  Breach of 
contracts 
  
-Dropping exports 
due to government 
shifting to domestic 
supply  
- Access to 
finance  
 
- Employees laws  
 
-custom duties 
  
-Macroeconomic 
stability  
-Less exports 
& lower 
prices  
-Government 
withholding 
payments to oil & 
gas producers  
-Investment 
Consultancy 
services  
 
-Conservative 
investments 
  
 
Respondent 
4 
Chemicals  Full  -Shortage of energy 
supplies 
  
 
-Access to 
finance  
-Property rights 
& intellectual 
rights  
 
-Less start- up 
costs and 
procedures  
 
-Efficient 
institutions & 
custom 
authorities  
- Government 
gaining 
credibility 
during 2015 
- High Tax rates  
 
- Energy 
Shortage & 
higher costs 
 
-Exchange rate 
fluctuations 
 
 
 
 
-Partnerships 
 
-Conservative 
investments 
  
-Investment 
Consultancy 
services  
 
-Credit 
Default swap 
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Respondent 
5 
Pharma. Full - Illegal and unfair 
competition 
between pharmas. 
 
-Protection of 
intellectual property 
rights  
 
 
-Access to 
finance  
 
-Taxes  
-FX fluctuations  
 
-Custom 
authorities  
 
-Illegal 
competition  
 
-Price distortions 
& health 
insurance  
- Violent acts 
disrupting 
production  
-Taxes  
- Increasing 
interest rates on 
banking 
facilities  
 
- Access to 
finance  
 
-start-up costs 
& new licenses  
 
-Protection of 
intellectual 
property rights  
- Partnerships  
 
-Conservative 
gradual 
investments  
-Horizontal 
diversification 
Respondent 
6 
Pharma. Full  - Low prices of 
pharma. Products  
 
-Registry license for 
new medicine takes 
up to 3 years  
 
-Protection of 
intellectual rights  
 
- Patents laws not 
enforced  
 
-Distortion in prices 
of medication  
 
-Counterfeit in 
active ingredients   
- Raising 
medication prices 
by less than 10 
EGP at a higher 
quality 
 
-Tighter 
supervision to 
enforce patent 
law 
 
-Insurance system 
re-designed    
- 20% Fall in 
sales  
 
- Devaluation 
of Egyptian 
pound and 
higher FX 
 
-Shortage   of 
some drugs  
 
- Shortage in 
raw materials 
 
-90% 
collateral to 
be paid in 
case of 
importing the 
active 
ingredients  
- Impossible 
Access to 
finance  
 
- Patent 
enforcement  
 
-Stability of FX 
prices for 
imports of raw 
material  
 
-Price distortion 
due to failure of 
health care 
system 
- Partnerships  
 
-Conservative 
gradual 
investments  
 
-Horizontal 
diversification 
Respondent 
7 
Auto. Partial  Contracts and 
dispute settlement 
laws 
  
- Increasing 
paperwork & startup 
costs for investors 
 
-Access to finance  
- Efficiency of 
custom 
authorities & 
schedules  
 
- Rigidity of 
taxation laws, 
double taxation  
 
-Increase in the 
conversion to FX 
- Breach of 
contracts  
 
–Less 
banking 
guarantees 
-Macroeconomic 
stability is 
dispensable  
- Risk 
insurance 
premium  
 
-Credit 
default swap  
 
-Gradual 
investments  
Respondent 
8 
Auto.  Full  -lower custom 
duties due to PTA 
and agreements for 
European cars only 
 
-Inflation  
 
-Devaluation of 
pound & increasing 
FX 
 
-Access to 
finance  
 
-Less taxes  
 
-More flexibility 
of custom 
authorities  
 
-Lower cost for 
start-ups 
 
 
-Amendments 
of investment 
law 
 
-Decline in 
tourism 
affected their 
microbus 
sales  
 
-Regulatory 
laws for the 
industry  
-Lower taxes  
 
-Increasing 
imports costs 
through customs  
 
-Higher prices 
of assembly 
inputs  
 
-Liquidity & 
increasing FX 
prices  
- Partnerships  
 
-Conservative 
gradual 
investments  
 
-Investment 
consultancy 
services  
 
-Horizontal 
diversification 
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Respondent 
9 
Heavy 
indus. 
Full  - Debt rescheduling 
& liabilities when 
buying out the 
factory  
 
-International 
arbitration & 
dispute settlement 
with world banks  
 
-  
-Labor laws and 
their enforcement  
 
-Lower prices for 
factors of 
production  
 
-Energy sources  
 
-Maximize 
cement prices 
despite lower 
volumes  
 
-Switch to pet-
coke  
 
-Increase 
energy prices  
 
-Higher 
wages for 
employees  
 
-Increasing 
prices of 
production 
inputs  
-Reduction of 
energy subsidies  
 
-Unstable 
supply of 
electricity  
 
-Double taxation 
problem  
 
-Macro 
economic 
stability 
 
-Market 
adjustments  
-Conservative 
investment  
 
- Investment 
risk premium  
 
- Horizontal 
expansion  
Respondent 
10 
Heavy 
Duty 
Machinery  
Full  -Custom duties 
 
-Rigidity of 
investment law 
 
- Bureaucratic 
paperwork to start 
operations 
-Transparency of 
information 
 
-More efficient 
custom 
authorities  
 
-lower start-up 
costs  
- Credibility 
& 
government 
commitment 
to contracts  
Macro 
economic stability 
 
-Protection of 
intellectual 
property rights  
 
-Taxation & 
custom system  
- Partnerships  
 
-Conservative 
gradual 
investments  
 
-Insurance 
risk premium 
Respondent 
11 
Consumer 
goods 
Full  -Increasing of 
bureaucratic paper 
work 
 
 - Rigidity of 
investment & 
commercial laws  
 
-Breach of contracts 
& dispute settlement  
- Access to 
finance &banking 
facilities  
 
-  Investors 
guarantees   
 
-Efficiency of 
custom 
authorities  
 
-Dispute 
settlements & 
contracts 
enforcement   
 
-Access to 
infrastructure  
-Credibility & 
confidence 
returning to 
Egyptian 
market  
-Currency 
fluctuation of 
FX against 
Egyptian pound 
 
-Inflation  
- Opening in 
new markets 
& horizontal 
expansion  
Respondent 
12 
Electronics 
and energy 
Full  - Limited market 
opportunities due to 
illegal competition  
 
-rigidity of 
investment laws and  
 
- tax rates and their 
procedure 
- Access to 
finance  
 
-Customs & taxes 
efficiency  
 
-Contracts 
enforcement  
- Return of 
investors’ 
confidence  
 
-Improvement 
of investment 
climate  
- Presence & 
access to a 
strong 
infrastructure  
 
-Regulating 
energy prices  
Partnerships  
 
-Conservative 
gradual 
investments  
 
-Insurance 
risk premium 
Source: Excerpts and Transcription of 12-Indepth interviews was first performed manually  
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5.1 Final Remarks, Policy Implications and Future Extensions 
 
There is no doubt that the MENA region has embarked on many challenges deterring its integration 
efforts from reaching acceptable levels when compared to other regions. Accordingly, the motivation 
behind this Doctoral Thesis emerged from the need to analyse three main objectives that are believed 
to have eminent policy implications on the acceleration of MENA region’s trade flows and 
enhancement of its investment climate. i)consider how higher intra-regional trade flows among 
MENA countries could be attained; once we control for the impact of governance on trade regimes 
ii) Second objective is to shed light on the extent to which the Agadir Association agreement has 
fostered inter-regional sectoral trade flows between Agadir countries and E.U.  As well to detect the 
variation in the composition and structure of final versus intermediate sector specific export flows 
for Agadir countries, once Pan-Euro Diagonal Rules of Origin are adopted iii) to analyse the expected 
fragility of MENA countries’ institutions and how this affected FDI climate after the 2011 incidents, 
through an original qualitative dataset on FDIs in Egypt. The thesis includes two empirical articles 
addressing the estimation of intra-regional and inter-regional flows in MENA by means of a gravity 
equation. In addition, to an original qualitative dataset on FDI’s companies gathered through a 
questionnaire, which was conducted after the 2011 turmoil in Egypt. 
5.1 From a methodological point of view the main contributions are: 
 
i. An adaption of the methodology capturing the impact of governance, regime changes through (Polity 
IV), and trade restrictiveness variables (Trade Freeness) on intra-regional trade flows; as previously 
motivated by the literature for other regions. Our estimations added a new dimension in the empirical 
literature for the MENA region by suggesting that mixed regimes and trade free countries, tend to 
increase MENA’s intra-regional trade flow intensity. 
 
ii. The interaction between both regime governance variables and trade freeness variables by 
considering their different thresholds to obtain more rigorous results on the impact of both variables 
on intra-regional trade intensity between MENA countries. 
 
iii. The elaboration of a methodology combining between the gravity equation and impact evaluation of 
trade policy through Difference in Differences for Agadir Agreements sector specific flows with E.U. 
This was done through estimating inter-regional sectoral trade export flows between Agadir countries 
to the E.U. and in parallel modelling the adoption of Pan-Euro RoO 
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iv. The specification of a refined dataset on sectoral flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. to include Pan-
Euro regime wide RoO, most favoured nation tariff (MFN) and breakdown of regional versus local 
value-added content.  
 
v. The conduction of an original qualitative questionnaire gathering data on FDI in Egypt after the 2011 
incidents. In addition to the conversion of qualitative codes into statistical data to be introduced into 
the logistic regression estimations. 
 
vi. Reinvigorating the theoretical discussion on the permissiveness of regime wide RoO; given that they 
allow diagonal cumulation, when applied in the context of Association Agreements like Agadir 
countries. We propose that relaxation of the regional value content, allowed for Agadir countries to 
assimilate their inputs more efficiently from outside of RoO members instead of being bound only to 
European partners. This led to an upgrade in the composition, structure and value added of inter-
regional export flows between Agadir_4 and E.U. This theoretical framework could be extended to 
test for Agadir inter-regional trade flows with other Pan-Euro diagonal RoO members in (RoW) like 
China or United States. As well it could include other aspects of product specific RoO to test their 
restrictiveness on the intensity of trade flows. 
5.2 Regarding the main findings from the descriptive and econometric perspective, we 
can conclude that:  
 
- The similarity between governance of both trading partners; given that both trading partners in 
MENA are democratic, does not necessarily guarantee higher intra-regional trade intensity between 
them. We assigned polity IV dummies to MENA countries based on three thresholds to re-classify 
countries into (Polity_demo, Polity_Mixed and Polity, Autoc).  We found that, Polity_Demo variable 
has not shown any significance and reversed to a negative sign for intra-MENA at a factor of 0.89 
[exp (-0.115)-1]. We obtained significant results on the Polity_mixed that indicated, that trading 
between mixed regimes of MENA countries would raise intra-MENA trade by 42 percent.  
 
- Remarkable results were driven for the trade freeness variable within all its categories (Trade_free, 
Trade_mfree and Trade_unfree) in affecting MENA intra-regional flows; whether MENA countries 
are democratic or mixed regimes. More interesting was the interaction between both Polity_Mixed 
and Trade_Free variables together, which yielded a 104 percent increase in MENA’s Intra_regional 
trade flows. 
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- The insignificance of border-effects across all estimations except for the 3rd scenario, when Trade-
freeness variable was introduced, called our attention to how this border variable could be considered 
a “Pandora Box” to the region; especially in light of the on-going tensions and conflicts between its 
countries. 
 
- The cluster analysis for inter-regional trade flows between Agadir 4 and E.U. identified an increase 
in the export flows of the following three following cluster of sectors: Cluster 1, classified as 
petrochemicals, Cluster 2: consumer non-durables and finally Cluster 3 under which falls all 
machinery spare parts and components. 
  
- Across all estimations and robustness checks of descriptive and cluster analysis, PPML estimations 
and treatment with DID approach, results maintained consistency for petrochemicals (Other and 
industrial chemicals) and machinery spare parts. 
 
- The adoption of Pan-Euro RoO, between Agadir_ and the E.U., induced growth of regional value- 
added content and allowed permissiveness and sourcing of inputs at more efficient costs. This created 
an incentive for Pan-Euro applicants to implement RoO and led to the emergence of intermediate 
flows for sectors like: Rubber products growing at 48 times more after the adoption of Pan-Euro RoO 
between Agadir_4 and E.U. 
 
- After conducing, a principal component analysis to reduce the number of variables determining 
investment climate in Egypt, three Principal Components were obtained First component included all 
variables determining protection of investors property rights; especially for minority investor’s rights 
under political instability and transition.  The second component included fiscal and regulatory and 
paper work incentives given to investors. Finally, the third component covered all aspects of 
macroeconomic stability in Egypt such as inflation and FX currency regulation. 
  
- Almost 70 percent of in-depth interview respondents in Egypt preferred a ̔ Wait and Hold’ Approach 
or to maintain their ongoing investment status rather than expand their investments; especially after 
the 2011 revolts and during the transition. 
 
-  Foreign investors, when considering the investment climate in Egypt were mainly concerned with 
the time frame in which they can register their investments and how their taxation system will be 
dealt with and this in turn caused 73 percent of variability in the behavior between foreign and 
domestic FDIs’  
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5.3 Given that the Doctoral Thesis had achieved some contributions with respect to 
MENA region by giving a diagnostic approach over MENA Region’s trade flows, it had 
the following limitation that we wish to proceed with resolving beyond to improve the 
results: 
 
i) Our data set for Intra-regional trade flows for MENA countries could be extended to capture the 
impact of governance and regime changing variables on inter-regional trade flow; which could be 
quite complex and would require extensive work and econometric manoeuvring to obtain further 
breakdown of (RoW) into categories of trading partners with the MENA region. It could also suggest 
more sophisticated results that justify the robustness of the ones obtained for intra-MENA trade. 
  
ii) The availability of data on the detailed breakdown of product specific RoO by chapters, chapter 
headings and sub-headings components of trade in products between Agadir_4 countries and E.U, to 
be estimated in the model.  This would shed light on the restrictiveness of product RoO and would 
demonstrate, if a countervailing effect exist between Product restrictive RoO and Pan-Euro Regime 
wide RoO, thus washing out the effective impact of RoO. 
5.4 Future Research Agenda  
The Doctoral thesis could more flexibly accommodate to a fully-fledged future research agenda, 
targeting to increase trade intensity and value-added content and enhance the complexity of the 
Region’s trade flows and in parallel improve FDI climate for MENA countries to include but not to 
be limited to the following lines of research:  
 
- Detecting the impact of governance and similarity between MENA countries regimes and their 
trading partners for other region as (RoW) on trade flows intensities between MENA and world 
trading partners. This topic could be methodologically challenged by ‘Gravity of Institution’ 
 
- Investigating the neighbourhood effect between MENA countries, in light of the on-going political 
tensions and conflicts the region is exposed to.  This might leave the door open in front of all the 
possibilities regarding how Border variable will respond, when introduced to MENA region 
estimations.  
 
- The in-depth analysis of product specific and regime wide RoO of MENA countries and their impact 
on sector specific imports of MENA countries, adapted in the context of the gravity equation. The 
modelling exercise could be repeated by using Difference in Difference approach and Propensity 
Score matching approaches 
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- Looking at intra-FDI flows and multinational flows between MENA countries, which by all means 
will, be considered the new trend of trading between countries.  
 
- It is inevitable the MENA countries services trade represented 50 percent of their respective countries 
GDPs during 2015. Accordingly, services trade flows differentiated by sectors would be critical to 
boost the Region’s trade intensity at this point. This will be challenged through a gravity equation of 
sector specific services flows across MENA countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
5.1Final Remarks, Policy Implications and Future Extensions  
  
197 
 
 
5.1 Observaciones finales, implicaciones políticas y futuras ampliaciones 
 
No hay duda de que la región MENA se enfrenta a muchos desafíos que impiden sus esfuerzos de integración 
por alcanzar niveles aceptables en comparación con otras regiones. En consecuencia, la motivación de esta 
tesis doctoral surgió de la necesidad de analizar tres objetivos principales que se cree que tienen implicaciones 
políticas eminentes en la aceleración de los flujos de comercio de la región de MENA y la mejora de su clima 
de inversión: I) considerar la forma en que se podrían alcanzar las mayores corrientes comerciales Intra-
regionales entre los países de la región MENA; Una vez que controlemos el impacto de la gobernanza sobre 
los regímenes comerciales. II) El segundo objetivo es arrojar luz sobre la medida en que el Acuerdo de 
Asociación de Agadir ha fomentado los flujos sectoriales interregionales entre los países de Agadir y la UE. 
Así como para detectar la variación en la composición y estructura de los flujos de exportación específicos 
del sector final hacia los países de Agadir, una vez adoptadas las Reglas de Origen Diagonal Pan-Euro. III) 
analizar la fragilidad esperada de las instituciones de los países de MENA y saber cómo afectó al clima del 
IED después de los incidentes de 2011, a través de un conjunto de datos cualitativos originales sobre las IED 
en Egipto. La tesis incluye dos artículos empíricos que abordan la estimación de los flujos intrarregionales e 
interregionales en la región de MENA mediante una ecuación de gravedad. Además, un conjunto de datos 
cualitativos originales sobre las empresas de la IED se reunió a través de un cuestionario, que se llevó a cabo 
después de la turbulencia de 2011 en Egipto. 
 
5.1 Desde el punto de vista metodológico, las principales contribuciones son: 
 
i. Una adaptación de la metodología que capta el impacto de gobernanza, los cambios de régimen a través de 
(Polity IV) y los variables de restricción comercial (Trade Freeness) sobre los flujos de comercio 
intrarregionales; como previamente ha sido motivado por la literatura para otras regiones. Nuestras 
estimaciones añadieron una nueva dimensión en la literatura empírica para la región de MENA al sugerir que 
los regímenes mixtos y los países de libre comercio se inclinan a incrementar el comercio intra-regional de 
MENA. 
 
ii. La interacción entre los variables de gobernabilidad del régimen y los variables de la libertad comercial, 
teniendo en cuenta sus diferentes umbrales, con el fin de obtener resultados más rigurosos sobre el impacto 
de ambos variables sobre la intensidad comercial intra-regional entre los países de MENA. 
 
iii. La elaboración de una metodología que combine la ecuación de gravedad y la evaluación del impacto de 
la política comercial a través de la Diferencia de Diferencias para los Acuerdos de Agadir. Esto se hizo a 
través de la estimación de los flujos interregionales de exportaciones comerciales sectoriales entre los países 
de Agadir hacia la UE, y en paralelo modelar la adopción del Pan- Euro RoO. 
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iv. La especificación de un conjunto de datos refinado sobre flujos sectoriales entre Agadir_4 y U.E para 
incluir el RoO amplio del Régimen Pan-Euro, la tarifa de nación más favorecida (NMF) y el desglose del 
contenido de valor añadido regional versus local. 
 
v. La realización de un cuestionario cualitativo original que recogiera datos sobre la IED en Egipto después 
de los incidentes de 2011, además de la conversión de los códigos cualitativos en datos estadísticos que se 
introducirán en las estimaciones de regresión logística. 
 
vi. Revitalizar la discusión teórica sobre la permisividad del RoO de régimen amplio; dado que permiten la 
acumulación diagonal, cuando se aplican en el marco de acuerdos de asociación como los de Agadir. 
Supongamos que la relajación del contenido de valor regional permitió a los países de Agadir asimilar sus 
aportaciones de forma más eficiente de fuera de los miembros de la RoO en lugar de estar vinculados sólo a 
los socios europeos. Esto llevó a una mejora en la composición, estructura y al valor añadido de los flujos de 
exportación interregionales entre Agadir4 y UE. Este marco teórico podría ampliarse para probar los flujos 
comerciales interregionales de Agadir con otros miembros de Pan-Euro diagonal RoO (RoW) como China o 
Estados Unidos. 
 
5.2 En cuanto a los principales resultados de la perspectiva descriptiva y econométrica, podemos 
concluir que: 
 
- La similitud entre la gobernanza de ambos socios comerciales; dado que ambos socios comerciales en la región 
MENA son democráticos, no garantiza necesariamente la mayor intensidad comercial  intrarregional entre ellos. 
Hemos asignado a los dummies de la polity IV a los países MENA basados en tres umbrales para volver a 
clasificar los países en (Polity_demo, Polity_Mixed y Polity, Autoc). Se encontró que, Polity_Demo variable 
no ha mostrado ninguna significación y se ha invertido a un signo negativo para intra-MENA en un factor de 
0.89 [exp (-0.115) -1]. Obtuvimos resultados significativos en el Polity_mixed que indicaba que el comercio 
entre regímenes mixtos de los países MENA aumentaría el comercio intra-MENA en un 42 por ciento. 
 
- Se registraron resultados notables en la variación de la libertad comercial en todas sus categorías (Trade_free, 
Trade_mfree y Trade_unfree) al afectar los flujos intrarregionales de MENA, si los países de MENA son 
regímenes democráticos o mixtos. Más interesante fue la interacción entre los variables de Polity_Mixed y 
Trade_Free, lo que produjo un aumento del 104% en los flujos de comercio intra-regional de MENA. 
 
- La insignificancia de los efectos fronterizos en todas las estimaciones, excepto en el tercer escenario cuando 
se introdujo el variable Trade-Freeness, llamó nuestra atención a cómo esta variable de frontera podría ser una 
"Caja de Pandora" para la región; especialmente a la luz de las tensiones y conflictos en curso entre sus fronteras. 
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- El análisis por grupos de los flujos comerciales interregionales entre Agadir 4 y U.E identificó un aumento en 
los flujos de exportación de los tres siguientes grupos de sectores: Clúster 1, clasificado como petroquímica, 
Clúster 2: consumidor no duradero y finalmente Clúster 3 bajo el cual  caen  todas las piezas y componentes de 
maquinaria. 
 
- A través de todas las estimaciones y comprobaciones de robustez del análisis descriptivo y de conglomerados, 
las estimaciones de PPML y el tratamiento con enfoque DID, los resultados mantuvieron la consistencia para 
petroquímicos (Otros productos químicos industriales) y repuestos de maquinaria. 
 
- La adopción de Pan-Euro RoO, entre Agadir y la UE, indujo el crecimiento del contenido regional de valor 
agregado y permitió el permiso y la obtención de insumos a costos más eficientes. Esto creó un incentivo para 
que los solicitantes Pan-Euro implementaran RoO y condujeron a la aparición de flujos intermedios para 
sectores como: productos de caucho y goma crecer 48 veces más después de la adopción de Pan-Euro RoO 
entre Agadir_4 y UE . 
 
- Después de realizar un análisis de componentes principales para reducir el número de variables que determinan 
el clima de inversión en Egipto, se obtuvieron tres componentes principales, el primer componente incluyó 
todas las variables que determinan la protección de los derechos de propiedad de los inversores; especialmente 
para los derechos de los inversionistas minoritarios bajo inestabilidades políticas y transición. El segundo 
componente incluía incentivos fiscales y reglamentarios y papel para los inversores. Por último, el tercer 
componente abarcó todos los aspectos de la estabilidad macroeconómica en Egipto, como la inflación y la 
regulación de cambio de divisas. 
 
- Casi el 70 por ciento de los encuestados entrevistados en profundidad en Egipto prefirieron un "enfoque de 
espera y vigilancia" o mantener su estado actual de inversión en lugar de ampliar sus inversiones; especialmente 
después de las revueltas de 2011 y durante la transición. 
 
- Los inversores extranjeros, al considerar el clima de inversión en Egipto, se ocuparon principalmente del plazo 
en el que puedan registrar sus inversiones y de cómo se tratará su sistema fiscal, lo que a su vez provocó un 73 
por ciento de la variabilidad en el comportamiento.  
 
5.3 La tesis doctoral había conseguido algunas contribuciones con respecto a la región de MENA 
que daba un diagnóstico sobre los flujos comerciales de la Región MENA, pero tenía las 
siguientes limitaciones que deseamos seguir más adelante para mejorar los resultados: 
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i) Se podría extender nuestro conjunto de datos sobre los flujos comerciales intra-regionales para los países de 
la región MENA para captar el impacto de las variables de gobernanza y de cambio de régimen en los flujos 
comerciales interregionales; que podría ser bastante complejo y requeriría un trabajo extensivo y maniobras 
econométricas para obtener una mayor desagregación de (RoW) en categorías de socios comerciales con la 
región MENA. También podría sugerir resultados más sofisticados que justifiquen la robustez de los obtenidos 
para el comercio intra-MENA. 
  
ii) La disponibilidad de datos sobre el desglose detallado de los RoO específicos de los productos por capítulos, 
títulos de capítulos y subtítulos, componentes del comercio de productos entre los países de Agadir4 y UE , que 
se estima en el modelo. Esto arrojaría luz sobre el carácter restrictivo de las RoO de productos y demostraría, 
si existe un efecto compensatorio entre el RoO restrictivo del producto y el RoO Pan-Euro Régime, eliminando 
así el buen impacto de las RoO. 
 
5.4 Programa de Investigación Futuro 
La tesis doctoral podría acomodarse de manera más flexible a una agenda de investigación futura, dirigida a 
aumentar la intensidad comercial y el contenido de valor añadido y aumentar la complejidad de los flujos 
comerciales de la región, y en paralelo mejorar el clima para las IED en los países MENA, sin limitarse a las 
siguientes líneas de investigación: 
 
- Detectar el impacto de la gobernanza y la similitud entre los regímenes de los países de la región MENA y 
sus socios comerciales en otras regiones como, (RoW) sobre las intensidades de los flujos comerciales entre 
MENA y otros. Este tema podría ser cuestionado metodológicamente por "Gravedad de la Institución". 
 
- Investigar el efecto de vecindad entre los países de la región MENA, a la luz de las tensiones políticas y 
conflictos en curso en la región. Podría abrir todas las posibilidades sobre cómo responderá la variable Border, 
cuando se introduzca en las estimaciones de la región MENA. 
 
- El análisis en profundidad de los RoO específicos de cada producto y del régimen de los países MENA y su 
impacto sobre las importaciones sectoriales específicas de los países MENA, adaptado en el contexto de la 
ecuación de gravedad. El ejercicio d e  modelado podría repetirse utilizando el enfoque Difference in Difference 
y Propensity Score . 
 
- Mirando los flujos intra-IED y los flujos multinacionales entre los países MENA, que por supuesto serán 
considerados como la nueva tendencia de comercio entre países. 
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- Es inevitable que el comercio de servicios de los países de MENA represente el 50 por ciento del PIB de sus 
respectivos países durante 2015. Por consiguiente, los flujos comerciales de servicios diferenciados por sectores 
serían críticos para aumentar la intensidad comercial de la región en este punto. Esto será cuestionado a través 
de una ecuación de gravedad de los flujos de servicios específicos del sector en los países de la región MENA. 
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